- PhD, Syracuse University
- BA, Muhlenberg College
- Specialties: Ethics and Metaethics
- Competencies: Metaphysics, Philosophy of Mind, Early Modern, Political Philosophy
- Ruling Out Solutions to Prior's Dilemma for Hume's Law - Thought, vol. 9, no. 2: 84–93
- Reviving Concurrentism about Death - (2018) Journal of Value Inquiry, vol. 52, no. 2: 179–185
- Giving Up Hume’s Guillotine - (2015) Australasian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 93, no. 1: 109–125
(Titles altered for blind review)
The One About Reasons and Causal Exclusion
Many philosophers think goodness doesn't give normative reasons because the properties that make things good are sufficient on their own to generate all the reasons we have. I argue against this by showing that this way of excluding goodness leads to a regress where reasons are systematically alienating, and which may prevent them from existing.
The One About Normative and Motivating Reasons
It's a common thought that nothing is a normative reason unless it can be a motivating reason. This is a variation of the doctrine that ought implies can. But like OIC, there are many objections to the idea of reasons as possible motivators. I propose and defend a version of it against counterexamples while remaining neutral on the harder questions about reasons: perspectivalism, rationalism, and existence internalism.
- Contemporary Political Philosophy
- Introduction to Philosophical Problems
- Challenges of Modernity