My recent work in philosophy of mind has focused on how to distinguish delusions from false beliefs, and argued that it is sometimes genuinely indeterminate what beliefs or desires a person has. In my current project, I’m examining different ways tacit bias can affect perceptual experience. I’m also exploring whether we could count someone as responsible for experiences whose contents she rejects, as we sometimes hold someone responsible for a desire even when she acknowledges that she doesn’t approve of it herself.
That current project overlaps with moral psychology. Earlier work (on expression and silencing) dug into the territory shared by philosophy of language and philosophy of mind. I continue to be curious about how much of our mental activity — including our perceptual experiences — we manage to express in language, and how much one's physical and social location can affect not only what one can know, but what one can think. I'm also curious about whether we can do justice to the richness of our interactions with young children (and adults who never learn to speak) while still thinking of linguistic content as a good model for mental content.