Aaron Wolf

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Aaron Wolf

Visiting Assistant Professor in Philosophy

Department/Office Information

Philosophy
103 Hascall Hall
  • PhD, Syracuse University 
  • BA, Muhlenberg College 
  • Specialties: Ethics and Metaethics
  • Competencies: Metaphysics, Philosophy of Mind, Early Modern, Political Philosophy

CV

(Titles altered for blind review)

The One About Normative and Motivating Reasons

It's a common thought that nothing is a normative reason unless it can be a motivating reason. This is a variation of the doctrine that ought implies can. But like OIC, there are many objections to the idea of reasons as possible motivators. I propose and defend a version of it against counterexamples while remaining neutral on the harder questions about reasons: perspectivalism, rationalism, and existence internalism.

The One About Normative and Descriptive Terms in Inferences

In the last 30 years, discussion of the Humean "no ought from is" thesis has coalesced around the idea of proving theorems to the effect that normative sentences can never be properly inferred from descriptive ones. But each existing theorem comes with significant costs, and what they all have in common is that they need to cleanly sort sentences into different types. But what if sentence-level categories are the source of the problem? I explore the possibility that we can make sense of "no ought from is" just by talking about terms and remaining agnostic about sentences. 

  • Modern Philosophy
  • Contemporary Political Philosophy
  • Ethics
  • Introduction to Philosophical Problems
  • Challenges of Modernity