Ben Lennertz

BA, Vassar College
PhD, University of Southern California

Philosophy of Language, Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind (especially their intersection)

Logic, Early Modern Philosophy, Metaethics, Philosophy of Religion

• “Uncertainty and Intention.” (forthcoming). Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy.
• “Credences are Beliefs about Probabilities: A Defense from Triviality.” (forthcoming). Erkenntnis.
• “Imprecise Credences and Acceptance.” (2022), Ergo, 9(8).
• “Quantificational Attitudes.” (2021), The Journal of Philosophy, 118(11), 585-613.
• “Probabilistic Antecedents and Conditional Attitudes.” (2021), Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 51(1), 62-79.
• “Noncognitivism and the Frege-Geach Problem in Formal Epistemology.” (2021), Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 102(1), 184-208.
• “Linguistic Disobedience.” (2020), Philosophers' Imprint, 20(21), 1-16. (with David Miguel Gray)
• “What Might But Must Not Be.” (2020), Analysis, 80(4), 647-656. (with Stephen Finlay)
• “Evaluating the Multiple Proposition Strategy” (2020), Ratio, 33(3), 163-172.
• “Might-beliefs and Asymmetric Disagreement.” (2019), Synthese, 196(11), 4775-4805.
• “Probabilistic Consistency Norms and Quantificational Credences.” (2017), Synthese, 194(6), 2101-2119.
• “A Dutch Book Theorem for Quantificational Credences.” (2017), Ergo, 4(2), 27-59.
• “Quantificational Credences.” (2015), Philosophers’ Imprint, 15(9), 1-24.
• “Simple Contextualism about Epistemic Modals is Incorrect.” (2014), Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, 3(4), 252-262.
• “Taking ‘Might’-Communication Seriously.” (2014), Analytic Philosophy, 55(2), 176-198.

• Introduction to Philosophical Problems
• Introduction to Philosophical Traditions of Africa, the Americas, and Asia
• Challenges of Modernity
• Logic
• Modern Philosophy
• Philosophy of Language
• Contemporary Epistemology
• Philosophy of Mind
• Philosophy of Religion
• Rationality in an Uncertain World
• Skepticism about Knowledge of External World