Desire and impulse in Epictetus and the Older Stoics

1. Introduction

This paper challenges a supposition that has guided several recent, agenda-setting interpretations of Stoic moral psychology. It is that Epictetus uses the terms orexis and hormê in a way that differs widely from their use by the older Stoics. A preliminary aim of the paper is to explain how this assumption came about and show that it is mistaken. The main aim is to show that, once this assumption is abandoned, some of the central elements of Stoic moral psychology can be seen to fit together in a way that has not yet been appreciated, and which provides a more coherent and plausible account of motivation than the currently standard interpretation ascribes to the Stoics. I will argue that for the Stoics intentional action is in each instance the product of two kinds of cognition: a value ascription that attributes goodness or badness to some object, conceiving of its possession as beneficial or harmful to the agent, and a judgment that a specific action is appropriate in view of this value ascription. Orexis is the Stoic term for the value ascriptions and dispositional beliefs about goodness that supply the motivational backing for specific actions. Hormê—in one of its senses—is the Stoic term for the narrowly motivating judgment about what is appropriate in light of these beliefs. A hormê, we might say, is orexis issuing in action. The same applies, mutatis mutandis, to ekklisis and aphormê.  

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2 Though not in one way that might seem natural, as I explain below: it is not that orexis issues in hormê and ekklisis in aphormê. Rather it appears that orexis may underwrite both kinds of occurrent impulse, and so may ekklisis. That hormê and aphormê (in what I will call their narrow or specific sense) cut across orexis and ekklisis in this way can be seen, for instance, from Epictetus’ remark at Ench. 2: the progressor is told to suspend orexis and employ ekklisis together with hormê and aphormê. Cf. Diss. 1.4.1-2, 3.13.21, 3.22.13, and Epictetus fr. 27 apud Marcus 11.37.1.
This revised understanding of the Stoic theory has two important consequences. It shows, in the first place, that the theory of motivation developed by the older Stoics had more psychological depth than commentators have regularly supposed: in particular, that it makes room for the kind of basic evaluative beliefs that are essential to any plausible analysis of intentional action. Within the Stoics’ cognitive theory of motivation, these beliefs have the role of dispositional desires, and they function rather like the major premise in an Aristotelian syllogism, informing the particular judgments that are a more immediate cause of the agent’s actions. Second, this account provides an important alternative to the prevailing interpretation of Stoic moral psychology, according to which a *kathēkon* judgment may explain action without reference to further motivating attitudes, or by reference to ascriptions of selective value rather than predications of goodness. I think this interpretation is based on a misreading of the evidence, and that the Stoics instead accept a view according to which the attitudes of *orexis* and *ekklisis* are essential to any complete analysis of action. These forms of cognition comprise an agent’s conceptions of what is good and bad, and they determine and explain the *kathēkon* judgments that prompt specific motions of the soul. The interpretation I will develop confirms Michael Frede’s judgment that, according to Stoic theory, “it is only because we judge certain things to be good that we are motivated to act”.

Because I propose to show this by comparing Epictetus’ use of *orexis* and *hormê* with their use in our doxographies of older Stoic views, it may be helpful to begin with a brief general observation about Epictetus’ relation to the older Stoics. As any reader of Epictetus will recognize, the *Discourses* transmitted to us by Arrian have the flavor of informal discussions. They are perhaps closer in style to ordinary conversation than any other Greek text that survives from late antiquity, and they seem to be loose transcripts not of the formal lectures offered in Epictetus’ school at Nicopolis but of less formal discussions, perhaps of conversations that took place after formal study was concluded.

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3 Developed especially in Inwood 1985 and (more explicitly) in Brennan 2003 and Brennan 2014. In fact the literature is not consistent on this point, as I note below. It sometimes appears to treat *kathēkon* judgments as complete motivating states in their own right—*per se* motivating, in Brennan’s phrase—and sometimes as products of prior ascriptions of value, where this may include the selective value of indifferents.

for the day. Many of them appear to record Epictetus’ responses to those who sought him out for help or advice. As John Cooper observes, it is probable that Epictetus’ formal lectures would have dealt more systematically with topics to which the *Discourses* merely allude, and it is likely that such lectures involved the reading and exposition of canonical Stoic texts, especially those of Chrysippus, to whom the *Discourses* often refer.⁵

This context is important, because it bears on our understanding of Epictetus’ reliability as a transmitter of older Stoic views, and it tends to support the impression that Epictetus is not much of an innovator in Stoic ethics. It is true that the *Discourses* give us a somewhat idiosyncratic picture of Stoicism. This is not because Epictetus is interested in challenging or refining older Stoic doctrines, however, but because he is bringing his own experience and personal approach to bear on them. He has found Stoic doctrines transformative and aims to help others profit by them, but he does not conceive of himself in the role of philosophical innovator, and nowhere does he challenge Chrysippus in the manner of Posidonius or argue for synthesis in the mold of Antiochus. Where we can compare the *Discourses* with secure evidence for early Stoic theories, Epictetus’ basic orthodoxy seems clear. I think this sense of Epictetus’ relation to the older Stoics is likely to be confirmed by anyone who reads the *Discourses* along with the epitomes of Stoic ethics in Stobaeus, Cicero, and Diogenes Laertius. It is the general line taken in two careful and detailed nineteenth-century studies by Bonhöffer and more recently in a discussion by John Cooper.⁶

2. Inwood on Stoic Impulse

Brad Inwood’s invaluable study of Stoic moral psychology, *Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism*, took a different line with respect to a crucial taxonomical issue, however, one that has shaped subsequent discussion in important ways. Inwood notes, rightly and helpfully, that Epictetus’ use of the terms *hormê* and *orexis* seems to differ

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⁵ Cooper 2007, 10.
⁶ Bonhöffer 1894 concludes *dass Epictet mit klarem Bewusstsein über die heterodoxen Stoiker des zweiten und ersten vorchristlichen Jahrhunderts hinweg sich an die Lehre der alten Stoa angeschlossen hat* (iv). As Cooper 2007 notes, “it appears the main part of the curriculum consisted in the systematic reading out loud of classic old Stoic texts—particularly those of Chrysippus [. . .]” (10).
from the account we find in our doxographies of older Stoic views. In older sources, *hormê* seems to figure as the most general term for motivation of any kind. Arius Didymus (or whoever Stobaeus’ source may be) tells us that action is always preceded by assent to a *phantasia hormêtikê*—an impulsive impression—whose content is the judgment that the action in question is *kathêkon*. Moreover, we have Cicero’s clear equation of *hormê* with *appetitio animi*, suggesting that, whatever its conceptual nuances may be, *hormê* covers about the same ground as our word ‘desire’. *Orexis*, on the other hand, is said by Arius to be *hormê* of a quite specific form. *Orexis* is *hormê* directed at the apparent good—at what the agent takes to be good—and Arius emphasizes that it is not the *summum genus* of motivation, as in Aristotle, but merely one kind (*eidos*) of rational motivation distinguished by the Stoics. The motivation behind this classification is not made clear by Arius, but it is at least consistent with the Stoics’ taste for ramified taxonomies, and it is borne out by other texts. Several passages in Galen treat *orexis* as *hormê logikê*, and one of the *pathê*—which are clearly *hormai*—is said to be a form of *orexis*. So *orexis* seems to figure in older Stoic texts as one of a number of finer-grained species of impulse distinguished in the incomplete account that has come down to us in Stobaeus.

In Epictetus and Marcus, however, we find something very different. In almost every relevant passage, *orexis* and *ekklisis* are set alongside *hormê* and *aphormê* in a way that seems to place them outside the category impulse of altogether. Thus Epictetus regularly speaks both of reforming *orexis* and *ekklisis* (by restricting them to what is up to us) and of employing *hormê* and *aphormê* in accordance with reason, as if these were

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8 Stob. Ecl. 2.86.
9 Fin. 3.23. Cf. Fin. 4.39 and 5.17, Luc. 24, ND 2.58.
10 Stob. Ecl. 2.87. Cf. Aspasius in Aristot. Eth. Nicom. 45, 16 (=SVF 3.386). By ‘rational motivation’ I mean motivation that belongs only to rational agents, regardless of whether it is in some way mistaken or deficient. I will characterize those impulses that occur only in fully rational agents (such as the *boulêsis* of the Stoic sage) as cases of ‘fully rational motivation.’
11 In fact two of the *pathê*—*epithumia* and *hêdonê*—appear to be forms or determinations of *orexis*, as I argue below. Similarly, two of the *eupatheiai*—*boulêsis* and *chara*—appear to be forms of *orexis*. On *orexis* and the *pathê*, see Stob. Ecl. 2.90; Ps.-Andronicus De passionibus; DL 7, 113-14; Cicero Tusc. 4.11-15. For some of Galen’s references to *orexis*, see PHP 5.7.27 (=SVF 3.441), PHP 4.2.337 (=SVF 3.463), PHP 4.4.2 (=SVF 464).
distinct psychological exercises answering to different psychological states.\(^\text{12}\) What are we to make of this? If orexis is a species of rational hormê, as Arius maintains, why would Epictetus treat it as a different kind of attitude altogether? Inwood’s answer is that Epictetus has rearranged these terms for pedagogical reasons and that this “was almost certainly a deliberate change from the old Stoic usage he knew from the orthodox treatises he read and lectured on in his school”\(^\text{13}\).

Inwood goes on to offer some plausible conjectures about the motivations behind Epictetus’ supposed shift in usage, but I want to look more closely at the initial line of thought that leads him to conclude that this usage must be inconsistent with that of the older Stoics in the first place. There are, of course, the textual points I have already mentioned, which do seem to suggest a rearrangement of terms: if orexis is a species of rational impulse, it is at least odd to find it presented in Epictetus as a psychological category coordinate to or contrasted with impulse. What really drives Inwood’s conclusion, however, is a certain conception of impulse in the older Stoics, and it is worth presenting this conception in some detail to see why this is so. First, and as I mentioned above, it is fairly clear from our doxographies of older Stoic views that the particular bit of mental content that triggers action is always the judgment that some action or other is appropriate (kathêkon). The concept of to kathêkon is clearly at the core of the cognitive theory of motivation developed by the Stoics, and it seems to function, as Tad Brennan has emphasized, as a perfectly general template for occurrent impulse, supplying the description under which an agent acts, or at least a standard way of reconstructing the content of her intention.\(^\text{14}\) The kathêkon judgment that prompts an action may of course be false: the contemplated action may not be actually be commensurate with nature and Zeus’s boulêsis in the way required for it to be kathêkon. In such a case the resulting action, though judged by the agent to be a kathêkon, is in fact a hamartêma, an error or mistake. Whenever an agent acts, however, she does so because she assents to an

\(^{12}\) There are many examples of this in Epictetus, but see esp. Diss. 1.4.11-12, 1.18.1-3, 1.19.1-3, 2.8.29, 2.14.22, 3.2.1-3, 3.12.13, 4.4.16, 4.4.18. Cf. Marcus Med. 6.50, 8.7, 8.28, 9.7; Alexander Aphrod. de anima 97.8 Bruns (=SVF 2.839).

\(^{13}\) Inwood 1985, 118.

\(^{14}\) Brennan 2003, 268-9, 284.
impression that the action she is contemplating is appropriate. Even a thief, says Epictetus, conceives of his actions in this way.\(^\text{15}\)

A token action, then, will be a kathêkon or a hamartêma in point of fact depending on whether the kathêkon judgment that precipitates it is true. That is one way in which action may be assessed, according to Stoics: with reference to the truth or falsity of the propositional attitude that is its immediate cause. But an action may be evaluated in another way as well: a token action will be complete or perfect just in case, in addition to being kathêkon, it arises from the set of true and warranted beliefs in which virtue consists. The action that satisfies this further requirement is not merely kathêkon, though it is that. It is also a katorthôma, an action that participates in virtue and, because it flows from a good disposition, itself instantiates the property of goodness. Within the category of kathêkonta, then, the Stoics distinguish a subset of actions that are also katorthômata, resulting from a cognitive disposition that satisfies the demanding set of epistemic norms the Stoics accept. These two distinctions—between kathêkonta and hamartêmata and between kathêkonta and katorthômata—give us two dimensions along which the Stoics appraise action. The category of the kathêkon cuts across the categories of vice and virtue in roughly the way that katalêpsis cuts across the categories of doxa and epistême in the Stoics’ epistemological scheme.

All of this is borne out by our sources and well-established in the literature. Stoic texts standardly model or reconstruct the cognitive content that immediately precipitates action as a judgment that the action in question is kathêkon (or occasionally as a judgment involving roughly synonymous terms such as oikeion). When these judgments are true, the resulting actions are in fact kathêkonta—actions that conform to nature—and among these latter those performed on the basis of a virtuous disposition—that is, by a sage—are also katorthômata. To return now to Inwood’s account of orexis, recall that for the older Stoics, orexis is a form of impulse for the apparent good. And note that if we consider the account of impulse I have just sketched, we can see that in fact the members of a certain subset of actions prompted by impulse are goods: namely, the katorthômata performed by the sage. Inwood’s thought, then, is that orexis in the older Stoics should

\(^{15}\text{Diss. 1.18.1-3. Here I am indebted to many illuminating discussions with Tad Brennan, and especially to his paper, “Demoralizing the Stoics” (unpublished).}\)
somehow be linked with the subset of kathêkonta that are also katorthômata. Thus
Inwood writes:

For the old Stoics, morally correct actions, katorthômata, are also a kind of
kathêkon. They are referred to as perfect kathêkonta. In so far as impulses are to
appropriate actions, some are also to ‘the good’. For the old Stoics, orexis, an
impulse to the good, is one kind of rational impulse to the appropriate.16

As this passage makes clear, Inwood is here thinking of orexis in the older Stoics as a
form of impulse directed at actions rather than objects: he associates orexis with
katorthômata, and he takes katorthômata to comprise a subset of those impulses whose
content is the judgment that an action is appropriate or kathêkon. And it is this conception
of impulse—as a motivating state directed at actions—that prompts his conclusion that
Epictetus departs from the older Stoic scheme, at least terminologically. Thus Inwood
continues:

But Epictetus at no points sets out this relationship between the appropriate and
the good, and he clearly considers that they are the objects of two distinct and
mutually exclusive kinds of impulse. Impulse is directed [in Epictetus] at the
appropriate and orexis at the good, and the two are not thought of as overlapping.
[. . .] ‘Appropriate’ [i.e. kathêkon] is clearly used by Epictetus deliberately in a
significantly narrower sense than by the old Stoa. Instead of being the genus of
katorthôma it is a co-ordinate species.17

On Inwood’s picture, then, orexis in the older Stoics covers a subset of the impulses
whose content is the kathêkon judgment that stimulates action. It is in this sense that
orexis is supposed to be a kind of impulse for the older Stoics, by being a kind of
kathêkon judgment—a judgment about actions—that is good-dependent in some way.
Epictetus, on the other hand, does not seem to treat orexis as a kathêkon judgment at all,
but as a good-dependent species of impulse that excludes judgments of this form. This
picture of older Stoic doctrine, and of Epictetus departure from it, appears to rest on two
key assumptions: first, that if orexis is a hormê, its content must be a kathêkon judgment,
since that is the general template for hormê. \(^{18}\) Second, that since orexis is for the apparent good, the older Stoics must associate it with those actions that are genuine goods, that is, with katorthômata. That is why, in explaining orexis, Inwood emphasizes that “in so far as impulses are to appropriate actions, some are also to the ‘good.’” \(^{19}\)

I believe Inwood’s account of Epictetus’ usage is correct, and also that he correctly identifies the referent of the term hormê, in one of its Stoic uses, as narrowly associated with kathêkon judgments leading straightaway to action. \(^{20}\) But the Stoics use the term hormê in a variety of ways, and I want to look more carefully at the taxonomy Inwood attributes to the older Stoics, and at his conclusions about orexis especially. It is worth asking, in particular, exactly how the identification of orexis with katorthômata is supposed to work: to what subset of kathêkonta can the ‘some’ in Inwood’s phrase refer, singling them out as instances of orexis? On the one hand, it is clear that we cannot identify orexis with the set of kathêkon judgments that actually issue in katorthômata, for those are restricted to the sage. Orexis is not restricted to sages, however, since it figures in the account of the pathê, of which the sage is free. \(^{21}\) Perhaps then orexis is the Stoic term for impulse directed at actions an agent takes to be goods, involving the judgment that the prospective action is not merely a kathêkon but a kathorthôma as well. This would be one way in which orexis could be a both a kathêkon judgment and a good-dependent form of impulse, by being directed at actions the agent believes to be katorthômata. In the case of the non-sage, whose actions cannot amount to katorthômata, such judgments would of course be systematically false.

This analysis, however, looks like a conflation of a third-person characterization of action with the mental content that precipitates it. For it requires that the agent act in the belief that the contemplated action is a katorthôma and hence a good. It is true that the Stoics regard an appropriate action that also flows from a virtuous disposition as a

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\(^{19}\) Inwood 1985, 117.

\(^{20}\) I disagree with Inwood’s further suggestion that Epictetus does not regard katorthômata as a species of kathêkonta (1985, 117). Both in older Stoic sources and in Epictetus, katorthômata are the kathêkonta performed by the fully rational sage. Inwood’s reasoning on this point seems to rest on the assumption that orexis, being directed at what is good, is directed at actions that are good, at katorthômata. He then concludes that in distinguishing orexis from hormê Epictetus distinguishes katorthômata from kathêkonta.

\(^{21}\) This brings out another oddity in the supposition that orexis should be associated with actual katorthômata: epithumia is an irrational form of orexis, but an action prompted by epithumia cannot be a katorthôma. So at least some forms of orexis cannot issue in katorthômata.
It doesn’t follow, however, that the agent (even the virtuous agent) acts in the judgment that her action is a *katorthôma*—just as it doesn’t follow from the fact that the thief’s action is a *hamartêma* that this is the description under which the thief acts.\(^22\) The distinction between an action that is *kathêkon* and those that are *katorthômata* does not appear to depend on the immediate description under which an agent acts but on the deeper structure of beliefs from which her actions and assents flow. Actions that are objectively judged to be *katorthômata* and *hamartêmata* seem equally to be prompted by judgments about what is *kathêkon*, as Inwood elsewhere emphasizes.\(^23\)

3. *Orexis* and *Hormê* in our Sources

*Orexis*, then, cannot be identified with the subset of impulses that are to actual *katorthômata*, since those are restricted to the sage, and it looks as if it shouldn’t be identified with some category of impulses that *conceive* of the prospective action as a *katorthôma*, since the Stoics do not seem to recognize such a category. In fact I suspect we have not understood the use of these terms by Epictetus because we have not fully understood their use by the older Stoics. And in general I think we should be surprised to find that Epictetus has departed as widely from older Stoic usage as Inwood suggests. In addition to the impression one gets from the Discourses—that they are substantially in line with older Stoic views—Epictetus is evidently familiar with two treatises of Chrysippus, one on *hormê* and another on *orexis* and *ekklisis*, evidently as distinct from *hormê*.\(^24\) And in one passage in which Epictetus is himself discussing *hormê*, he refers to Chrysippus’ treatment of *hormê* in the immediate context. So if it is puzzling to find

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\(^22\) See especially Brennan 2003 (268), and cf. Kamtekar 2005: “when he acts, Cicero’s sage judges his action appropriate, not perfect or virtuous” (221). There is independent reason to doubt that a sage, in acting, conceives of her own actions as *kathorthômata*. Every action performed by the sage is a *katorthôma*, but a sage may fail to realize that she is a sage, as a number of sources make clear. In such a case it is clear that the sage will not regard her own actions as goods.

\(^23\) That *orexis* is not directed at actions is also suggested by consideration of *ekklisis*. If *orexis* is a species of *kathêkon* judgment that envisions a prospective action as good, *ekklisis* should be, by parity of reasoning, a species of *kathêkon* judgment that somehow envisions a prospective action as bad. But this clearly cannot be the case. Like *orexis*, *ekklisis* must be a belief oriented towards objects or outcomes that issues in further judgments about actions. This difference seems to be confirmed by the Stoics’ use of the prepositions *epi* and *pros*. The *pathê* are said to be *pros* what is thought to be good or bad but *epi* actions and psychic movements (Stob. Ecl. 2.87-2.88).

\(^24\) Diss. 1.4.14, 4.4.16. As Stephen White points out to me, these references may not reflect distinct treatises—which are not otherwise attested—but merely topical divisions. In either case it appears that *hormê* was conceived of as topic to be distinguished from treatments of *orexis* and *ekklisis*, and that this division belongs to Stoic orthodoxy.
Epictetus distinguishing between *hormê* and *orexis*, we should perhaps also be puzzled to find that Chrysippus devoted separate discussions to each.

There is thus some independent suggestion that *orexis* and *ekklisis* are not, at least in the first instance, a species of *kathêkon* judgment that immediately precipitates action, but have a special status in the older Stoics as well as in Epictetus. As I have noted, what seems to lead Inwood to the conclusion that *orexis* must be a *kathêkon* judgment resulting in action is the assumption that impulses must always have content of this form, and that *orexis* must therefore be directed at actions of one kind or another. But I can find no Stoic text that requires us to assume this. It is clear from our texts that action cannot occur in the absence of a *kathêkon* judgment, and also that, when such a judgment occurs, practical impulse must follow. But these points show only that a *kathêkon* judgment always precedes action as a final, triggering cause. They do not show that the content of every *hormê* is the judgment that a contemplated action is *kathêkon* or that judgments of this kind are sufficient to generate and explain action in their own right. The crucial passage on which Inwood’s assumption appears to be based says only that a *kathêkon* judgment always activates or sets *hormê* in motion:

*T1* They say that what moves impulse is nothing other than an impulsive impression (*phantasian hormêtikê*) of what is immediately appropriate (*kathêkontos autothen*), while in genus impulse is a motion of the soul towards something. The impulse which occurs in rational creatures is viewed as a species of this, as well as that which occurs in irrational creatures. For desire (*orexis*) is not rational impulse but a species of rational impulse.\(^{25}\)

This passage deserves more discussion than I can give it here, but the active participle in the expression *what moves impulse*—*to de kinoun têh hormên*—is consistent with, and perhaps even suggests, a model according to which some of the psychological states the Stoics call *hormai* are prior, in some respect, to the occurrent judgments that set them in motion, issuing in token actions or psychic movements.\(^{26}\) In fact the use of the term

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\(^{25}\) Stob. *Ecl.* 2.86. The translation is after Pomeroy but adopts Inwood and Gerson’s rendering of *phantasian hormêtikê* as “immediately appropriate.” The text is that of Wachsmuth. Here and elsewhere, I follow the emendations to Wachsmuth’s text adopted by Pomeroy.

\(^{26}\) Cf. Cicero *Luct.* 24-25 (=SVF 2.116), Plutarch *De virt. mor.* 449c, Seneca *Ep.* 51.32-33. Each of these passages is consistent with the model I am proposing, according to which *orexis* and *ekklisis* are, in the first instance, cognitive dispositions that are moved or activated by *kathêkon* judgments. The distinctive
hormê by the older Stoics appears to include cognition of both forms. In many contexts it clearly does apply narrowly to events of the kind Inwood envisions, to motions of the soul whose immediate cause is the judgment that a particular action or affect is appropriate. But not all Stoic uses of the term can be understood in this way.

Commentators have long suspected that the Stoics recognize a form of latent or preliminary impulse distinct from the practical impulses—hormai practikai—that issue in punctual actions, and Arius says explicitly that the Stoics apply the term hormê both to the psychic motion (phora) that results from a practical judgment and to the underlying disposition—hexis hormêtikê—from which this motion arises. As I will show, there is evidence that—for the older Stoics as well as for Epictetus—dispositional impulses of the latter sort have a cognitive content that differs from that of the kathêkon judgments Inwood and others have narrowly associated with Stoic impulse, and that they in fact underlie and explain impulse in the latter, narrower sense.

So the assumption behind Inwood’s interpretation that should be given up, I think, is that everything our sources call hormê has a kathêkon judgment as its content, so that orexis and ekkîsis are themselves hormai of this kind. It rather appears that the older Stoics sometimes include dispositional forms of cognition within the category of impulse and that they distinguish these dispositions, in other contexts, from the judgments that directly precipitate action or psychic movement. Though occurrent or activated hormê is indeed a motion of the soul—a phora or kinês—is the terms orexis and ekkîsis seem also to characterize hormê in its dispositional form, as distinct from the judgments that directly issue in psychic motion. On this account, neither hormê nor praxis can occur apart from assent, but assessments of appropriate action do not, as it were, bring conation

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27 Thus Long, 1976: “We should not suppose that [hormê] is always, and certainly not that it is automatically (or mechanially) followed by action. [. . .] The Stoics seemed to have distinguished impulses and desires which are not acted upon from hormê that they called praktikê” (80). Cf. Bônhoﬀer 1890, 255; Tsekourakis 1974, 77; Preus 1981; Stevens 2000. Contrast Inwood 1988, 287n 271 and Brennan 1998, 28. Hormê praktikê in particular is said “to contain something kinêtikon” (to kinêtikon periechein, Stob. Ecl 2.88). For a further reference to hormê praktikê, see Plutarch Stoic. repugn. 1057b.

28 Inwood himself notes the presence of dispositional forms of hormê in his excellent study (see esp. Inwood 1985: 44, 112, 127, 162, 224). But a close association of impulse with kathêkon judgments seems especially to guide his analysis of orexis.
into existence, but rather activate or set in motion prior dispositions that are also characterized as forms of impulse.²⁹ In short, what the Stoics call *hormê* appears to be present both as a disposition and as an occurrent psychic movement. It is a confusing but critically important feature of our sources that they sometimes—but not always—employ technical terminology to mark this difference.

To motivate this account, I want next to present three considerations. The first is that, as Bonhöffer observes, the same contrast between *orexis* and *hormê* that figures in Epictetus also figures in our reports of older Stoic views.³⁰ The second is that we have fairly clear evidence that although the content of every *hormê* does include a predicate (one represented by an articular infinitive), in the case of preliminary or dispositional impulse the predicate is not (or does not represent) the performance of an action but the possession (*to echein*) of an object. And this predicate figures not as a component of the judgment that the action is *kathêkon* but as a component of the belief that the possession of the object in question would benefit (*ôphelein*) the agent.³¹ The third is that the analysis of impulse I have just sketched is borne out by the place of *orexis* and *ekklisis* in the Stoic analysis of the *pathê*. The four main genera of *pathê*—appetite, fear, pain, and pleasure—are identified with various specific *kathêkon* judgments that turn out to be pathological just in case they flow from *orexis* or *ekklisis* that is false or unstable in some way. This is consistent with Epictetus’ own usage, which recommends, as a way of eliminating the *pathê*, the restriction of *orexis* and *ekklisis* to what is up to us—where this means abandoning false beliefs that external things are good or bad, a source of harm or benefit. A *kathêkon* judgment is pathological when it is founded on *orexis* or *ekklisis* of this sort, on false convictions about the scope of goods and bads.

So first some evidence for a distinction between *orexis* and *hormê* in the older Stoics. Consider the account preserved by Stobaeus at *Eclogues* 2.97-98:

**T2**: They say that we choose what must be chosen, wish for what must be wanted, and desire what must be desired. For choices (*haireseis*), desires (*orexeis*), and wishes (*boulêseis*) are for predicates (*katêgorêmata*), as with the impulses (*hôsper

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²⁹ For *hexeis hormêtikai* as a form of *hormê*, see Stob. Ecl. 2.87 (= SVF 3.169).
³⁰ Bonhöffer 1890, 255-7. See esp. 257: *Auch in der älteren Stoa wurde die orexis, obgleich gewöhnlich als Spezies der hormê dargestellt und hinter diesem Begriff zurücktretend, zuweilen als selbständige Willensfunktion der hormê koordiniert.*
³¹ Stob. Ecl. 2.78, 2.97-98.
However, we choose, want and likewise desire to have good things (*ecēin* *mentoi* *hairoumetha* *kai* *boulometha* *kai* *homoiōs* *oregometha* *tagatha*). Hence good things are worth choosing, worth wanting, and worth desiring. We choose to have intelligence and self-restraint, not, by Zeus, to have “being sensible” and “being self-restrained”, which are incorporeals and predicates.\(^{32}\)

Arius here draws an implicit distinction between *orexis* and *hormê* (as *hōsper* *kai* *hai* *hormai* suggests) while also emphasizing a commonality between the two: both are directed at predicates. The same distinction between *orexis* and *hormê* is implied in the account of the Stoic sage given at Eclogues 2.115:

\[\text{T3: They also say that nothing contrary to desire (mēte para tēn orexin), contrary to impulse (para tēn hormēn), nor contrary to his inclination (para tēn epibolēn) occurs in the case of the worthwhile man, because he does all such things with reservation and nothing adverse befalls him unforeseen.}\(^{33}\)

In each of these passages *orexis* is presented, as it is in Epictetus and Marcus, as somehow coordinate to or distinct from *hormê*. On the assumption that the older Stoics adhered narrowly to the classification of *orexis* as a species of *hormê*, these references ought to be no less surprising than those in Epictetus.

Next, consider what our sources say about the content of *orexis*. All *hormai*, we are told, are directed at predicates that are contained somehow (*pōs*) within a truth-evaluable proposition (*axiōma*) that is the content of the attitude.\(^{34}\) This appears to be true of those impulses I have characterized as dispositional as well as those that are occurrent.\(^{35}\) The metaphysical status of predicates is poorly understood in that Stoic texts treat them, consistently and confusingly, both as propositional entities expressible in language (*lekta*) and as the causal results of bodies—incorporeal accidents attributable to bodies in virtue of the way those bodies are disposed. As causal results, predicates are such that (to take a Stoic example) a knife may bring it about that the predicate *being cut*...
(tou temnesthai) obtains at a particular time of a particular piece of flesh.\textsuperscript{36} As a propositional entity, on the other hand, a predicate may be entertained as an object of thought regardless of whether it ever applies to or is true of any object in the world.\textsuperscript{37} In the case of \textit{kathêkon} judgments, these predicates are clearly associated with actions the agent may come to perform, with incorporeal attributes that may come to obtain of her insofar as she acts. An agent who gives her assent to an impulsive presentation (\textit{phantasia hormêtikê}) judges that a token action immediately in prospect is appropriate (\textit{kathêkon}), the one to perform. Having assented to an impression of this kind, she subsequently comes to be disposed in the way described by the predicate contained in its content, so that the predicate comes to be true of her, provided that nothing external interferes with her agency.\textsuperscript{38} As a result, impulses are said to be for predicates that may be true of (or belong to) an agent. They are expressed linguistically by an infinitive construction, and they are standardly embedded in the judgment that a particular action is

\textsuperscript{36} Stob. \textit{Ecl.} 1.138-139 (=SVF 1.89 and SVF 2.336 =LS 55A), Sextus, M 9.211 (SVF 2.341=LS 55B), Clement \textit{Misc.} 8.9.30.1-3 (=SVF 2.349=LS 55D).

\textsuperscript{37} I have tried to avoid assuming any particular account of Stoic predicates (\textit{katêgorêmata}), a topic that involves some of the thorniest issues in Stoic metaphysics. The basic difficulty is that our evidence pulls in conflicting directions. On the one hand, predicates are classified as incorporeal \textit{lekta}—roughly what is said or signified—and it is tempting to suppose that they are purely propositional items—meanings or objects of thought—that may represent states of affairs regardless of whether those states of affairs are instantiated. Such a view may even seem to be required by the fact that the Stoics press incorporeal predicates into service as the contents of motivational attitudes, as representing actions that the agent may or may not come to perform. In this role predicates must be able to represent mere \textit{possibilita}—states of affairs not yet realized—and cannot comfortably be identified with facts or with properties that actually obtain. On the other hand, this picture is hard to reconcile with those texts that incorporate predicates into the Stoics’ analysis of causation. These texts do not speak of predicates as though they \textit{represent} causal outcomes, but as though they \textit{are} causal outcomes. Here the various identity claims in our sources become particularly awkward. For instance, the causal results of virtue—a physical disposition of the soul—are straightforwardly identified with predicates (\textit{katêgorêmata}; Stob. \textit{Ecl.} 2.96, 2.98), and these predicates are in turn said to be—not represent—the benefits (\textit{ôphelêmata}; Stob. \textit{Ecl.} 2.78, 2.86, 2.98) associated with the possession and exercise of virtue. Putting these claims together, it can sound as though benefits are propositional objects. As Frede observes, in the case of false or uninstantiated \textit{lekta}, the Stoics appear to preserve a distinction between \textit{lekta} as representational entities and the unactualized properties or states of affairs they represent. On the other hand, many of our texts seem to collapse (or neglect) this distinction so that \textit{lekta} appear to be realized or instantiated as states of affairs. Accordingly, a Stoic \textit{katêgorêma} seems to be something that “if predicated truly of something is an attribute,” but which is otherwise a propositional (i.e. representational) object (Frede 1994: 126-27). Cf. also Bobzien 1999: “Perhaps [\textit{lekta}] that are real serve at the same time both as true propositions and as states of affairs that obtain, whereas there is no corresponding identity between false propositions and states of affairs that do not obtain . . . ” (95). I thank Vanessa de Harven for illuminating comments and extended discussion of these points, though I do not mean to attribute any particular view to her here.

\textsuperscript{38} See especially the discussion in Graver 2007, 39.
appropriate (*kathêkei*/*i*oporet*) to the agent.\textsuperscript{39} Thus, to take Seneca’s example, an agent walks or sits only after assenting to an impression that it is appropriate that she walk or sit.\textsuperscript{40}

But although we are told that all impulses are directed at predicates—at the causal results of bodies—we are nowhere told that the predicates in question must always be (or must always represent) a punctual action or episode of behavior. On the contrary, \textsuperscript{T2} makes clear that *orexis* is not directed toward any action envisioned as appropriate, but toward the possession of some object, where this state of affairs is thought to be beneficial (*sumpheron*) to the agent, and where it likewise associated with an incorporeal predicate that supervenes on the physical disposition of bodies.\textsuperscript{41} As is true of *kathêkon* judgments, the cognitive content of *orexis* appears to be a complete, truth-evaluable proposition (*axioma*) that includes a predicate represented linguistically as an infinitive. The predicate involved in *orexis*, however, at least in its dispositional form, does not pick out an action but a state or condition, a having rather than a doing. In particular, it appears to pick out a state or condition that the agent regards, rightly or wrongly, as one in which she is benefitted. Thus we desire *sôphrosunê* or *phronêsis* in the (true) belief that these are goods whose possession will benefit us.\textsuperscript{42} Or rather, on the Stoic account the dispositional desire for a good such as *sôphrosunê* appears to consist in the conviction that it is a good whose possession will benefit us.\textsuperscript{43} Here and elsewhere the Stoics employ distinct verbal adjectives to distinguish the causal factors involved in this condition: a corporeal object such as wealth or virtue is said to be desirable (*orekton*) in so far as it is thought by an agent (rightly or wrongly) to be a cause of benefit to its possessor.\textsuperscript{44} What an agent desires, on the other hand—the result or outcome represented by her motivational attitude—is the benefit itself, the having of the object.\textsuperscript{45} The Stoics classify

\textsuperscript{40} *Ep.* 113.118.
\textsuperscript{41} Cf. Stob. *Ecl.* 2.78.
\textsuperscript{42} Stob. *Ecl.* 2.78, 2.98.
\textsuperscript{43} Strictly, such a desire is proper to the sage alone, which appears to be the case envisioned here. Since the progressor is not yet capable of *sôphrosunê* or *phronêsis*, her pursuit of these goods can only lead, for the present, to the frustration of her desire.
\textsuperscript{44} Stob. *Ecl.* 2.78, 2.98.
\textsuperscript{45} For a similar account of the predicate that is the content of *hairesis* in particular, see Troels Engberg-Pederson 1990, 26-27. I thank Susan Sauvé Meyer for drawing my attention to this passage.
the predicate associated with this outcome, *to possess the object*, as an incorporeal, the causal result of a body, and something to-be-desired (*orekeion*).\(^{46}\)

So there is evidence in Stobaeus that, in the older Stoics as well as in Epictetus, *orexis* is sometimes distinguished from the *hormai* that issue in specific actions and whose cognitive content involves the judgment that a token action is *kathêkon*. It would be nice to have some confirmation of this beyond that of Stobaeus’ source, and fortunately we have. It is what Cicero says at *Tusc*. 4.21:

**T4:** They [older dialecticians whose views the Stoics adopted] distinguish another sense of appetite (*libido*) and make it also mean desire for the predicates affirmed of a person or persons (the terms used by the logicians being *katêgorêmata*), as for instance a man longs to have riches (*habere divitias*), to obtain distinctions (*capere honores*); while greed (*indigentia*) is for the actual things, as for instance, for distinctions, for money.\(^{47}\)

Cicero’s distinction between greed and desire appears to answer to the Stoic distinction, which I noted above, between a corporeal object and the incorporeal predicate that is the having of it.\(^{48}\) What is important here, however, is that *libido* is Cicero’s rendering of *epithumia*, which is a pathological form of *orexis*.\(^{49}\) Here too the predicate associated with *orexis* is not the *doing* of an action but the *having* of what the agent takes to be good. So we have, from another source, additional evidence about the formal content of

\(^{46}\) It is unclear exactly how the content the Stoics associate with dispositional *orexis* should be spelled out, but Stobaeus’ source appears to come close to telling us when he says that the cause of *epithumia* is an *orexis* involving the false opinion “that something good is approaching and that if it were present we would be getting away fine” (*Ecl*. 2.90, trans. Pomeroy). This suggests that *orexis* rests on or consists in more than one propositional attitude, and it may be that the Stoics think of it as a complex of conceptually-related beliefs about the good and the beneficial, and perhaps also about the types of actions that are appropriate in relation to the good and the beneficial (cf. Graver 2007, 41-47). Since the Stoics define the good as a physical *cause* of benefit (a description satisfied by virtue alone, in their view), such an analysis would not be surprising. We might think of an agent’s *orexis* as a set of (de re) beliefs that ascribe goodness to some range of objects, conjoined to the (de dicto) belief that it is beneficial to possess what is good. The latter belief is of course true, on the Stoic account, even when the conception of goodness is mistaken or misapplied.

\(^{47}\) King’s translation, with minor changes. Seneca (*Ep.* 117) elaborates the Stoic distinction between the exercise and possession of a corporeal good such as wisdom, noting that the Stoics adopted the distinction from unnamed *dialectici veteres* (117.12).

\(^{48}\) On which, see esp. Brunschwig 1994.

orexis: it is indeed a predicate, but it is not a judgment about the kathêkon. It is rather a judgment about what is good, about what it would benefit the possessor to have.\(^{50}\)

4. The Structure of the Pathê

Finally, we should consider the Stoic taxonomy of the pathê. These are clearly hormai, and the texts that deal with them amount to the most detailed evidence for the Stoic analysis of motivation that has survived. The Stoics distinguish four main genera of pathê under which a range of more specific pathologies are classed. These are desire (epithumia), fear (phobos), pain (lupê) and hêdonê (pleasure), impulses the Stoics regard as irrational insofar as they rest on false or unstable convictions about what is good and bad. It is clear from our sources that these disturbances are psychological motions proceeding from cognitions of two sorts: beliefs about goods and bads together with judgments about appropriate actions or affects. In the strictest sense the Stoics appear to identify a pathos with the latter form of cognition—with a kathêkon judgment—and with the psychological movement that follows on it.\(^{51}\) But our sources occasionally speak more loosely as though the passion should be identified with the dispositional cognition that precedes it, with the belief that (for example) money and health are genuine goods.\(^{52}\) This looser way of characterizing the pathê appears to reflect the fact that, although generalized beliefs about goods and bads are not themselves pathê, they are without exception the fundamental basis of the pathê. The Stoics treat these structures of belief (hexeis) as proclivities or tendencies towards various emotions—as cognitions that are pathological in that they give rise to pathê, and which may be deeply rooted and difficult to reform. When they are deeply enough entrenched, the Stoics rank them on a scale of

\(^{50}\) It is especially worth comparing these passages in Stobaeus and Cicero with Epictetus Diss. 1.18.1: “so also in the case of impulse toward something [thought and action begin from] the conviction that it is beneficial for me, and that it is impossible to judge one thing beneficial (sumpheron) and yet desire (oregesthai) another, and again, to judge one thing appropriate (kathêkon) and yet be impelled (horman) toward another” (trans. after Oldfather). Cf. Diss 3.2.1. At Eclogues 2.76 Stobaeus’ source characterizes the telos of happiness as the final object of orexis (to eschaton tôn orektôn)—a further indication that orexis is not directed at actions, but at objects or outcomes. Here the predicate that is the content of orexis is to have or obtain eudaimonia (to tuchein tês eudaimonias, Ecl. 2.77).

\(^{51}\) Zeno and Chrysippus are said to have differed about this, Chrysippus identifying the pathê with judgments, Zeno with the psychic motions that followed. See Galen, PHP 4.3.2 and 5.1.4.

\(^{52}\) E.g. DL 7.111. Cf. Graver 2007, 39 and 141.
increasing severity, characterizing them, in medical terms, as illnesses (*euemptôsiai*), diseases (*nosêmata*) and maladies (*arrôstêmata*).\(^{53}\)

Now it is striking that the form of content I have just considered as the content of *orexis*—that certain objects are goods or bads and that their possession constitutes a benefit or harm to their possessor—closely matches Stoic characterizations of the *hupolêpseis* that constitute the tendencies and dispositions that give rise to the occurrent motions of the *pathê*.\(^{54}\) Moreover, as Margaret Graver’s recent, elegant analysis brings out, it seems clear that the occurrent elements of a pathos “engage beliefs that are already in place as to the goodness of certain kinds of objects,” where these prior beliefs are best thought of as dispositions that give rise—as in the account I have presented—to situational judgments and consequent psychic movements.\(^{55}\) The dispositional and occurrent elements of a *pathos* are represented, in Graver’s scheme, by a syllogism whose major premises express the agent’s antecedent evaluations—her ascriptions of value and disvalue to some range of object-types—as well as her conviction that some type of action or affect is an appropriate response to objects of these kinds. A *kathêkon* judgment then follows on an agent’s further situational judgment, answering to a minor premise, that some token of a valued or disvalued object type is now at hand. Though the latter *kathêkon* judgment appears to function as a final, proximate cause of psychic motion, in the case of the *pathê* this judgment is itself clearly an expression—or application—of an antecedent complex of cognitions, without which, presumably, such a judgment would not occur at all.

I believe that this model—already well-established in the case of the *pathê*—is in fact a perfectly general template for motivation in the older Stoics, with an important qualification. In Graver’s scheme, the evaluative convictions that give rise to the *pathê* go unnamed, and *orexis* and *ekklisis* are identified with occurrent motions of the soul at issue in two of the four kinds of *pathos*, with the content of a specific range of *kathêkon* judgments.\(^{56}\) By contrast, on the account I am proposing, *orexis* and *ekklisis* are, in the

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\(^{53}\) Stob. 2.93 (=SVF 3.421). Cf. *Tusc*. 4.26-32: “They define sickness of soul as an intense belief, persistent and deeply rooted, which regards a thing that is not desirable as though it were eminently desirable” (trans. King). For discussion, see Brennan 1998, 39-42; Graver 2007, 39-40 and 135-45.

\(^{54}\) E.g., Stob. *Ecl*. 2.88; *Asp. in EN* 44, 12 Heylbut (=SVF 3.386).

\(^{55}\) Graver 2007, 40.

first instance, Stoic terms for the evaluative beliefs that remain in the background of all such judgments—for the cognitions that precede and explain every individual assessment of affect or action and which therefore underlie all four of the pathê. This is suggested by the account of the pathê preserved by Stobaeus, where two of the pathê—epithumia and phobos—are in fact classified as irrational forms of orexis and ekklisis, and where these pathê have a special priority in the Stoic scheme: epithumia and phobos are explicitly said to lead the way (proègeisthai), while hèdonê and lupê are said to follow (epigenesthai) on them. Epigenesthai may of course indicate a causal or temporal relation or, in some contexts, a relation of logical sufficiency.\textsuperscript{57} In the case of the pathê, it appears to mean that pleasure and pain are, in an important respect, developments out of desire and fear, which is to say, out of the pathological forms of orexis and ekklisis. They are the forms that epithumia and phobos take just in case an object the agent conceives of as good or bad overtakes her or falls into her grasp. Pleasure and pain follow on the primary emotions, that is, by being the satisfaction and realization, respectively, of desire and fear. Thus Philo of Alexandria says that the expectation of evil produces fear and its presence pain, so that the pathos of fear is nothing other than pain before pain.\textsuperscript{58} And Epictetus writes that “fear of things anticipated becomes pain when these things are present”.\textsuperscript{59}

These considerations strongly suggest that the cognitions involved in orexis and ekklisis underlie the secondary pathê of pleasure and pain no less than the primary pathê of desire and fear, and they help to explain a second asymmetry between the two pairs of pathê: in the reports of Stobaeus and Andronicus, only the secondary pathê of pleasure and pain are identified with kathêkon judgments with a specific content. In particular, they appear always to involve the judgment that psychic expansion (eparsis) or contraction (sustolê) is an appropriate response to a supposed good or evil that is now at hand. Thus pain is analyzed as

**T5**: Believing (to doxazein) that some fresh evil is present, at which it is

\textsuperscript{57} Graver 2007, 32.  
\textsuperscript{58} Mut. 163: Phobos de ara ènouden è lupê pro lupês.  
\textsuperscript{59} Diss. 4.1.84, trans. Oldfather. Cf. Stobaeus’ presentation of the pathê at Ecl. 290-2.92, Tusc. 4.12 (where Cicero grounds laetitia and libido in a single opinio bonorum), Philo de fortitudine 419 (=SVF 3.388), Lactantius Div. insti. 6.15, Cicero Off. 1.102.
appropriate (eph’ hoi kathêkei) to contract (sustellesthai).\textsuperscript{60}

Similarly, pleasure is

\textbf{T6:} Believing (to doxazein) that some fresh good is present, at which it is
appropriate (eph’ hoi kathêkei) to be elated (epairesthai).\textsuperscript{61}

For pleasure and pain, then, we are given a motivational schema in which the content of
the kathêkon judgments on which these impulses depend is fully specified: thus the
\textit{pathos} of pleasure—an irrational movement of the soul—requires both a false ascription
of goodness and a kathêkon judgment that specifies a determinate psychic movement—
elation—as an appropriate response. \textit{Eparsis} and sustolê are psychic motions resulting
from kathêkon judgments of a single, determinate kind.

On the other hand, in notable contrast to pleasure and pain, no specific kathêkon
judgments are ever associated with the primary \textit{pathê} of desire and fear. In particular, as
Graver observes, the infinitive forms answering to orexis and ekkllisis are never
embedded within the scope of kathêkon judgments, as those answering to eparsis and
sustolê consistently are.\textsuperscript{62} Our sources do not use oregesthai and ekklinein to indicate the
content of specific kathêkon judgments designating token actions, as they do so use
sustellesthai and epairesthai. Now if orexis and ekkllisis are, in the first instance,
dispositional beliefs about goods and bads, we should of course not be surprised to find
that their content is not narrowly associated with situational judgments about token
actions. On the account I am proposing, it is unsurprising to find that the infinitives
oregesthai and ekklinein do not come within the scope of kathêkon judgments in our
sources, for in contrast to sustellesthai and epairesthai, these terms do not answer to
specific actions or psychic motions. It is rather that the Stoic regard a range of kathêkon
judgments—those issuing in pursuit or avoidance behaviors—as driven by orexis or
ekkllisis, as founded on the antecedent belief that some type of object is orekton or
pheukton.\textsuperscript{63} When I am in the grip of false orexis, believing that money is good and its

\textsuperscript{60} Stob. Ecl., 2.90, trans. after Pomeroy.
\textsuperscript{61} Stob. Ecl., 2.90, trans. after Pomeroy.
\textsuperscript{62} Graver 2007: in the primary genera of epitumia and phobos “kathêkei is replaced by a verbal adjective
of similar force: orekton ‘to reach for,’ means, ‘such as it is appropriate to reach for,’ and pheukton ‘to avoid’ means, such as it is appropriate to avoid” (42).
\textsuperscript{63} That is, we do not have evidence for kathêkon judgments with content of the following sort: that it is now
appropriate (kathêkon) to pursue (oregesthai) or avoid (ekklinein) x. That oregesthai and ekklinein are not
possession beneficial, this belief may issue in a range of *kathêkon* judgments and occurrent impulses—all instances of *epithumia*—that collectively comprise my project of securing or pursuing or disposing of money in one way or another. I may judge that various courses of action—investing it or burying it or securing it by graft—are appropriate in different circumstances. Should I secure the money, my vicious *orexis* will no longer be manifest in judgments that range over various prospective actions but in a singular judgment specifying a determinate psychic motion: that, having acquired what I believe to be good, it is now appropriate to be elated (*sustellesthai*). The *kathêkon* judgments involved in desire and fear are left indeterminate in our sources simply because these *pathê* may be realized in a wide variety of judgments specifying some form of pursuit or avoidance. On the other hand, the content of pleasure and distress is fully specified because there is a determinate form that these judgments always take.64

If this is correct, it follows that each of the motivating states at issue in the *pathê* should be understood as the conjunction of *orexis* or *ekklisis* with a *kathêkon* judgment that specifies an appropriate response to the envisioned good or bad. The *pathê* are those violent motions of the soul grounded in false or unstable forms of *orexis* and *ekklisis*, while the *eupatheiai*, occurring only in the sage, are motions that flow from *orexis* and *ekklisis* in their fully rational forms. What we getting in the Stoic account of the *pathê*, that is to say, is not a schema in which *orexis* and *ekklisis* are coordinate to *sustolê* and *eparsis* and so figure narrowly as psychic motions following on *kathêkon* judgments, but one in which they are cognitive commitments at the root of the *pathê* and the *eupatheiai* alike. An agent’s fundamental beliefs about good and bad may work themselves out—in the case of the primary *pathê*—in the indeterminate range of pursuit and avoidance behaviors that constitute desire and fear (*epithumia* and *phobos*) as well as—in the case

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64 For a careful alternative account of *orexis* and *ekklisis* as purely affective motions of the soul, see Sauvé Meyer 2018. Though I agree with Sauvé Meyer that the content of these attitudes (in what I have called their dispositional forms) is not a *kathêkon* judgment, I doubt the Stoics suppose that psychic motion of any kind can occur in the absence of *kathêkon* judgments. Accordingly, to the extent that prospective affects (such as craving or worrying, say) do involve psychic motion, my analysis assumes that these affects will also supervene on assent to impressions of what is *kathêkon*, impressions that are underwritten, in turn, by beliefs about what it is good for the agent to possess or bad to encounter—by *orexis* and *ekklisis* as dispositions.
of the secondary pathê—in the determinate psychic motions that constitute pleasure and distress (hêdonê and lupê). On this account, the difference between the primary and secondary pathê is extrinsic in an important respect: it depends not on any change in the agent’s basic evaluative convictions—on the content of her orexis and ekklisis—but on her incidental relation to the objects she regards as a source of harm or benefit—on whether or not these objects have somehow overtaken her or fallen into her grasp—and on the specific kathêkon judgments that accompany these developments. These latter judgments will either have to do with some outward pursuit of the object in question, or they will specify a determinate psychic motion that eventuates once the object is present or within the agent’s grasp. In each case, however, these judgments and consequent motions originate in the more deeply seated evaluative attitudes the Stoics call orexis and ekklisis. Orexis and ekklisis stand at the origin of the pathê and eupatheiai, eparsis and sustolê at their terminus.

Epictetus’ usage strongly confirms this interpretation. If orexis and ekklisis were coordinate to sustolê and eparsis we would expect all four of these attitudes to have roughly equal priority in discussions of the pathê. But this is not at all what we find in the Discourses. Where sustolê and eparsis are scarcely mentioned by Epictetus, he regularly and consistently treats orexis and ekklisis as cognitions whose irrational instances are the root cause of every mental disturbance, and he clearly regards the reform of these

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65 In particular, such dispositions might “work themselves out” both by determining whether an agent assents to a given impression that an action is kathêkon and, more fundamentally, by determining what actions appear to her to be kathêkon.

66 It is worth emphasizing that this analysis differs fundamentally from the currently prevalent account of the Stoic pathê. On the prevailing view, orexis and ekklisis are not associated with the basic evaluative cognitions from which all the pathê arise, as they are on my reading, but are rather understood—as commentators following Inwood and Brennan have supposed—to be occurrent impulses resulting from particular kathêkon judgments. Thus Knuutilla, reflecting the consensus view, writes that “the Chrysippan definitions of the emotions involve the judgment that it is proper to be contracted (sustolê), to be elated (eparsis), to lean away (ekklisis), or to reach out (orexis) with respect to that which is regarded as good or bad” (Knuutilla 2004, 60). Knuutilla here regards ekklisis and orexis as attitudes whose form and content are parallel to that of eparsis and sustolê, so that all four attitudes have coordinate roles in an agent’s psychology. By contrast, on the view I have sketched, orexis and ekklisis as attitudes whose irrational instances are the root cause of every mental disturbance, and he clearly regards the reform of these
attitudes as both necessary and sufficient for freedom from the pathê. Moreover, in both Epictetus and Marcus there is a close association of orexis and ekklisis with objects and hormê with activities: hormê is consistently distinguished from orexis and ekklisis as a form of motivation concerned with actions and issuing either in kathêkonta or hamartêmata. Orexis and ekklisis, on the other hand, are associated with object-types to be had or possessed, or with states of affairs to be pursued or avoided. This is consistent both with the report of Stobaeus and with Chrysippus’ own account of pleasure and pain as reported by Galen: in both passages the secondary pathê are characterized with reference to the objects of lust and fear, that is, with reference to the objects of irrational orexis and ekklisis. The Stoic picture is that an agent must reform her beliefs about the scope of goods and bads, on the one hand, while also perfecting her judgments about what actions are appropriate in relation to what is good and bad, that is, the judgments that prompt to occurrence impulse. The case of the pathê allows us to see how these forms of evaluative cognition interact in the Stoic scheme.

5. A Revised Account

The Stoic distinction between orexis and hormê in its narrower, specific sense thus amounts to something like a distinction between standing and occurrent forms of desire or, to put it in cognitive terms, between two phases or segments of the evaluative cognition that underwrites and explains intentional action. Though the former attitude is not itself an instance of psychic motion (a phora or kinêsis), it would seem to be an essential cause of this motion and fundamental to any adequate explanation of why the

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67 E.g., 1.4.1, 2.13.13, 2.17.23, 2.2.3, 3.22.48, 4.1.84, 4.10.5.
68 Ecl. 2.90. Cf. Galen PHP 4.2.4 (=SVF 3.463), PHP 4.3.2 (= SVF 3.464), and PHP 5.7.29-30, where the pleasurable is said to have figured in Chrysippus’ definition of orexis.
69 It is tempting to say “in order to secure the good and avoid the bad,” but the relation envisioned in the sources is not always instrumental. Sustolê and eparsis are reactive psychic movements engendered by the presence of what is believed to be good or bad, but they are not directed at securing or avoiding the objects of these beliefs.
70 As Stevens 2000 notes, these two segments or phases of impulse are suggested by Plato’s locution at Rep. 339b5: toutou oregetai kai epi touto hormas(i). The same two-part structure is reflected in the dialectical claims advanced by the Academy in its polemics with the Stoics: “[T]wo things are required for action: sense must present what is appropriate (deitai [. . .] phantasias tou oikeioun), and impulse must set out for the good so presented” (Plutarch, Col. 1122d, trans. after Einarsen and de Lacy).
agent acted. This means, it is true, that there is an apparent inconsistency between the characterization of orexis as an instance or species of hormê and those texts that present it as somehow distinct from hormê. This inconsistency is not specific to Epictetus, however. It is clearly present in Stobaeus, and it is implicit in the Stoic analysis of the pathê as occurrent judgments rooted in persistent beliefs about good and bad. The question is not how or why Epictetus differs from the older Stoics on this score, but how the Stoics in general are thinking of orexis such that they sometimes call it an impulse and sometimes present it as a distinct attitude altogether.

The answer, it seems, is that the Stoics use the term hormê with greater or lesser specificity to pick out different aspects or phases of the cognition that constitutes our motivations. In the wider or generic sense found in Stobaeus’ taxonomy, the term is used broadly enough to encompass the dispositions (hexeis) that underlie and explain individual judgments about appropriate action. This broader sense belongs also to Cicero’s characterizations of hormê in De finibus and De legibus, and to many uses of the term in non-Stoic sources, where hormê names conation quite broadly conceived.

On the other hand, as we have seen, a large number of Stoic references in sources both early and late apply the term hormê to just those incidental judgments and consequent motions that directly precipitate action, to what we might call mere hormê or perhaps occurrent or practical hormê. In this narrower or specific sense, in which hormê is set alongside of orexis, the term appears to designate just that side of the motivating cognition that

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71 On this account, the Stoics will analyze a token action—opening a safe, say—by pointing to both the dispositional and occurrent cognitions that explain it. In the pathological case, an agent regards money (let us say) as a type of good and judges that the particular activity of opening the safe is a means of securing a token instance of that type. The former evaluation informs and explains—presumably in concert with other situational beliefs—the latter judgment that opening the safe is now the thing to do. Since her conviction about money is a false orexis, the resulting episode of action is a pathos, an instance of epithumia. If she secures the money and is thereby elated, this expansion of her psyche will be, according to the Stoic diagnosis, a further pathos, an instance of hêdonê. The difference between these two pathê will not be explained by any substantial change in her orexis—in her beliefs about what is good—but by her changing assessments of what is appropriate.

72 ‘Impulse’ has been the standard translation of hormê since Inwood, who rightly criticizes Voelke’s translation of the term as tendance. But as a translation that connotes an event or episode, ‘impulse’ seems to me to err in the opposite direction from Voelke. ‘Impulse’ captures the specific usage in which hormê is contrasted with orexis, but not the broader sense that extends to orexis and ekklisias as dispositions. Since it ranges over a variety of motivational attitude-types, both dispositional and occurrent, the broader sense is more precisely rendered simply by ‘desire’ or perhaps—as de Lacy renders Galen’s usage—‘conation’. On Galen’s use of the term, see especially Preus 1981, 54.
immediately issues in a motion of the soul. This classification is consistent with standard Stoic practice whereby a narrowly distinguished species is named “homonymously with the genus” (homōnumōs tōi genei) to which it belongs, and parallels to this usage can be produced for many other instances of Stoic terminology. The texts that treat orexis as distinct from hormê fit this pattern: both attitudes are species falling under the genus hormê, but one of them—what I am calling practical or occurrent hormê—shares the genus name. It is in this latter sense, as a homonymously named species of the broader genus hormê, that Epictetus distinguishes hormê from orexis.

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73 In those cases in which orexis and ekklisis are distinguished from occurrent hormê, the terms orexis and ekklisis appear to apply exclusively to the dispositions that precede and explain the psychic motions prompted by kathêkon judgments. It is true that in other contexts these orexis and hormê appear to designate categories of occurrent impulse as well. Stoic texts explicitly identify the excessive movements of the pathê as instances of epithumia and phobos, and these in turn said to be irrational forms of orexis and ekklisis, as I noted above. But as I read it, this feature of our evidence reflects the fact that the Stoics are thinking of the occurrent side of impulse as orexis or ekklisis in an extended sense, as an application or realization of prior dispositions. Thus an instance of epithumia, a pathos that occurs only in the non-wise, is a motion of the soul resulting from an application of mistaken beliefs about the good to judgments about action, an instance or expression of false orexis. So too boulêsis, a eupatheia that occurs only in the sage, is an instance of orexis in its fully rational form, an application of true and stable beliefs about the good. Cf. Preus 1981, “orexis is a subconscious volition, and hormê is a motor response” (54). There is no reason to suppose that orexis must be subconscious or unconscious, but Preus is right to think of orexis as an attitude that is prior to occurrent hormê.

74 DL 7.78 (Inwood’s translation). Origen tells us that hormê is the “highest genus of many species,” and that hormê and aphormê are named homonymously with this genus (Comment in Mattheum t. iii, 446 Delarue =SVF 3.170; trans Patrick). This accurately describes Epictetus’ own usage, in which the genus term hormê is applied to occurrent impulse—to punctual hormê and aphormê—but not to orexis and ekklisis. I doubt whether the Stoic taxonomy of impulse can be fully understood on the basis of our evidence, but several points seem clear. First, there is clearly a narrow sense of hormê that answers closely to kathêkon judgments that issue in occurrent motions of the soul. When Chrysippus devotes separate discussions to hormê and orexis (Epictetus Diss. 1.4.14, 4.4.16.), he appears to employ hormê in this narrow sense, using the genus term to distinguish occurrent hormê from the underlying hormetic disposition he calls orexis. This is the usage followed by Epictetus (see n12 above), and I see no reason to suppose that Epictetus departs from Chrysippus’ terminology in any important respect. There is also clearly a wider or fully generic sense of hormê, which appears to cover both dispositional and occurrent attitudes or perhaps applies to the disposition conceived as something that is activated or expressed in many occurrent instances (Stob. Ecl. 2.86; cf. Cicero Fin. 3.23, Luc. 24, ND 2.58). Finally, the Stoics are evidently willing to characterize occurrent impulses by reference to the underlying disposition from which they arise. Many of the forms of practical hormai mentioned by Stobaeus—boulêsis, hairesis, prohairesis, and thelêsis (Ecl. 2.87)—as well as the pathê appear to count as hormai in this sense: as motions of the soul characterized by the dispositions from which they flow. The idea is perhaps that occurrent impulse, conceived abstractly, receives its character from the hormetic disposition that underlies and determines it. There is ample precedent in Stoic theory for applying genus names to species of a less determinate sort. Thus tenures (hexeis) such as the technai receive the genus name in contrast to those tenures that are also characters (Long and Sedley 1987 Vol. 1, 376). Subsistent incorporeals receive the genus name—to huphestos—to distinguish them from subsistent things that are also bodies (Ju 2009, 375). Conceptions or ennoiai receive the genus name to mark them off from preconceptions that are naturally acquired (Jackson-McCabe 2004, 328). In the case of impulse, hormê and aphormê receive the genus name in contrast to orexis and ekklisis. On the Stoic practice of applying genus names to species, see further Inwood 1985, 225, 322n3; Graver 2007, 136-37; Ju 2009, 376n18.
If this reconstruction is on the right lines, there is a simple and philosophically attractive model that explains our evidence and reconciles Epictetus’ usage with that of the older Stoics: it is that a complete motivating state comprises an agent’s deeply seated convictions about good and bad, harm and benefit, together with a kathêkon judgment about a token action or affective response that is appropriate in view of these convictions. There are, that is to say, distinct but complementary forms of cognition that figure in the generation of affect and action, both of which are essential to a complete analysis of motivation. Though the term hormê may be applied to either side of this cognition, and perhaps to both together, orexis and ekklisis appear to be proper terms for the dispositional cognitions directed at the pursuit and avoidance of outcomes and object-types. These forms of motivation seem especially to answer to guiding aims or aspirations, to motivational commitments that determine individual episodes of action over time. Hormê in its specific sense applies more narrowly to the assessments of action arising from these dispositions, to the pursuit and realization of an agent’s aims in particular psychic motions. On this account, the judgment that an action is kathêkon does not figure as an isolated cause of impulse, but as a final psychological element added to a prior complex of descriptive and evaluative beliefs, where this entire complex plays an essential role in generating and explaining psychic movement. The evidence of Stobaeus and Epictetus strongly suggests that this analysis is not restricted to the pathê, but that orexis and ekklisis remain in the background of every occurrent impulse.

More is at stake in these issues than mere taxonomy or the question of Epictetus’ relation to the older Stoics. If orexis and ekklisis function as basic evaluations that determine every instance of action, as I have proposed, then the Stoic theory of motivation as a whole—and not merely the account of the pathê—has the basic shape of a practical syllogism, and Graver’s elegant analysis of the passions in fact reflects a perfectly general template for motivation in the older Stoics. Orexis and ekklisis should not be identified with occurrent impulses that issue immediately in action, however, but with the cognitions that answer to the major premise in Graver’s account, with the representation of object-types or outcomes as good or bad, a source of harm or benefit. It

75 In speaking of practical syllogisms, I don’t mean to suggest an explicit chain of reasoning or an inference pattern of which the agent is aware, merely a complex of beliefs that will be invoked to explain the grounds on which the agent acted.
is because an agent regards some object or outcome as a source of harm or benefit—because of the content of her orexis and ekklisis—that she comes to regard a token action as appropriate, so that these attitudes precede and explain every episode of psychic motion. The kathêkon judgments that directly precipitate action, on the other hand, are situational or deictic, triggering token episodes of action in something loosely akin to the final, conclusory judgment of a practical syllogism. In sum, I take orexis and ekklisis to be basic divisions of motivation for the older Stoics expressed or realized in the situational judgments that prompt individual actions, and falling under Chrysippus’ more general characterization of impulse as reason in humankind, commanding what must be done, forbidding what must be avoided. An agent’s motivations are comprehensively rooted, in this way, in her conceptions of what is good and bad.

Two further implications of this revised account are worth emphasizing. Recent interpretations of Stoic moral psychology have tended to focus on the role of kathêkon judgments to the exclusion of other forms of evaluative cognition, and this has shaped further assessments of Stoic moral psychology in substantive and sometimes surprising ways. This emphasis is partly due to the fact that kathêkon judgments resulting from assent to hormetic impressions are the final term, so to speak, in the generation of action, a crux of agency and a natural focus for questions of responsibility. But in developing this point, commentators sometimes appear to assume, in addition, that the Stoics regard an appeal to judgments of this sort as a complete motivational analysis, a citation of the most relevant psychological factors that caused the action and a sufficient explanation of why the agent acted. Such judgments have been regarded as motivating in their own right, so that a single attitude performs all of the psychological work that Hume distributes across a belief-desire pair. Accordingly, it has sometimes appeared, in discussions of the Stoic theory of action, that deliberate actions may be wholly motivated

[76] I am grateful to Philipp Brüllmann for helpful discussion of this point.
[77] Plutarch Stoic. repugn. 1037f. Cf. Cicero, Tusc. 4.12 (=SVF 3.438), Seneca, Ep. 118.9, Epictetus, Diss. 3.3.4, Lactantius Div. Inst. 6.15. Cicero presents what I take to be the same, comprehensive division of impulse (appetitus) into desire and aversion at Off. 1.102. It may also be worth mentioning that, as I understand the Stoic theory, the Stoics in fact employ the terms orexis and ekklisis in a manner similar to that which Graver 2007 associates with Aristotle as distinct from the Stoics, as characterizing “for pursuit and avoidance generally (30).” At the same time, the Stoics’ narrow use of hormê is similar to the use of hormê that Inwood 1985 associates with Aristotle, as meaning “activated desire” (10).
and explained by the judgment that an envisioned action is *kathêkon*.\(^{78}\) This is a surprising view to ascribe to thinkers who analyze the rational soul as a complex structure of representations. As an account of intentional action, such an analysis is minimal in the extreme, for it envisions the Stoic agent as acting on the basis of a single occurrent attitude, where the motivational force of this attitude need not depend on prior evaluations.

This worry is largely answered in some of Tad Brennan’s later work, which more clearly regards *kathêkon* judgments as the expression of prior evaluations, and in Graver’s detailed analysis of the *pathê*, which explicitly links an agent’s basic evaluations, at the level of types, to judgments about token instances of action or psychic motion.\(^{79}\) But a further assumption runs through the interpretations of Inwood, Brennan, and Graver, which is incompatible with the interpretation I have offered here. It is that *kathêkon* judgments, to the extent that they do rest on prior evaluations, need not rest on ascriptions of goodness and badness in particular. They may depend, instead, on ascriptions of the secondary or subordinate value the Stoics assign to promoted and dispromoted indifferents.\(^{80}\) Such ascriptions are supposed to comprise a distinct form of impulse—selection (*eklogê/selectio*)—that is sufficient to motivate and justify action in its own right, supplying an independent basis for rational action. On this account, *kathêkon* judgments will in some cases be informed by an agent’s true ascriptions of value to what is promoted, just as they are informed in other cases by true ascriptions of goodness to what is good. If this is the correct way to understand Stoic theory, then the Stoics must reject the Socratic view that motivation is always ultimately dependent on an agent’s beliefs and judgments about what is good, so that every deliberate action is in some sense undertaken for the sake of the good. This further conclusion—explicitly drawn by Brennan—stands in contrast to the view taken by Michael Frede, according to

\(^{78}\) This view is especially suggested in Brennan 2003 (267-69, 280) and developed more fully in Brennan 2014.

\(^{79}\) See Brennan 2005, Chapter 7 and Graver 2007, Chapter 2.

\(^{80}\) The gist of this account, which Rachana Kamtekar aptly calls ‘the two-motivators view,’ is that alongside the various good- (and bad-) dependent forms of motivation named in our sources for older Stoicism, the Stoics recognize a fundamentally distinct form of impulse—selection—invoking ascriptions of the sort of value that the late Stoic Antipater called selective value (*axia eklektikê*).
which “it is only because we now judge certain things to be good that we are motivated to act,” in Stoic theory.\(^\text{81}\)

I think there are independent reasons, both textual and conceptual, for rejecting this reconstruction of the Stoic position. As Tony Long noted some time ago, and as Stephen White has noted more recently, no Stoic text actually identifies lépsis or eklogê as a species of hormê or treats it as a form of motivation structurally parallel to that of good-dependent impulse.\(^\text{82}\) Moreover, if orexis and ekklisis drive occurrent impulse in every case, as I have proposed, the Stoics do not regard selection an alternative basis for motivation, for that psychological role is fully occupied by the cognitions I have associated with orexis and ekklisis. In conflating orexis and ekklisis with the occurrent judgments to which they give rise, the prevailing view overlooks the deeper layer of cognition that runs through the Stoic analysis. In particular, it overlooks those dispositional forms of motivation that are clearly present in the case of the pathê and which do involve—as one following Frede’s interpretation might expect—an agent’s conceptions of what is good and bad. If we qualify Frede’s statement so as to accommodate the case of ekklisis—noting that an agent’s convictions about what is bad and harmful may also stand behind her assessments of appropriate action—then I believe it to be correct. If orexis and ekklisis remain in the background of each kathêkon judgment, as I have argued, then every intentional action will have, as part of its psychological explanation, the agent’s conviction that some object or state of affairs constitutes a benefit or harm. This means both that an agent may harbor a range of

\(^{81}\) Frede, 1999, 75.

\(^{82}\) Long 1976, 81; White 2010, 110. I agree with White that the propositional content associated with hormê counts against the suggestion that selection (eklogê/lépsis) is a species of impulse: hormai are motivating attitudes directed at predicates associated with actions; selection, on the other hand, is an attitude involving ascriptions of selective value and disvalue to objects or states of affairs. One might therefore suppose that selection, like orexis and ekklisis, is a dispositional evaluation directed at objects and sufficient to motivate individual actions. Pace White and others, however, I do not think the Stoics regarded selective value (axia eklektikê) as a proper basis for motivation. Selection is rather the attitude one takes to indifferents in excluding them from the scope of motivating attitudes such as orexis and hairesis. If promoted indifferents figured as the proper objects of motivation in Stoic theory, we would expect Stoic sources to characterize actions undertaken on the basis of selection as léptea, just as they characterize actions undertaken on the basis of orexis and hairesis as orektea and hairetea. But despite many occurrences of lépton to characterize indifferents themselves, no Stoic source applies the verbal adjective lépteon to actions. Stoic texts systematically characterize the objects of selection by way of contrast with the objects of orexis and hairesis. Promoted and dispromoted indifferents are not motivational substitutes for goods and bads in Stoicism. See further Klein 2015.
evaluative beliefs that allow her to deliberate in advance of action and that each of her actions must be analyzed by reference to her basic conceptions of good or bad, as Frede suggests. That the Stoics had such a theory is unsurprising, for it is already explicit in the case of the pathē. My aim here has been to show that this is in fact a general feature of the Stoic theory of action, and that the Stoics integrate dispositional and occurrent forms of impulse in a complete motivational account.

It should be noted, finally, that this is an independently plausible analysis. A theory that aims to explain intentional action as intentional must represent the agent’s aim or end in acting. This is accomplished in Aristotle’s theory by the normative content of the major premise of a practical syllogism, which represents the obligation a particular action is thought to satisfy. It is accomplished in Hume’s theory by reference to the desire whose satisfaction a particular action is believed to serve. But the content of a kathēkon judgment alone cannot illuminate the goal or aim of action in this way. To say that an agent judges an action to be appropriate is not to specify the purpose or reason for which she acts. No one who asks why someone is opening a safe would regard an answer of this form—that she judges it to be appropriate—as one that illuminates the grounds of her action. On the other hand, to say that she believes money to be a good and its possession a benefit (or that she believes poverty to be harmful and worth avoiding) is to specify a consideration that guides and explains her behavior. If the Stoic theory is intended to illuminate the intentional basis of action, as I believe it is, some reference to the agent’s aim or end in acting must be included in the analysis it offers. An analysis that traces each action to orexis or ekklisis in the way I have proposed represents an agent’s aim in the appropriate way.

This interpretation raises further questions that cannot be pursued here, but I think it is more consonant with the totality of our evidence than the supposition that orexis and ekklisis are a species of kathēkon judgment. That is the assumption that leads unnecessarily to Epictetus’ supposed departure from the older Stoic view. On the other hand, if we consider Epictetus’ own use of orexis and ekklisis, and if we generalize from the place of orexis and ekklisis in the Stoic account of the pathē, we arrive at a taxonomy that brings Epictetus’ treatment into harmony with the older Stoic position and makes sense of the cognitive content associated with orexis. Such an account, according to
which desire is ultimately directed toward the apparent good and away from the bad, fits closely with Stoicism’s Socratic credentials. It illuminates the evaluative basis of intentional action, and it explains why Epictetus speaks continually of the need to reform orexis and ekklisis, insisting that the pathê can be eliminated only by restricting these attitudes to what is up to us.

Works Cited


