1. Introduction

Securely Stoic accounts of oikeiōsis—appropriation, as I will translate it—are marked by two features: they begin with the apparently descriptive claim that the complex, seemingly purposeful behaviour all animals display in relation to their environment depends on a sophisticated capacity for self-perception. They conclude, on the other hand, with the normative thesis that the human good consists in a life regulated by reason or, as the Stoics sometimes describe it, in a life lived according to nature.¹ This account is central to three of the fullest surviving presentations of Stoic ethics, and sources report that the Stoics appealed to it to defend their conception of the human good in general and their account of justice in particular.² Since Pohlenz, most commentators have regarded the oikeiōsis doctrine as substantially Stoic in origin and important, one way or another, to Stoic ethical theory.³ But they

¹ On the translation of oikeiōsis and its cognates see nn. 14 and 16 below.
² Diogenes Laertius (7. 85–6 = LS 57A = SVF iii. 178) and Cicero (Fin. 3. 16–22) assign the doctrine a grounding role in their surveys of Stoic ethics, and Cic. Acad. 2. 131 (= SVF i. 131) says that the Stoic account of the end is derived from oikeiōsis (’ducatur a conciliatioe’). Hierocles makes oikeiōsis the starting-point of his ethical treatise (El. Eth., col. 1–2). On the doctrine’s connection to justice see Porph. Abst. 3. 19 (= SVF i. 197); Plut. Stoic. repugn. 163 b (= LS 57E = SVF ii. 724); Soll. an. 962 x; De amore 455 c; Anon. In Plut. Theaet., cols. v. 24–vii. 1 (= LS 57H).
³ Von Arnim bases his attribution of the doctrine to Theophrastus on the syncretizing account of oikeiōsis preserved in Arius Didymus’ survey of Peripatetic ethics (Arius Didymus’ ‘Abriß der peripatetischen Ethik (Vienna, 1926)). He is followed by F. Dirlmeier, Die Oikeiosislehre Theophrasts (= Philologus, suppl. 36.1; Leipzig,
have also found it difficult to understand the relationship between its central elements. On the face of it, an appeal to animal behaviour does not offer a compelling strategy for establishing fundamental ethical conclusions. How did the Stoics set about drawing normative principles from claims about animal psychology, and how is the doctrine relevant to the Stoics' distinctive ethical concerns?


Besides the general problem of the scarcity of surviving sources, attempts to answer these questions face two more specific difficulties. In the first place, the empirical claims from which the oikeiōsis theory begins can seem strangely out of joint with the particular normative conclusions the Stoics wish to draw. As is well known, the Stoic account of the human end combines the broadly Socratic claim that virtue is the only good, necessary and sufficient for eudaimonia, with a highly cosmopolitan view of the other-regarding requirements of virtue. The normative elements of Stoic ethical theory appear to include quite demanding obligations towards others, and it is clear that in their discussions of justice the Stoics defended at least a minimal notion of obligation to all human beings as such. The sources dealing with oikeiōsis, on the other hand, consistently foreground a particularly egoistic...
form of behaviour: the readily observable tendency of animals to care for themselves by pursuing what is conducive to their own survival and avoiding what is not. Though commentators have offered various suggestions about the relation between the motive of self-preservation and the other-regarding dimensions of Stoic ethics, there is no consensus about how (or indeed whether) the Stoics integrated them within a single account. The self-regarding focus of the *oikeiōsis* doctrine seems to cut against the cosmopolitan tenor of Stoic ethics.

A second difficulty is posed by the survival of a closely parallel theory—or cluster of theories—associated with the late Academic tradition and deriving, as most commentators now agree, from Antiochus of Ascalon. Antiochus' adoption and prominent use of the *oikeiōsis* theory tend to confirm its centrality to Stoic ethics, but they also obscure our view of the doctrine's role in early Stoic theory. In later Academic versions of the doctrine, a structurally similar account of moral development that also begins from the motivational patterns apparent in animal behaviour is made to support a conception of the human telos that differs in crucial respects from the Stoics' own. In the Antiochean accounts of *De finibus* 4 and 5, for instance, the motivational impulses of children and animals are said to confirm a conception of the end according to which states and conditions external to virtue are goods in their own right and contribute, together with virtue itself, to the happiness of human agents (Cic. *Fin.* 4. 16–19, 25–39; 5. 24–36). This analysis of the human good differs importantly from the Stoic identification of goodness with virtue alone; yet it is supposed to follow from some of the same

---


motivational tendencies the Stoics affirm and from the primacy of self-preservation in particular. By contrast, Antiochus represents the Stoics’ own conclusions as incompatible with the empirical observations from which the Stoics begin (Cic. Fin. 4. 33–9).

Despite these challenges, I want to suggest that there is room for further attention to the doctrine’s purported ethical import. Appeals to the character of neonatal motivation figure in the ethical arguments of each of the main Hellenistic schools, and in each case they seem intended to clarify the structure of fully rational motivation in human agents. The Stoic doctrine of oikeiosis follows this pattern in two important respects. First, it treats the capacity for perception, and the capacity for self-perception in particular, as the psychological basis of the activities appropriate to animate organisms in virtue of the constitutions given to them by nature. Second, it treats the perfection of these capacities and the functions they control as a sufficient condition of an organism’s teleological success. These claims are continuous with the Stoic analysis of human agency, and they answer to the central claims of Stoic ethics: viz., that virtue consists in a cognitive condition that centrally includes self-knowledge and that, together with the activities to which it gives rise, this condition is constitutive of the human good. Stoic sources insist, as Academic and Peripatetic accounts do not, that animals are born with a capacity to perceive themselves and their situation in the world, and that this capacity enables them to coordinate their actions in a way that is appropriate both to their surroundings and to their distinctive constitutions.

8 Strictly speaking, the Stoics identify goodness with virtue and what participates in virtue, including especially the activities to which virtue gives rise (D.L. 7. 94 = STF iii. 76; Stob. 2. 57 = STF iii. 79).
9 I use ‘animate organisms’ to distinguish organisms that possess psuchē from those that do not in the Stoic scheme. Such a phrase would be redundant in a discussion of Aristotle’s biology, which treats every living organism as ensouled.
10 Here and throughout, I employ ‘cognitive’ to characterize a mental state whose functional role is to represent the world. In this usage ‘cognitive’ applies quite generally to representational states such as perceptions, beliefs, and judgements no less than to knowledge. This clarification is important since ‘cognitive’ and ‘cognitive impression’ are sometimes used to translate the Stoic technical terms καταληπτικός and φαντασία καταληπτική. So employed, ‘cognitive’ carries a further sense I do not intend, that of warrant. A warranted belief results, in the Stoics’ view, from assent to impressions that (1) are true, (2) precisely represent their object, and (3) have (on the interpretation I accept) a phenomenal character distinct from mental representations that fail conditions (1) or (2). In my usage, a cognitive mental state possesses a representational ‘direction of fit’ but need not satisfy any of these further conditions.
I will argue that these elements of the *oikeiōsis* doctrine help to clarify its role in Stoic ethics. Though the characterization of animal behaviour central to each of the *oikeiōsis* accounts does not appear to constitute an argument for the Stoic analysis of the human *telos* in its own right, it does constitute such an argument when conjoined to a normative assumption the Stoics share with other Hellenistic schools: roughly, that the earliest object of motivation in animals and human infants corresponds to the object of motivation in fully rational human agents, thus providing a guide to the basic character of the human end. My aim here is not to defend this assumption but rather to reconstruct its role in Stoic theory as part of an argument for the Stoic account of the human good. If this assumption is a common starting-point of Hellenistic cradle arguments, as Jacques Brunschwig has argued, then the analysis of animal psychology that survives in fragmentary discussions of Stoic *oikeiōsis* can be seen to motivate the central tenets of Stoic ethical theory in clear respects. The Stoics explain the complex, goal-directed behaviours of animals by appealing to the perceptive and proprioceptive capacities with which they are born. This focus on animal perception supports the cognitive analysis of virtue the Stoics accept in the human case: what animals do on the basis of non-rational perception, the Stoics claim, human beings do on the basis of rational, conceptually structured perception and cognition. The Stoic understanding of human virtue as a cognitive condition that centrally includes self-knowledge is thus one instance of a wider analysis that makes accurate cognition the basis of appropriate action and teleological success in rational and non-rational animals alike.

If this reconstruction is correct, the Stoics argue for the primacy of cognition in their explanation of animal behaviour because they...
wish to argue that appropriate action is also achieved by human agents through a cognitive grasp of one's own constitution and through the perfection of the faculty on which this grasp depends. The psychological background of the oikeiōsis account is crucial to making sense of the doctrine's role in Stoic ethical theory, for it suggests an effort by the Stoics to extend key elements of Socratic psychology to a much broader analysis of the mechanisms by which animate organisms are regulated by nature so as to achieve their ends. In what follows, I argue for this interpretation in three stages. I first offer a brief survey of the available evidence for the theory of oikeiōsis. I then emphasize a number of difficulties raised by recent interpretations of this evidence. Finally, I suggest a revised account of the way in which the oikeiōsis theory supports the central claims of Stoic ethics: that virtue consists in a cognitive grasp of the natural order, and that this condition, when perfected, is sufficient for achieving the human telos.

2. Evidence for the Stoic doctrine

The state of the available evidence for the Stoic doctrine is complicated, to say the least. It is unclear whether the Stoics themselves coined the verbal noun oikeiōsis, and there is no direct textual evidence that Chrysippus himself used it, though his use of cognates is well attested (Plut. Stoic. repugn. 1038 b = LS 57E = SVF iii. 179, ii. 724; Galen, PHP 5. 5. 8–26 = Posid. fr. 169 = LS 65M). The term first appears in a fragment attributed to Theophrastus and derives from a family of words occasionally put to philosophical use by Plato and Aristotle. As Pembroke observes, the verb to which oikeiōsis is directly related is oikeioun, and this is derived in turn from the adjective oikeion and the noun oikos. A thing or person is said to be oikeion when it belongs to one either by kinship, as in the case of family, or by possession, as in the case of property. Some texts employ the middle-passive form oikeioauthai to suggest that something has been made an object of care and concern for a creature by the agency of providential nature. Oikeiōsis, on the

---

13 Cf. Hier. El. Eth., col. vii. 15–16; Plut. Stoic. repugn. 1038 a (=LS 57E = SVF
other hand, describes an orientation that is at once both cognitive and motivational. Plutarch (Stoic. repugn. 1928 c.=SVF i. 197) offers as an explanation of the Stoic concept the claim that oikeïōsis is a perception (aisthēsis) and grasp (antilēpsis) of what is appropriate (oikeion). No English rendering of oikeion is wholly satisfactory, but the Stoics’ technical usage is well captured by Brennan: a feature of an animal’s environment may be characterized as oikeion just in case it is a suitable object of concern for the animal.

The terminology of oikeiōsis figures in a range of texts in con-

In Striker’s paraphrase, oikeïōsis is the ‘recognition and appreciation of something as belonging to one’ (’Role’, 281). No single English word quite covers the complex sense the Stoics gave to the term. ‘Appropriation’ and ‘orientation’ come close but fail to capture the recognition of personal affinity conveyed by the Greek. ‘Appropriation’ has been the predominant translation since Long and Sedley, however, who observe that it ‘provides a means, through the verb or adjective “appropriate”, of rendering grammatically related forms of the Greek root oik-’ (A. A. Long and D. Sedley (eds.), The Hellenistic Philosophers [LS], 2 vols. (Cambridge, 1987), i. 351). ‘Appropriation’ also preserves the connection between oikeïōsis and appropriate (kathēκoν) action, which the Stoics intend (D.L. 7. 108=LS 59C=SVF iii. 493), and I have occasionally rendered kathēκoν by ‘appropriate’ as well. Besides that of Long and Sedley, discussions of the term and its cognates include Pembroke, ‘Oikeiōsis’, 144–16 and 132–41; Kerferd, ‘Search’, 177–96; Inwood, Ethics and Human Action, 183–4; Ramelli, Hierocles, 54. For the use of related terminology in Plato and Aristotle see esp. Pohlenz, Grundfragen, 12 n. 1; Pembroke ‘Oikeiōsis’, 132–8; Kerferd, ‘Search’, 183–4; Brennan, The Stoic Life, 135–63. In Greek διλόγρων is the contrast term for oikeio and διλόγρωπον (alienation, estrangement) is the corresponding verbal noun. Cicero typically renders oikeiōsis with either commendatio or conciliatio, with conciliatum and alienum answering to the Greek oikeio and διλό-
grōν.

Inwood doubts Plutarch’s trustworthiness in this passage on the grounds that oikeiōsis ‘depends on perception but is not itself a form of perception’ (Ethics and Human Action, 312 n. 36; cf. Striker, ‘Role’, 281 n. 1). This is no doubt correct, but it is not clear to me that Plutarch’s usage in this regard is any looser than the Stoics’ own. Given the details of Stoic psychology, which is built around a cognitive analysis of motivation, there is a tight connection between the recognition of something as oikeio and the consequent motivation to pursue it (cf. n. 76 below). Porphyry similarly maintains that perception (τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι) is the principle (ἀρχή) of oikeiōsis and διλόγρωπον (Abst. 3. 19=SVF i. 197).

See Brennan, The Stoic Life, 158: ‘I propose that what it means to take something to be oikeio is that one treats it as an object of concern.’ As Brennan observes (in personal correspondence), ‘concern’ must here be understood broadly enough to cover a spectrum of cases ranging from the nurturing and benevolent to the appetitive and predatory. Though it sounds objectionable to describe a newly hatched chick as oikeio to a bird of prey as well as to the mother hen, the different ways in which the chick is of interest to each are presumably to be explained by the differing constitutions of hens and hawks. Cf. D.L. 7. 108 (=LS 59C=SVF iii. 493).
The Stoic Argument from oikeiōsis

connection with a distinctively Stoic account of human development. These reports differ importantly in emphasis, and it is possible to produce different pictures of the oikeiōsis doctrine depending on which of them are given the most weight. Two of the fullest presentations, which have also received the most scholarly attention, are those of Diogenes Laertius and Cicero. Though the shorter of the two, Diogenes’ account is distinctive for its presentation of material that appears to be taken from Chrysippos’ lost treatise On Ends, and it probably gives us our most reliable glimpse of the main lines of the early Stoic doctrine. Cicero’s version (Fin. 3. 16–23), though more detailed in some respects, is also more difficult to attribute. Cicero does not mention any of the older Stoics by name, and his summaries of the theory may follow later versions that appear to be based (in De officiis) on Panaitius and are perhaps based (in De finibus) on Diogenes of Babylon. Finally, there is the detailed, apparently orthodox but regrettable fragmentary treatise of the Stoic Hierocles, which defends specific aspects of the Stoic doctrine against later critics. These texts can be supplemented by a helpful but incomplete account of oikeiōsis in one of Seneca’s letters, by shorter passages in Cicero and Aulus Gellius, and by many oblique references in Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius.

Each of these sources merits individual discussion, but there is enough common ground among them to supply us with a reasonably uncontroversial overview of the Stoic theory. Diogenes, Cicero, and Hierocles each begin by alluding to a form of self-perception that precedes and explains an animal’s earliest impulses, enabling it to orient and co-ordinate its activities so as to ensure its own survival. No one, the Stoics observe, teaches a newborn animal what its limbs and appendages are for, nor the sort of food it needs, nor the predators it must avoid in order to...
survive. From birth animals display a striking sensitivity, present without instruction, to the nature of their own faculties and to the threats and benefits present in their environment. Hierocles argues at length that animals continuously perceive not only what their own physical faculties with their various limbs and appendages are for, but also what the dispositions of other animals are for and the actions, such as flight or aggression, that constitute an appropriate response to them (El. Eth., cols. i. 50–111. 29). The same form of self-perception is invoked to explain a range of co-ordinated behaviour animals display in relation to other animals, including concern for offspring and, in some cases, co-operation with other species. Thus a central claim of the oikētōsis theory is that animals are born with a capacity to perceive, in a teleologically informed way, their appropriate relation to a range of complex features of their environment.

The focus on animal behaviour, however, is apparently not the central import of the Stoic theory. In each of the main accounts, this initial focus shifts to an analysis of psychological development in humans and, finally, to conclusions about the character of the human good. Unfortunately, Hierocles’ otherwise continuous and detailed account contains a lengthy lacuna at just the point at which the case of human development and its implications are about to be described. The summaries of Cicero and Diogenes briefly outline, however, what fuller articulations of the doctrine must have described in greater detail: the way in which the initial perceptions and attractions of pre-rational children develop in the ideal case into the systematic, propositionally structured form of cognition in which virtue consists. This condition is rooted in a developing set of conceptions (ennoiai) that appear to involve, as part of their content, an increasingly articulate awareness of the kind of creature one is and of the modes of behaviour that are appropriate as a result.
The Stoic Argument from oikeiosis

It is clear that the Stoics regard such conceptions as partly and perhaps primarily constitutive of the rational faculty that guides and explains human behaviour quite generally. Thus Diogenes describes the human transition to rational maturity as the point at which 'reason supervenes as the craftsman of impulse' (D.L. 7. 86 = LS 57A=SVF iii. 178, trans. Long and Sedley), and Cicero's account describes the eventual appreciation by human agents of the 'order and harmony of our obligations' (Fin. 3. 21 = LS 59D=SVF iii. 188, trans. after Rackham). These descriptions suggest that a central goal of the oikeiosis theory is to establish reason's role in shaping the motivations of adult human beings and to characterize this role as the distinguishing mark of human agency.

3. Interpretative difficulties

This overview more or less summarizes the picture that emerges if the reports of Cicero, Diogenes, and Hierocles are taken together. Though most commentators agree that the oikeiosis theory is somehow central to Stoic ethics, there is little agreement about the way in which an argumentative appeal to it is supposed to proceed. We can distinguish two broad ways of understanding the ethical implications of the Stoic account that have so far dominated the interpretative literature. These interpretations are best illustrated by reference to a prominent feature of Diogenes' report, the impulse to self-preservation that characterizes animal behaviour from birth:

See n. 65 below.
They [sc. the Stoics] say that an animal has self-preservation [τὸ τηρεῖν ἑαυτῷ] as the object of its primary impulse, since Nature from the beginning appropriates it (to itself), as Chrysippus says in his On Ends book 1. The first thing appropriate to every animal, he says, is its own constitution and the awareness of this. For Nature was not likely either to alienate the animal (from itself) or to make it and then neither alienate it nor appropriate it. So it remains to say that in constituting the animal Nature appropriated it to itself. This is why the animal rejects what is harmful and accepts what is appropriate. They hold it false to say as some people do that pleasure is the object of an animal’s first impulse. For pleasure, they say, if it does occur, is a by-product which arises only when Nature all by itself has searched out and adopted the proper requirements for a creature’s constitution, just as animals [then] frolic and plants bloom. Nature, they say, is no different in regard to plants and animals at the time when it directs animals as well as plants without impulse and sensation, and in us certain processes of a vegetative kind take place. But since animals have the additional faculty of impulse, through the use of which they go in search of what is appropriate to them, what is natural for them is to be administered in accordance with their impulse. And since reason by way of a more perfect management has been bestowed on rational beings, to live correctly in accordance with reason comes to be natural for them. For reason supervenes as the craftsman of impulse. (D.L. 7. 85–6=LS 57A=SVF iii. 178, trans. Long and Sedley, with minor changes)

Diogenes here describes a form of motivation present in every animal, a πρῶτη ὁρμή or primary impulse whose object is the preservation of the constitution (sustasis) nature has given the animal and of...
The Stoic Argument from oikeiōsis

which it is aware. Commentators differ sharply about the role this impulse plays in the Stoic characterization of practical rationality, which the theory of oikeiōsis seems intended to support. The main challenge is to fit the apparently egoistic character of this impulse with what is known independently about the altruistic requirements of Stoic ethics. If the Stoics intend to argue for an other-regarding conception of the requirements that apply to rational human agents, why do they begin from such a confined and self-centred form of motivation, which they appear to regard as universal in animate organisms?

There are two general approaches to this problem in the literature. According to one line of interpretation, the primary impulse to self-preservation is primary not in the sense of being one of the earliest motivations observable in every animal but in the sense of being the dominant form of motivation in every animal, including fully rational human agents. On this model, the pro̱tē hormē to self-preservation characterizes the motivation of a sage no less than that of non-rational animals and pre-rational humans. In the ideal case of the child who eventually becomes a sage, the acquisition of a capacity to shape her actions by reason does not supplant or supersede the impulse to self-preservation with which she was born; it rather determines the form this impulse is to take. Rather than preserving herself as an animal with animal needs, she one day begins to preserve herself qua rational, which is to say, she does the things a fully rational human being should do. Though the impulse to preserve herself is now an impulse to preserve her essentially rational nature, it nonetheless remains primary to her motivational outlook. Since, ex hypothesi, the sage is a fully rational agent, on this interpretation the impulse to self-preservation structures the motivations the

33 A number of sources speak both of self-preserving motivation and behaviour and of a πρῶτον οἰκεῖον or primary appropriate thing. Diogenes’ account, however, is the only source that makes explicit mention of a πρῶτη ὁρμή or primary impulse. See Inwood, Ethics and Human Action, 218–24.


35 See e.g. M. Pohlenz, Die Stoa (Göttingen, 1948), 115: ‘Wenn sich dann aber im Laufe der Jahre der Logos ausbildet und seiner selbst bewußt wird, wendet sich die Oikeiosis dem Logos als dem wahren Wesen des Menschen zu und erkennt in der reinen Entfaltung der Vernunft das, was für den Menschen wahrhaft “naturgemäß” und “gut” ist.’ Pohlenz goes on to identify concern for human reason with concern for that of the cosmos as a whole (117), a move Striker dismisses with the observation that ‘concern for my glass of water is not concern for yours, or for the whole mass of water in the universe’ (‘Following Nature’, 227). The mass of water in the universe is not a continuous or unified entity, however. Stoic πνεῦμα is.
Stoics regard as paradigmatically rational. With some differences of emphasis and detail, Pohlenz, Pembroke, and Inwood defend this model of oikeiōsis. Each has also argued that Stoic ethics is derived not merely from the oikeiōsis account in general but from the impulse to self-preservation in particular.\(^{26}\)

A second line of interpretation holds that, at least in the human case, the later stages of psychological development involve a comprehensive break with the self-interested outlook characteristic of animals and pre-rational children. On this model, it is implausible to suppose that Stoic ethics is somehow derived from the motive of self-preservation, since this motive is entirely superseded in the course of rational development. Those favouring this general account, again with differences of detail, include White, Striker, and Frede. White, for instance, comprehensively criticizes Pohlenz's understanding of the oikeiōsis doctrine, arguing that its focus on self-preservation and self-interest is mistaken based on a reading of De finibus 4 and 5, thereby confusing older Stoic views with Antiochus’ later appropriation of the doctrine. White explicitly rejects Pohlenz’s supposition that the motivations of the sage are ‘derived from the impulse to self-preservation’, arguing instead that this impulse is eventually replaced by a regard for the rational order apparent in nature as a whole, an order the sage comes to esteem propter se.\(^{27}\) Frede and Striker adopt a similar interpretation. Frede holds that ‘in the course of this development one’s motivation undergoes a radical change’, a change that explains why although one is born with a strong impulse to preserve oneself, the Stoic sage is not even so partial as to prefer her own survival to another’s.\(^{28}\) Striker similarly suggests that what the Stoics need ‘is an argument to show that man’s interests should at a certain point in life shift

---

\(^{26}\) Thus Pohlenz: ‘Das Grundmotiv der Lehre ist, die Normen für die Lebensgestaltung aus einem Urtriebe der menschlichen Natur abzuleiten’ (Grundfragen, 12). Pembroke speaks of ‘the morality which the Stoics derived from self-preservation’ (Oikeiōsis, 132). Inwood characterizes the motive of self-preservation as ‘the starting-point for all value’ in Stoic theory (Ethics and Human Action, 184) and attributes to Chrysippus the view that ‘Man’s commitment to virtue could be derived . . . from the basic instinct of self-preservation’ (Ethics and Human Action, 194). According to R. Salles, ‘On [the Stoic] view, our moral evolution is determined by the development of our concern for self-preservation’ (The Stoics on Determinism and Compatibilism (Aldershot, 2005), 48).

\(^{27}\) White, ‘Basis’, 149–53.

The Stoic Argument from oikeiōsis

from self-preservation or even self-perfection to an exclusive interest in observing and following nature’. In her view, the sage’s motivation ‘will not simply be an enlightened form of self-love’.

The upshot, then, is that the literature on oikeiōsis reflects a basic disagreement about the correct way to understand the rational development of the Stoic sage and, more generally, the relationship between the observations with which the oikeiōsis account begins and the conclusions the Stoics go on to draw. Each of these interpretations, moreover, is at points difficult to square with the available evidence. On the one hand, there is good reason to suppose that the Stoics regard the primary impulse to self-preservation as primary to rational agents no less than to children and non-rational animals. This understanding seems to be required by a number of texts, and it fits closely with the eudaimonist framework of Stoic ethics as a whole. On the other hand, the tendency of commentators to understand this impulse in narrowly egoistic terms has prompted the assumption—traceable especially to the interpretations of Pohlenz, Brink, and Pembroke—that the Stoics must have recognized two distinct forms of oikeiōsis, variously characterized by commentators as outward- and inward-looking or as personal and social forms of oikeiōsis. This distinction has prompted, in turn, a number of deflationary conclusions about the point and

10 Striker, ‘Following Nature’, 231. She suggests that according to Cicero’s account, ‘self-preservation is replaced as a primary goal by the desire for order and harmony’ (ibid. 227).

11 The emphasis on self-preservation in the rational case is perhaps strongest in Seneca’s Letter 121, where Seneca relates the actions appropriate at each stage of life to a fundamental orientation towards self that is constant through each of them and to which a creature’s behaviour is referred. It seems clear from Seneca’s account that this form of motivation is prior in some respect to every other form of motivational impulse: ‘If I do all things because of concern for myself [propter curam mei], concern for myself is prior to all things’ (Ep. 121. 17, my translation). For discussion of this passage see Inwood, Seneca, 342. Similarly strong statements of self-interest appear in Epictetus, who clearly intends them to apply in the case of the sage (e.g. Diss. 1. 19. 11–15; 2. 4. 1–4; 2. 10. 10–18; 2. 22. 15–22; 2. 23. 17–19); cf. Cic. Fin. 3. 59 (=LS 59F = SVF iii. 498); Marc. Aur. Med. 11. 16; Alex. Aphr. Quaest. 4. 119. 23 Bruns (=SVF iii. 165). Cf. Kühn, ‘L’attachement’, 215–24.


coherence of the Stoic doctrine. Thus Inwood, building on the reconstruction proposed by Brink, concludes that the Stoics introduced social oikeiōsis as a 'later graft' onto the original theory, which initially dealt only with appropriation to oneself.33 The suggestion that the older Stoics failed to connect these distinct forms of oikeiōsis in a coherent way is now embedded in one strand of the interpretative literature. Yet it attributes to the Stoics a disjointed and apparently ad hoc account.

The model favoured by Striker and Frede invites other difficulties. If the motivations of a fully rational agent are characterized by a fundamental shift away from self-concern, as their interpretations suggest, it is difficult to understand why references to the self-preserving behaviour of animals figure so prominently in the oikeiōsis account at all. As Jacques Brunschwig emphasizes, Stoic and Epicurean appeals to neonatal motivation are evidently intended to inform us, in the last analysis, of the structure and content of the human telos.34 In each case, these arguments offer us a story about what does occur in infants and non-rational animals and about what, given these starting-points, ought to occur in rational agents. Neonatal motivation and fully rational motivation constitute the two poles of the Epicurean argument, and the Epicureans’ appeal to the former is clearly intended to support their account of the latter (D.L. 10. 137; Cic. Fin. 1. 26–31 = LS 21A; Fin. 2. 31–2). That the Stoic account works on analogous lines is strongly suggested by a number of sources. It is assumed by Cicero, for instance, and it is stated quite clearly by Alexander of Aphrodisias, who notes that disagreement about the primary object of oikeiōsis corresponds to disagreement about the highest good, so that these objects are correlative in an important respect.35 If the impulse to

33 Inwood, ‘Comments’, 192. Inwood suggests that ‘Chrysippus’ failure to forge a firm and plausible link [between personal and social oikeiōsis] can be seen as the cause for the confusion seen in later discussions’ (ibid. 197). Again, ‘if the Stoics themselves had only an ad hoc explanation for the relation of the two oikeiōses, it is less puzzling that this late Hellenistic text [i.e. that of Arius Didymus] failed to produce a philosophically coherent doctrine from them’ (ibid. 199). Cf. Brink, ‘Theophrastus and Zeno’, 137: ‘Later Stoics could use the whole range of Theophrastus’s oikeiotēs grafted on to their own doctrines.’ For persuasive criticisms of this suggestion see Long, ‘Theophrastus’, 373–4.


35 At Mant. 150. 27–8 Bruns Alexander attributes to each of the main schools what Inwood usefully calls the ‘alignment condition’, viz. that ‘the distinguishing feature of the primary object of desire (τὸ πρῶτον οἰκεῖον) corresponds to the distinguishing feature of the ultimate object of desire’ (trans. Inwood, in Ethics after Aristotle,

Jacob Klein
self-preservation is wholly abandoned by rational agents, why do Stoic accounts of *oikeiōsis* insist on the primacy of this impulse in the first place? To hold that human motivation undergoes a radical shift in the ideal course of development seems to undercut the dialectical point of the *oikeiōsis* account.

A central difficulty in understanding the ethical import of *oikeiōsis*, therefore, is that of fitting the Stoics’ claims about animal psychology and teleology together with their claims about rational human agency. If we emphasize the motive of self-preservation with which the *oikeiōsis* accounts begin, we seem unable to explain the single-minded attachment to virtue that characterizes the fully rational sage. On the other hand, if we point to discontinuities between the animal and human cases, we seem to undermine the dialectical point of the argument as a whole. The Stoics appear to lack a convincing account of the psychology that bridges the gap between non-rational and rational forms of motivation, or an explanation of how neonatal concern for one’s self supports the other-regarding injunctions the Stoics accept in the human case. On the whole, commentators have not been optimistic about the Stoics’ success in bridging these gaps or in showing how appeals to *oikeiōsis* could be used to support the central tenets of Stoic ethics. More recently some have concluded, in view of these difficulties, that the *oikeiōsis* theory must not have been offered as a justification for ethical conclusions at all. Instead of offering grounds for accepting the Stoic analysis of virtue, it merely details the psychological route by which this condition is acquired. This assumption structures the *Carneadia divisio*, and Alexander here applies it for his own critical ends, much as Cicero does in *De finibus* 5. Influenced as they are by Carneades, Alexander’s testimony and representation of the Stoic position must be treated with care. In my view, however, what is distorted in Carneadean accounts of *οἰκείωσις* is not the ‘alignment condition’ but the psychological details that underpin Stoic versions of the argument. In particular, Carneadean accounts obscure the distinctive analysis of the *πρῶτον οἰκεῖον*, with its emphasis on cognition and self-perception, from which Stoic versions of the argument begin. As I argue below, this distortion lies behind the allegation—implied in *De finibus* 3, explicit in *De finibus* 4—that the Stoic account of the human telos is inconsistent with the motivational starting-points the Stoics themselves accept. See further n. 92 below.

---

118. This assumption structures the *Carneadia divisio*, and Alexander here applies it for his own critical ends, much as Cicero does in *De finibus* 5. Influenced as they are by Carneades, Alexander’s testimony and representation of the Stoic position must be treated with care. In my view, however, what is distorted in Carneadean accounts of *οἰκείωσις* is not the ‘alignment condition’ but the psychological details that underpin Stoic versions of the argument. In particular, Carneadean accounts obscure the distinctive analysis of the *πρῶτον οἰκεῖον*, with its emphasis on cognition and self-perception, from which Stoic versions of the argument begin. As I argue below, this distortion lies behind the allegation—implied in *De finibus* 3, explicit in *De finibus* 4—that the Stoic account of the human telos is inconsistent with the motivational starting-points the Stoics themselves accept. See further n. 92 below.


37 Striker, ‘Role’, 293; S. Menn, ‘Physics as a Virtue’, *Proceedings of the Boston
Jacob Klein

The interpretative claim I want to develop is that the Stoic argument fits the dialectical pattern prominent in other Hellenistic appeals to neonatal motivation. The Stoic theory of oikeiōsis is more than a description of the process by which rational agents acquire the beliefs in which virtue consists; it is also offered as a justification of Stoic claims about the cognitive character of virtue and about the sufficiency of virtue for happiness. My reconstruction takes as a starting-point two pieces of evidence for the Stoic view. (1) Seneca (Ep. 121. 10 = LS 29F = SVF iii. 184) and Alexander of Aphrodisias (Mant. 150. 30–3 Bruns = SVF iii. 183) confirm that, according to at least some of the Stoics, the object of a creature’s primary oikeiōsis relation is not self-preservation narrowly construed, but the preservation (tērēsis) of its constitution (sustasis/constitutio). (2) Galen preserves a fragment of Posidonius in which Chrysippus is said to have restricted the oikeion to the fine (kalon) alone (PHP 5. 5. 8–26 = Posidonius fr. 169 = LS 65M). An animal’s impulse to self-preservation, I will argue, should not be identified with an impulse to pursue its physical well-being per se, nor with a form of motivation that is radically altered or replaced in the fully rational case. Rather, it should be identified with an impulse to preserve (tērein) its leading faculty or hēgemonikon in a condition of conformity to nature. Being directed at the hēgemonikon itself, the primary impulse is prior not in order of time or strength, but in so far as it has as its object the preservation of the faculty in which each of an


38 This latter claim should be distinguished clearly from a third possibility the Stoics do not intend: that the oikeiōsis account supplies epistemic grounds for the beliefs in which virtue consists. It is clear that no one could acquire the demanding cognitive condition the Stoics identify with virtue merely by accepting basic theoretical claims about virtue. As I argue below, the oikeiōsis account offers one kind of support for Stoic claims about the character of virtue and the objects towards which virtuous motivation is directed. One does not acquire the set of beliefs in which virtue consists merely by accepting these claims, however.

39 Alexander reports that those Stoics who ‘are thought to speak more subtly and to make more distinctions about this say that it is to our own constitution [ōnōma] and its preservation [výgōma] that we have been appropriated’ (Mant. 150. 30–3 Bruns, trans. Sharples). Pohlenz takes this to refer to Chrysippus (Grundfragen, 8–9). Here appropriation to one’s own constitution is contrasted with appropriation to oneself simpliciter. Seneca’s Letter 121 is devoted to considering whether ‘animals have an awareness of their own constitution’ (Ep. 121. 5, trans. Inwood). Cic. Fin. 3. 16 (=SVF iii. 182) preserves a similar distinction, noting that an animal is appropriated to its constitution (‘suum statum’) in particular. See esp. Inwood, Ethics and Human Action 190, 313 nm. 38 and 40, and Seneca, 333–7.
animal’s impressions and impulses originates. As Nathan Powers has recently emphasized, the Stoics ‘ascribe to the ἡγεμονικὸν control over all an animal’s life functions’. An animal’s impulse to preserve this faculty must then be a higher-order impulse to preserve the integrity of the faculty that comprehensively determines its first-order motivations. It is primary, that is to say, in that it underlies each of an animal’s activities and explains its inclination to perform them. It is best thought of, I believe, as an orientation towards appropriate function, an animal’s disposition to carry out the kinds of activities implicit in its physical constitution. This disposition is made possible, in turn, by the mechanism of self-perception, which enables an organism to grasp the ends for which it has been framed by nature.

This understanding of the πρῶτη ἤμη helps to resolve the tensions I have noted. On this account, the Stoics do not view the primary impulse as a distinct form of οἰκείωσις underwriting a distinction between οἰκείωσις towards self and οἰκείωσις towards others. Instead, they view an animal’s constitution—the πρῶτον οἰκεῖον that is the object of its primary οἰκείωσις relation—as a template for each of its first-order impulses: a specification of the patterns of behaviour appropriate to a creature of its kind. Thus the vulnerability of a hen’s constitution determines, under relevant conditions, that flight is an appropriate response to predators, while the constitution of the pea crab determines the appropriateness of its cooperation with the πίναξ mollusc. So understood, the primary impulse will be satisfied not simply by those activities that promote an organism’s physical survival, but by the full range of behaviours the Stoics regard as appropriate (καθέκον) to the organism. In a fully rational agent, this impulse is indeed a form of appropriation to

[40] D.L. 7.159 (= SVF ii. 837): ‘By the ruling part of the soul [ἡγεμονικόν] is meant that which is most truly soul proper, in which arise presentations [αἱ φαντασίαι] and impulses [αἱ ὁρμαί] and from which issues rational speech’ (trans. Hicks). According to Aratus Didymus, ‘Every soul has some ruling faculty [ἡγεμονικὸν τι] in it; and this is its life and perception and impulse’ (fr. phys. 39 Delia=SVF ii. 821, trans. Powers). Cf. S.E. M. 9. 192; 7. 236–7.


[42] Seneca gives the example of a hen (Ep. 121. 19). Cicero, Plutarch, and Athenaeus independently describe the interest Chrysippus took in the pea crab, πιναθερές οἰκεῖον (whose name preserves the Greek verb τηρεῖν), because of its supposedly commensalistic relation to the πίναξ mollusc (Cic. Fin. 3. 63 = LS 57F= SVF iii. 39b; ND 2. 123–4=SVF ii. 729; Plut. Soll. an. 98a λ=SVF ii. 729b; Athen. 80 c=σ=SVF ii. 729a).
what is fine since virtue, as the Stoics conceive it, consists in a perfected state of the hēgemonikon and in the activities which flow from this condition. Under this interpretation, Alexander is to be taken seriously when he observes that Hellenistic disagreements about the nature of the prōton oikeion correspond to disagreements about the structure of the human telos. As a condition of the hēgemonikon, virtue will itself be the primary object of oikeiōsis for fully rational agents, and the concern to guard and preserve their own virtue will underwrite and condition each of their first-order activities and impulses. On this account, an animal’s primary impulse to preserve its constitution answers in a straightforward way to a fully rational agent’s concern to preserve her virtue.

This reconstruction fits the broader pattern of Hellenistic argument emphasized by Brunschwig, and I will argue that it is supported by a range of considerations drawn from Stoic physics and psychology. In particular, the Stoic argument can be seen to rest on a wider analysis of the conditions under which animate organisms quite generally achieve their telos. The key to its structure is the supposition that the Stoics apply a single criterion of teleological success to organisms at each level of the scala naturae. At each level of the cosmic order, the hēgemonikon is also a mode of pneuma, the direct vehicle of divine activity in the physical cosmos. In the human case, the physical perfection of the rational hēgemonikon—i.e. virtue—is clearly sufficient for the realization of the human end. If one considers the evidence for Stoicism that is securely free of Academic influence, it appears quite plausible to suppose that other animate organisms similarly achieve their ends, in the Stoics’ view, when they preserve the faculty in which each of their psychic motions originates, so that their activities are correctly administered by nature as a result.

A parallel made largely explicit by Cicero at Tusc. 5. 38–9.
45 The term ‘preservation’ glosses over some complexities, including especially the fact that the sage appears to achieve virtue only through a lengthy process by which she frees herself from falsehood and previously accumulated cognitive error. To speak of preserving the ἰσοτροπία may thus seem to imply continuity of a sort of perfection that was never there to begin with. Here it is important to distinguish two kinds of development that are implicit but not clearly distinguished in the sources that survive. On the one hand, the activities of animals as the Stoics conceive them appear to conform to nature more or less regularly from birth to death (cf. nn. 111

---

43 Jacob Klein

---
The Stoic Argument from oikeiōsis

The interpretation of animal behaviour developed by the Stoics is part of a general analysis that supports their claim that virtue is sufficient for happiness. This interpretation helps to explain why Stoic texts appear to treat the primary impulse as the unified basis of appropriate actions (kathēkonta), whether self- or other-directed, and also why the Stoics regard an analysis of animal psychology as instructive for the human case.

4. Representation and motivation

Each of the interpretations of oikeiōsis so far considered treats the self-preserving behaviour of animals as such as a primary concern of the oikeiōsis theory. Each also treats Stoic claims about self-perception as a philosophically interesting but more or less ancillary concern, one largely independent of the doctrine’s ethical import. There are two general reasons for supposing that this focus is misplaced. First, the self-preserving behaviour of animals is a datum common to Stoic and Academic versions of the oikeiōsis account, and it plays a comparable role in the ethical arguments of both schools (Cic. Fin. 2. 33; 4. 16; 5. 24; ND 3. 33; Stob. 2. 118).

and 115 below). In the human case, however, this developmental process goes off the rails at an early stage because of human beings’ susceptibility to external influences (on which see esp. M. Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (Chicago, 2007), ch. 7). The starting-points of nature, says Diogenes, are never corrupt, but rational agents are corrupted, ‘sometimes by the persuasiveness of things from without, sometimes through the teaching of associates’ (D.L. 7. 89–SVF iii. 228, trans. Graver). As a result, the ideal of sagehood seems usually to be conceived of as a kind of recovery from errors that universally affect human agents (cf. esp. Galen, PHP 5. 5. 9–20).

This picture supposes another ideal in the background of the Stoic view, however: the theoretical possibility of a human being whose cognitions are never distorted in the first place, so that her actions conform to nature from start to finish. It is in this sense that preserving one’s ἡγεμονικόν would presumably guarantee conformity to nature all along, a realization of the τέλος at every stage of development. The possibility of this sort of diachronic conformity to nature seems to be envisioned by Seneca’s discussion of oikeiōsis in Letter 121.

Inwood suggests that ‘Hierocles’ decision to focus on self-perception as the central question is both deliberate and unusual’ (‘Hierocles’, 155). See further ibid. 157: ‘Why this obsession with one theme [self-perception], to the disadvantage of hormē and of oikeiōsis itself?’ Contrast Long, ‘Representation’, 254–5 and 269 n. 12. I agree with Long that perception and self-perception are foundational to the Stoic theory. As I argue below, these features of the oikeiōsis doctrine support the Stoic claim that virtue is a wholly cognitive condition.

Many of the Stoics’ examples of self-preserving animal behaviour belong to a common stock of received zoological wisdom. It is useful to compare the examples
What distinguishes the position of each school is rather the details of the psychological account offered to explain it. Stoic sources insist, as Antiochean sources do not, that animal activity of any sort is made possible only by the animal’s perception of itself, and that this awareness always accompanies and informs its perception of what is external (Cic. Fin. 3. 16 = SVF ii. 182; Hier. Et. Eth., col. vii. 1–10). Second, it is clear from late discussions of oikeiōsis that Stoic claims about self-perception—rather than self-preservation per se—became a particular point of contention with rival schools, one that surfaces provocatively in overtly ethical contexts. Thus Seneca argues, in a letter ostensibly devoted to ethical concerns, that an animal is able to co-ordinate its movements only through the perception (sensus) of its own constitution (constitutio) and that a capacity for self-perception, even if confused or inarticulate, must therefore be present at birth (Ep. 121. 9 = LS 57B). Similarly, the primary aim of Hierocles’ ethical treatise is to defend the Stoic theory of oikeiōsis against critics who reject Stoic claims about perception in particular.

These points suggest that we should not expect the ethical significance of the Stoic argument to turn narrowly on the claim that animals seek to preserve themselves but on the distinctive psychological explanation the Stoics offer for this mode of behaviour. Here it is important to distinguish clearly between three distinct elements of the oikeiōsis accounts: (1) activities directed towards an animal’s physical survival, prominently emphasized by Seneca and Hierocles; (2) an animal’s primary impulse to preserve and maintain its own constitution (sustasis), mentioned by Diogenes and confirmed by other texts; (3) the phenomenon of self-perception, which the Stoics take to be a precondition of motivation generally. On the one hand, it is clear that Hierocles and Seneca present (1) as evidence of the psychology associated with (2) and (3), i.e. that the Stoics appeal to the self-preserving behaviour of animals in order to establish their claims about self-perception and the primary impulse. This supposition is uncontroversial, and it fits the pattern offered by Hierocles, Seneca, and Cicero (ND 2. 120–53) with those of Aristotle’s Historia animalium, Plutarch’s De sollertia animalium, and Philo’s De animalibus. What is distinctive in Stoic theory is the claim that these behaviours can only be explained (and in fact are comprehensively explained) by the animal’s perceptual states. 

See further Inwood, Seneca, 332–46.
of argument preserved in each of the main sources. Commentators have further assumed, however, that the Stoics narrowly associate the psychology of (2) and (3) with (1), i.e. that they treat self-perception and the primary impulse as the motivational basis of only those patterns of appropriate behaviour—such as the pursuit of food or flight from predators—that are narrowly directed towards an animal’s physical survival. This further assumption explains why commentators have regarded the primary impulse of Diogenes’ account as an inadequate basis for the impulses of the fully rational sage and why they have treated it, instead, as a form of motivation that must either be abandoned by fully rational agents or somehow integrated with concern for and appropriation to others.

I believe this latter assumption—that according to Stoic theory self-perception and primary impulse ground narrowly self-preserving or self-directed behaviours—should be given up. This is the assumption that motivates the alleged distinction between personal and social forms of oikeiōsis, but it is not required by the dialectical structure of the Stoic argument, and it fits poorly with additional features of the Stoics’ view, including, in particular, their well-attested interest in the co-operative behaviour of social animals. It is clear that the Stoics regard the self-preserving behaviour of animals as evidence of their capacity to perceive themselves and of their consequent impulse to preserve their natural constitutions. It is not clear, however, that they regard an animal’s perception and preservation of its constitution as the basis of narrowly self-preserving behaviour alone. The Stoics might well appeal to the self-preserving behaviour of animals as evidence for a particular motivational account without supposing, in addition, that this account explains only behaviour of that form.

The clearest confirmation of this interpretation is found in the psychological details that underpin the oikeiōsis theory. These emerge most clearly in the fragmentary remains of the Hierocles manuscript, which preserves in greater detail than any other source the Stoic analysis of phantasia and hormē in non-rational animals and indicates the broader basis of this analysis in the Stoic (and largely Chrysippian) doctrine of pneuma. The primary aim of Hierocles’ treatise is not to show that animals preserve themselves from birth, but that the co-ordinated behaviour this requires can be

50 The edited text with Italian commentary appears in Bastianini and Long, ‘Hierocles’.
explained only by a mode of cognition that registers the teleological significance of the animal’s own faculties. The thrust of the treatise is strikingly similar to that of Seneca’s Letter 121 in that it is directed against critics who reject Stoic claims about self-perception in particular. The manuscript begins with a short argument to show that ‘an animal differs in two respects from what is not an animal: perception and also impulse’ (col. 1. 31–3). Hierocles then narrows his focus to perception in particular (col. 1. 33–7). In the text that follows he attacks the critics of self-perception by drawing their attention, first and foremost, to a range of behavioural phenomena easily taken for granted. These include the animal’s pursuit of its own physical survival, but they also extend to more complex forms of co-operation with other animals. Thus Hierocles emphasizes that a bull perceives the use of its horns (and Epictetus adds that it deploys them in defence of the herd). Other animals are said, strikingly, to perceive their own co-operative arrangement (sum-basis) with other animals.

The inferences Hierocles draws from this catalogue of observations are intended to demonstrate the fact of self-perception, but they are also intended, as his preamble makes clear, to support a more general explanation of animal motivation in terms of cognition and, in particular, in terms of cognition whose content is both evaluative and factive. This account is rooted in the Stoics’ highly specific analysis of the physical soul in animate organisms, which Hierocles takes some care to explain at the outset of his treatise (El. Eth., col. 1. 1–37). According to this analysis, the organic body of an animal is itself a compound of pneuma, an admixture of the active elements of air and fire together with the passive elements of earth and water with which it is further interblended. This compound is

51 One class of these critics appears to deny that self-perception occurs at all; the other denies that it occurs as soon as an animal is born. See Inwood, ‘Hierocles’, 156–8 and 167–78; Long, ‘Representation’, 255.
52 We do not need to speak of the latter of these for the moment, but it seems appropriate to say a few things about perception, for this contributes to cognition of the first appropriate thing (ἀφεθεὶ γὰρ ἐς γνώσιν τοῦ πρώτου οἰκείου), which is the subject we said is the best starting-point for the elements of ethics’ (my translation).
54 El. Eth., col. iii. 23; cf. Cic. Fin. 3. 66 = LS 57F = SVF iii. 342; ND 2. 123–4 = SVF ii. 729.
55 The Stoic analysis on which Hierocles draws is well attested in other sources. A thorough discussion is A. A. Long, ‘Soul and Body in Stoicism’ [‘Soul and Body’], in id., Stoic Studies, 224–49.
The Stoic Argument from oikeiōsis

responsible for the functions of nutrition and growth, and it is common to plants and animals alike. In animate organisms, however, pneuma has a further, higher-order expression the Stoics identify as soul properly speaking (S.E. M. 7. 234 = LS 53F; cf. D.L. 7. 138–9 = LS 470 = SVF ii. 634). When a plant-like embryo leaves the womb, a portion of its leading faculty or nature (phasis) is cooled by contact with air so that its tensional properties begin to sustain the capacities of phantasia and hormē required for animal motion (Plut. Stoic. repugn. 1552 f–1553 A; Hier. El. Eth., col. 1. 15–34). These capacities, which belong to the animal’s hēgemonikon, are held to be the defining features of animate organisms, and the Stoics analyse them as capacities for two distinct types of motion: phantasia being a passive alteration (kinēsis) that represents its cause, hormē being an active movement (kinēsis) of hegemonic pneuma reactively reaching towards the represented object. Both types of motion are expressions of the divine and active principle working in passive matter to bring about its providential aims.

Commentators have sometimes emphasized the segmented character of cognitive development as the Stoics conceive it: the sharp difference between the cognitive abilities of children and adults or the starkness of the gap between the conditions of virtue and vice.


As στοιχεῖα, earth and water are also compounds of god and featureless matter. But as Long puts it, it is in air and fire that god appears in propria persona, as it were (‘Soul and Body’, 249). These active elements of which pneuma is comprised are most closely analogous to the active organizing features of divine reason at earlier stages of cosmogenesis and to the original, primal στοιχεῖον characterized by Zeno (perhaps proleptically, as Cooper suggests) as designing fire (πῦρ τεχνικὸν), by Cleanthes as flame (φλόξ), and by Chrysippus as a flash (αὐγή). See Cooper, ‘Elements’. Cf. Marc. Aur. Med. 11. 20; Alex. Aphr. Mixt. 218. 2–10 Bruns.

e.g. Pohlenz, Die Stoa, 40. On the Stoic account of concepts, animal perception is largely if not wholly non-conceptual. For the view that animals have ‘quasi-concepts’ according to the Stoics see Brittain, ‘Perception’. Contemporary accounts resembling the Stoic view of non-conceptual perception include that of Gareth Evans: ‘Most organisms have at least some among other members of their own species, if only their parents and offspring; and since so much of an organism’s welfare (especially among the social animals) is dependent upon successful interrelation with other members of its
The Stoic account of the animate soul ensures, however, that the faculties that control and explain the motivations of non-rational animals are parallel in basic respects to the human case. This isomorphism is required, in part, by the fact that the Stoics treat the division between phantasia and hormê as an exhaustive classification of the motions to which the animate soul is subject above the level of nutrition and growth. Phantasia itself is an exceedingly broad category in Stoic theory, covering every mode of cognition to which non-rational and rational animals are subject.

In the rational case, memory (mnēmē), concepts (ennoiai), belief (doxa), knowledge (katalēpsis), and experience (empeiria) are all defined in terms of phantasia, and virtue is itself a physical configuration of the soul built up from assents to propositionally structured impressions (phantasai). The impressions that belong to animals, on the other hand, are not fully conceptual or propositional in the Stoics’ sense, and it is unclear to what extent animals may entertain a generalized piece of content independently of overtly perceptual states, on the Stoic account.

In animals too, however, phantasia involves an object of which the animal is made aware through its causal impact within the soul—an imprint, in Zeno’s terminology—so that in veridical cases of perception the phenomenal character of the representation is causally linked to the perceived object. The basic ele

59 These parallels are especially emphasized by V. Goldschmidt, Le Système stoïcien et l’idée de temps (Système stoïcien), 4th edn. (Paris, 1989), 55–9. Cf. n. 115 below.

60 According to the Stoics, φαντασία is the most basic representational faculty, and every other kind of mental representation is explicated in its terms. In this respect the Stoic taxonomy of mental states differs importantly from Aristotle’s. For both Aristotle and the Stoics, desire of the most basic sort (ὄρεξις for Aristotle, ὡρμή for the Stoics) requires αἴσθησις. On the Stoic account, but not on Aristotle’s, αἴσθησις also requires φαντασία. Hence on the Stoic account, but not on Aristotle’s, desire of any form requires φαντασία. Aristotle attributes ὡρμή and αἴσθησις to some animals which lack φαντασία (DA 414b, 428a8–11; cf. H. Lorenz, The Brute Within: Appetitive Desire in Plato and Aristotle (Oxford, 2006), ch. 10). On the Stoic account of φαντασία see Long, ‘Representation’, 266–75.


62 According to the basic Stoic definition, a φαντασία is ‘a pathos occurring in the soul, which reveals itself and its cause’ (Aët. 4. 12. 15 = LS 39B = SYP ii. 54, trans.
ments of this analysis cut across the differences between the highly conceptualized modes of cognition that belong to rational agents and the non-rational perceptions of other animals.

One of Hierocles’ central concerns, then, is to show that the behaviours hecatalogues are rooted in the soul’s capacity to represent the world through physical interaction with it. From the point of view of action theory, what is most significant in this account is not the thesis that motivation always occurs in conjunction with an appropriately discriminating mental representation. It is rather the claim that cognition of this form determines impulse, that an organism’s activities are caused and controlled by mental states that have, as we would now say, the cognitive direction of fit, whose function is to grasp and conform to the contours of the world. In animals and human agents alike, the outward motions of impulse are engendered and wholly explained by representations arising in the perceptive pneuma of the animal’s hēgemonikon. In the human case, such representations may be propositional, susceptible of verbal articulation, and conditioned by a range of antecedent cognitive conditions that also have a propositional and conceptual content. Though an animal’s impressions of this form are not of comparable structure and complexity, they are nonetheless inchoate analogues of the impressions that belong to human agents. Even in animals, such impressions appear to require the possibility of content that minimally includes an evaluative component, representing the world in a manner capable of producing and structuring impulse in ways commensurate with the animal’s faculties and basic needs. Without exception phantasia is the causal basis of impulse, and its content explains the force and direction of an animal’s activities.

As Inwood has emphasized, these distinctive psychological claims are notably absent from parallel accounts of animal psychology found in Antiochean sources. Though perception is said in De finibus 4 and 5 to guide and shape an animal’s impulses as it

Long and Sedley). Zeno seems to have characterized an instance of φαντασία as a τύπωσις (imprint), while Chrysippus preferred the less committal ἑτεροίωσις (alteration). See S.E. M. 7. 236 (=SVF i. 58). Representations lacking the appropriate causal connection to the world are φανταστικά or φαντάσματα, in the Stoic scheme. See D.L. 7. 49 (=LS 39A=SVF ii. 52); Aët. 4. 12. 1–5 (=LS 39B=SVF ii. 54).

63 Such impressions, that is to say, are informed by ἔννοιαι (conceptions) and have λεκτά (verbalizable representations) as their content. I do not mean to imply a direct equivalence between these Stoic categories and contemporary ones.

64 Inwood, ‘Hierocles’, 175–8.
matures, it is not there presented as a sine qua non of motivation generally, nor is it regarded as a faculty responsible for generating impulse as soon as the animal is born. By contrast, Stoic versions of *oikeiōsis* make it clear that accurate cognition is the sole basis of teleologically appropriate behaviour in animals and humans alike. Hierocles' account of the psychology that underpins animal behaviour corresponds, therefore, to an important and controversial Stoic claim about the structure of rational motivation: namely, that there are no sources of impulse that are not governed by cognitive appraisals of some form. Though it supports more complex discursive and inferential functions than those that occur in animals, the rational faculty that controls right action in human agents does so through an accurate representational grip on the world. On the Stoic account, appropriate action in animate organisms generally is preceded and structured by a cognitive grasp of the natural order.

5. Self-perception

The Stoics' concern to defend the motivational priority of cognition, however, does not wholly explain their insistence on the phenomenon of self-perception or the attention devoted to it by Seneca and Hierocles. Both authors are also concerned to demonstrate that the purposeful, kind-appropriate behaviour animals display is to be explained by self-perception in particular. Whereas perception underlies animal behaviour generally, self-perception explains an animal's capacity for behaviour that is kind-relative. Hierocles' examples are carefully chosen to emphasize this point: an animal's activities are appropriately keyed to its individual nature and faculties. They must therefore be rooted in its capacity to grasp, through perception, the distinctive features of its own constitution. Like the Stoic analysis of *phantasia*, this analysis depends on physical and psychological features that are common to animals and human

---

65 According to Chrysippus, 'Reason is a collection of certain conceptions and pre-conceptions' (Galen, *PHP* 5. 3. 1 = LS 53V = SVF ii. 841; trans. Long and Sedley). Cf. Cic. *Tusc*. 5. 39: 'if this [rational] soul has been so trained, if its power of vision has been so cared for that it is not blinded by error, the result is mind made perfect, that is, complete reason, and this means also virtue' (trans. King). On the Stoic account of reason see M. Schofield, *The Stoic Idea of the City* (Cambridge, 1991), 70–1; Frede, 'Reason'; J. Cooper, 'Stoic Autonomy', in id., *Knowledge, Nature, and the Good: Essays on Ancient Philosophy* (Princeton, 2004), 264–44 at 216–18; Brittain, 'Common Sense'.
agents. Self-perception originates at birth, together with the soul’s capacity for phantasia, when the causal interaction of the newly formed soul and the organic body engenders in the animal a perception of its own constitution. As soon as it is born, Hierocles maintains, an animal possesses an impression (phantasia) of itself, which develops over time into a more refined grasp of its own characteristic features (idiōmata). The animal is pleased (euarestein) with this representation, appropriated to its constitution (sustasis), and disposed to care for itself as a result (cols. vi. 22–51; vii. 40–61). Seneca similarly takes pains to emphasize that this reflexive awareness, though inarticulate at the outset, is nonetheless present from birth as a necessary condition of an animal’s subsequent impulses (Ep. 121. 14–17).

The form of self-perception involved in oikeiōsis has occasionally been associated with self-consciousness or with notions of the self quite broadly construed. But although Hierocles sometimes characterizes this form of cognition as aisthēsis heautou—self-perception—it is clear from a number of texts that the self that is the object of perception is not an abstract entity shading into later notions of selfhood. Like the primary impulse of Diogenes’ account, self-perception is directed at the creature’s constitution (its sustasis or, as later sources tend to represent it, its kataskeuē).

This is, roughly, the array of physical capacities nature has given it, of the sort Hierocles catalogues at length in his treatise. Seneca, moreover, preserves an important technical elaboration of this notion: A creature’s constitution (constitutio) is its hēgemonikon or soul in the strictest sense, the ‘leading part of the soul in a certain disposition relative to the body’ (Ep. 121. 10 = LS 29F = SVF iii. 184, trans. Inwood).66 This high-level mode of pneuma suffuses the animal’s faculties in one of the specific modes of mixture distinguished by Chrysippus, a blending in which each element (1) preserves its own nature but (2) is spatially continuous with other elements of the mixture at every point (Alex. Aphr. Mixt. 216. 14–218. 6 Bruns = LS 48C = SVF ii. 473; cf. D.L. 7. 151 = LS 48A = SVF ii. 479; Plut. Comm. not. 1078 ε = LS 48B = SVF ii. 480). An animal’s perception of its constitution arises from the thorough admixture of the perceptive pneuma that constitutes the

hegemonikon with the animal’s organic body and from the fact that these two causally impinge on one other. What animate organisms perceive through self-perception is neither the soul nor the body on its own, but rather the interrelation of the hegemonikon and the organic matter through which it passes.  

Two further features of the attitude associated with self-perception in Stoic sources are worth emphasizing. Commentators have sometimes compared the Stoic account of this capacity to contemporary accounts of proprioception or the general monitoring of bodily states by an organism’s nervous system. Some of Hierocles’ examples certainly support this comparison. Self-perception continues through sleep, for example, and it appears to play a role in regulating basic autonomic functions (El. Eth., cols. IV. 54–v. 31). It should be emphasized, however, that even in non-rational animals self-perception does not appear to be limited to low-level representations of this sort. Some of the examples in Hierocles and Seneca have nothing to do with spatial perception, kinaesthetic awareness, or autonomic function, but with much more determinate modes of perception and action, as when an animal recognizes and observes its own co-operative arrangements with other animals (El. Eth., col. III. 23) or when a toddler, recognizing a bipedal orientation as consistent with its physical capacities, struggles, even in the teeth of pain, to stand upright (Ep. 121. 8=LS 57B). In fact self-perception of some form appears to attend every perceptual representation of the soul that occurs in animate organisms above the level of nutrition and growth. As such, it appears to include both conscious and unconscious modes of representation without

67 It is not clear whether an organism’s σύστασις is the hegemonikon strictly speaking or the hegemonikon together with the matter it most directly affects. Brennan argues for the former account while Inwood, as I understand him, adopts something closer to the latter view. See Brennan, ‘Souls’, 402–3; Inwood, Ethics and Human Action, 190 and 313 n. 40; Inwood, Seneca, 337. Some ambiguity between these views may be present in the Stoic understanding of the hegemonikon itself, which is both (a) the controlling faculty of the organism and (b) that which makes the organism the kind of creature it is, its ‘principle of organization’, as Powers puts it (‘Argument’, 257). For my purposes, the relevant claim is that an animal’s soul registers both its own affections and those of its organic body, so that both are perceived by the animal (Hier. El. Eth., cols. III. 57–IV. 53). Cf. Pembroke ‘Oherióû’, 119.

68 At El. Eth., col. II. 35–46, a toad is said to co-perceive itself together with the interval it is about to jump. Perception of this form closely resembles the non-conceptual, egocentric, and proprioceptive forms of spatial perception discussed by Gareth Evans (Reference, 220–4). Even in these cases, however, συναίσθησις as the Stoics conceive it appears to involve a mental representation derived from an object’s causal effect on the animal’s soul.
The Stoic Argument from oikeiōsis

being limited to either. The examples of self-perception cited by Seneca and Hierocles connect it with a variety of functional roles associated with the regulation of kind-appropriate behaviour.

It is worth noting as well that the Stoics appear to regard the attitude involved in animal self-perception as a broadly veridical or factive state. This is not because they regard mental representations in general as true, but because the category of aisthēsis as they conceive it applies only to veridical cases of perception (Aët. Plac. 4. 8. 1 = SVF ii. 850; 4. 8. 12 = SVF ii. 72; 4. 9. 4 = SVF ii. 78). In addition to aisthēsis heautou and sunaisthēsis, the most frequent term applied to an animal’s self-awareness by Hierocles is antilēpsis.

In addition to aisthēsis heautou and sunaisthēsis, the most frequent term applied to an animal’s self-awareness by Hierocles is antilēpsis.

This need not imply that the non-rational representations involved in animal self-perception are truth-evaluable, but it does imply that the Stoics regard them as evaluable in some way on the

69 By a conscious mental state I mean, roughly, a mental state the subject is aware of being in. This functional sense of ‘conscious’ should be distinguished from a usage such as that of e.g. David Chalmers, who employs it programmatically to characterize mental states that have phenomenal content (e.g. The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory (Oxford, 1996), 25–9). Proprreative mental states (and perhaps animal perceptions generally) may be representational mental states without being states the subject is aware of being in, and on many accounts mental states (such as tacit beliefs or judgements) may be representational but lack phenomenal content.

70 Cf. the second sense of αἴσθησις distinguished at D.L. 7. 52 (= SVF ii. 71) and employed at Stob. 2. 82. 31. It is in this second sense, presumably, that Chrysippus called αἴσθησις the criterion of truth (D.L. 7. 54 = LS 40A = SVF ii. 105). Cf. also F. H. Sandbach, Aristotle and the Stoics (Cambridge, 1985), 22: ‘For the Stoics phantasia preceded aisthēsis, which was always true, being the perception of something really there.’

71 As G. Boys-Stones observes, at least in Hierocles’ usage αὐωναἰσθησις presupposes but is distinct from αἴσθησις ὑποῦοι (‘Physiogony and Ancient Psychological Theory’, in id. et al., Seeing the Face, Seeing the Soul: Polemon’s Physiogomy from Classical Antiquity to Medieval Islam (Oxford, 2007), 19–124 at 85). I have adopted Boys-Stones’s translation of αὐωναἰσθησις as ‘co-perception’ here.

72 That is, ἀντίληψις connotes at least some grasp of the perceived object and implies some degree of representational conformity to the world. Some sources (e.g. S.E. M. 7. 424 = LS 40L = SVF ii. 68) seem to treat κατάληψις as a form of ἀντίληψις, one that is propositional, true, and wholly stable. In the animal case, ἀντίληψις does not satisfy these conditions, but it may nonetheless be capable of guiding the animal in a way that is appropriate to and commensurate with the kind of animal it is. Cf. Aët. Plac. 4. 8. 1 (= SVF ii. 850).
basis of their fit with the world. The impressions that occur in ani-
mals do not have a fully conceptual or propositional structure, and it
seems clear that they do not satisfy the formal set of conditions
associated with kataleptic impressions. They nonetheless appear to
have in common with kataleptic impressions both that they are fac-
tive and that they are capable of grasping the world in a way that
allows the animal to recognize, with greater or lesser accuracy, a
particular object or course of action as appropriate to perform. As
a capacity for representation, self-perception can be evaluated even
in animals by its fidelity to the contours of the world.\footnote{If this
seems a surprising conjunction of views, it is worth noting that it has
analogues in the contemporary literature on perception and especially in
views about non-conceptual content. On accounts such as those of
Gareth Evans and Christopher Peacocke, the content of animal
perception is non-conceptual but nonetheless eval-
uable in virtue of the representational information it conveys. In
Evans’s view, the non-conceptual content of a mental perception ‘permits
of a non-derivative clas-
sification as true or false’ in virtue of its functional role, even if its subject lacks
the concepts that are constituents of the evaluation (Reference, 226–7).
Peacocke restricts
truth-evaluable to content that is propositional and hence (on a Fregean account
of propositions) conceptual. He nonetheless regards the non-conceptual content of
perception as ‘content which is evaluable as correct or incorrect’ (‘Does Percep-
tion Have a Nonconceptual Content?’, Journal of Philosophy, 98 (2001), 239–64 at 239–
40). The Stoic position resembles the latter view in that the Stoics restrict judge-
ments of truth and falsity to λεκτά, where these are the contents of the conceptu-
ally structured representations (φαντασίαι λογικαί) that belong exclusively to rational
agents. On such an account, though an animal’s perceptions are not fully conceptual,
they may nonetheless be evaluated as correct or incorrect in virtue of their pheno-
menal content, functional role, or both.}

It is probably impossible to recover a fine-grained account of
the kind of content the Stoics associated with self-perception or
a detailed understanding of the way in which it was thought to
co-ordinate sophisticated animal behaviour. What seems clear
from the oikeiōsis accounts, however, is that the doctrine of
self-perception supplies a crucial link, within the Stoic system,
between cosmic teleology and psychological theory. A creature’s
constitution—the set of faculties permeated and held together
by its psychic pneuma—provides a reference point for each of its
first-order impulses. Constitutions are, crucially, constituted by
nature for a purpose, and they function as a kind of template that
encodes, as it were, the patterns of behaviour that belong to each
kind of creature. It seems clear, moreover, that the appropriateness
of an animal’s behaviour strongly depends, in this scheme, on its
ability to grasp these patterns through self-perception. What an
animal’s self-perception grounds, specifically, is appropriate modes

\( \text{\footnotetext{73}} \)
The Stoic Argument from oikeiōsis

of action, and it does so through representations that are in some way factive or correct. Conversely, even in animals defective motivation and action would seem to involve, on the Stoic theory, some failure of cognition. What we have in the oikeiōsis account, it thus appears, is a motivational theory that aims to explain appropriate action in both animals and humans on the basis of self-awareness and accurate cognition. This is, I suggest, a characteristically Stoic extension of a Socratic point, one that applies a cognitive theory of motivation—remarkably—to a much wider analysis of living organisms.

How the primary impulse was thought to arise from self-perception and why the Stoics regard it as a necessary condition of motivation generally are further matters for conjecture, but the fundamental role of self-perception in determining an organism’s impulses strongly suggests that, like the mechanism of self-perception, the primary impulse was thought to underlie the full range of activities appropriate to an organism. Though most of the behaviours mentioned by Stoic sources are narrowly geared towards the animal’s physical survival, some of them are not. What all rather have in common is that they are guided by an in-born awareness that enables the creature to act in just the ways that nature constituted it to act. Brad Inwood has plausibly argued that the primary impulse of Diogenes’ account is an instance of what the Stoics call a hormetic disposition (hexis hormētikē), a fundamental orientation that explains why an animal ‘undertakes action to preserve itself, avoiding things which harm it and pursuing things which are appropriate or natural to it’. I would add that the Stoics appear to regard this disposition not simply as the psychological basis for behaviour of this form, but as a disposition, rooted in self-perception, that co-ordinates all of an animal’s kind-relative behaviours. It should perhaps be thought of not as a further psychological element distinct from self-perception, but rather as the motivational side of the animal’s self-directed cognition, much as impulse in general seems to be the motivational side of a hormetic impression.

74 The focus on self-preserving behaviour can be explained by the fact that it is the most widespread and readily observable form of animal behaviour and by the likelihood that it therefore became the focus of debate among rival schools, which offered differing psychological accounts to explain it.
75 Inwood, Ethics and Human Action, 190–1.
76 This characterization, I am aware, invites difficult questions about the kind of
Attempts at further reconstruction are necessarily speculative, but one suggestive detail of Stoic physics deserves consideration: namely, that the Stoics clearly envision a close connection between the physical properties of an organism’s *hēgemonikon* and its ability to perform the functions that belong to it. Our evidence for this relationship is clearest in the rational case, where an explicit connection is drawn between representational error and the internal tension of the *hēgemonikon*. Stoic texts describe failures of perception and impulse in terms of a mismatch between the representational content of perceptual states and the world, but they also characterize them as a slackening of the perceptive *pneuma* that extends from the heart and penetrates each of the sense organs. In human agents, this condition precipitates assent to non-kataleptic impressions and, sooner or later, access to the violent impulses of the passions. In human beings right action is secured by accurate cognition, and accurate cognition is secured, in turn, through an appropriate tension (or perhaps through appropriate *tensions*) in the soul’s hegemonic *pneuma*. Though we have less explicit testimony about the animal case, the details of Stoic physics and psychology strongly suggest a similar order of explanation. In animals too perception and impulse appear to supervene on the tensional properties of hegemonic mental state a *ḥŷmov* is supposed to be: for example, whether *ḥŷmov* is the causal result of a purely representational state or whether it is a single state that performs the functions of both representation and motivation, thereby resembling the ‘besires’ of some contemporary theories. I am here suggesting the latter sort of account and thinking, in particular, of Margaret Graver’s characterization of the evaluative content of a hormetic impression as registering its ‘motivational aspect’. See Graver, *Stoicism and Emotion*, 44.

77 Galen, *PHP* 4. 6. 2–3 (=LS 62T=SVF iii. 473); 5. 2. 25–8 (=SVF iii. 471). Cf. Cic. *Tusc*. 4. 31. The possibility of a mismatch extends to *ḥŷmov* in that they are a product of evaluative representations and may be correct or incorrect as such. On the relationship between slackness (*ἀτονία*) of soul and failures of perception and impulse see esp. Kerferd, ‘Origin’, 489–92. As Kerferd puts it, ‘When there is a good state of tension in the soul—*eutonia*—a man judges rightly and does well’ (490). So too ‘wrong judgements . . . are themselves *kinaēsis* and *hormai* and are all cases of the *hēgemonikon* disposed in a particular way’ (491). On the physical basis of Stoic virtue see further M. Schofield, ‘Cardinal Virtues: A Contested Socratic Inheritance’, in A. G. Long (ed.), *Plato and the Stoics* (Cambridge, 2013), 11–28 at 19–21.

78 According to Stobaeus, ‘Proper function [*tò kathēkōn*] also extends to the non-rational animals, for these too display a kind of activity which is consequential upon their own nature’ (2. 82=LS 59B=SVF iii. 494, trans. Long and Sedley). According to Diogenes, ‘Proper function [*tò kathēkōn*] is an activity [*ἐνέργημα*] appropriate to constitutions that accord with nature [*ταῖς κατὰ φύσιν κατασκευαῖς οἰκεῖαι*]’ (D.L. 7. 108=LS 59C=SVF iii. 493, trans. Long and Sedley).

77 Galen, *PHP* 4. 6. 2–3 (=LS 62T=SVF iii. 473); 5. 2. 25–8 (=SVF iii. 471). Cf. Cic. *Tusc*. 4. 31. The possibility of a mismatch extends to *ḥŷmov* in that they are a product of evaluative representations and may be correct or incorrect as such. On the relationship between slackness (*ἀτονία*) of soul and failures of perception and impulse see esp. Kerferd, ‘Origin’, 489–92. As Kerferd puts it, ‘When there is a good state of tension in the soul—*eutonia*—a man judges rightly and does well’ (490). So too ‘wrong judgements . . . are themselves *kinaēsis* and *hormai* and are all cases of the *hēgemonikon* disposed in a particular way’ (491). On the physical basis of Stoic virtue see further M. Schofield, ‘Cardinal Virtues: A Contested Socratic Inheritance’, in A. G. Long (ed.), *Plato and the Stoics* (Cambridge, 2013), 11–28 at 19–21.
The Stoic Argument from oikeiōsis

pneuma, and it is through these faculties that nature regulates (oikeiōnomein) their activities. The Stoics may well have thought of the slackening of hegemonic tension in animals as a kind of falling away or loosening of pneuma’s controlling grip on the organism, engendering an imprecision in its perceptions and impulses.

One way of understanding the impulse to self-preservation, then, is as a creature’s inborn tendency, implanted by nature, to sustain the tensional properties of its hēgemonikon in a way that guarantees the accuracy of its representations and the appropriateness of its impulses. So understood, self-preservation involves preserving the very properties that determine the animal’s motions, ensuring the correct relationship between the animal’s psychic pneuma and the organic matter it permeates and controls. Such a view might be spelt out in different ways consistently with the physical model implied by the sources. What is crucial to the oikeiōsis account, however, is that the primary impulse to self-preservation, as the Stoics conceive it, appears to be satisfied when each of an animal’s first-order impulses and activities is commensurate with the kind of creature it is. In perceiving and preserving its hēgemonikon,
an animal is at the same time guarding the integrity of the representations and impulses that originate there, bringing them into line with the constitution given to it by nature. As long as the *pneuma* that constitutes it as a living organism is maintained in its proper condition, each of an animal’s activities will conform, like the content of its representations, to the patterns of nature itself.

This analysis is reflected in each of the *oikeiōsis* accounts that can be reliably associated with the Stoics independently of Antiochean sources, and it makes a crucial difference to interpreting the Stoic theory. In particular, it explains why the Stoics themselves did not distinguish narrowly between personal and social forms of *oikeiōsis* or between an animal’s self- and other-regarding activities. That misleading distinction rests on the supposition, due to Pohlenz, that the primary impulse is a first-order motivation narrowly associated with self-preserving activity. By contrast, on the account I have offered an animal’s impulse to preserve itself is not a first-order motivation in competition with *oikeiōsis* towards other things (such as offspring or other animals) but is rather the psychological basis of its recognition and appropriation of them as *oikeion*. An animal’s self-perception and consequent appropriation to self explain its self-preserving behaviour, certainly, but they equally explain other-regarding behaviours such as care for offspring, defence of the herd, and co-operation with other species.\(^8\) For an animal to perceive and preserve its constitution is for it to confirm and sustain itself as the kind of thing nature constituted it to be, with all the attendant activities this implies.

6. Constitutions and cosmic teleology

At the heart of the *oikeiōsis* account, then, is a notion of proper functioning that is closely tied to an animal’s capacity for representing the world and for grasping the teleological significance of its own faculties. If we wish to understand the place of *oikeiōsis* in Stoic ethical theory, it is important to recognize that the Stoics apply the basic elements of this analysis to both animals and human beings. Notwithstanding differences in the structure and complexity of cognition, the Stoics appeal to self-perception

The Stoic Argument from oikeiōsis

and self-preservation to explain teleologically appropriate behaviour in animals and humans alike. Particularly in Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius, references to one’s constitution (kataskeuē) are freighted with teleological significance. When Epictetus asserts that ‘perception [aisthēsis] of the state of one’s own ἡγεμόνικον is a starting-point for philosophy’, he appears to mean that an understanding of one’s individual nature and character precedes an understanding of right action (Diss. 1. 26. 15). A passage of Tertullian with clearly Stoic antecedents holds that ‘perception is the soul’s very soul’ and that ‘every soul has a practical knowledge of itself, without which knowledge of itself no soul could possibly have exercised its own functions’ (Carn. 12 = SVF ii. 845, trans. Holmes). René Brouwer has recently emphasized a neglected passage of Julian’s Orations that ascribes to the Stoics the view that self-knowledge is essential to the human end (Or. 6. 6, 185 d–186 Α.). In animals as well as human beings, self-perception provides a cognitive basis for the activities that constitute a life according to nature.

The Stoic concern with self-perception is thus not restricted to non-rational animals, and the same is true of self-preservation. Epictetus regularly speaks of preserving (tērein) one’s purpose (prohairesis) or proper character (idion). When he does so, he appears to have in mind the rational ἡγεμόνικον, the configuration

---

81 e.g. Epict. Diss. 1. 6. 7; 1. 6. 18; 2. 8. 19–20; 2. 10. 4; 3. 6. 10; 3. 24. 63–4; Marc. Aur. Med. 3. 16; 6. 16; 6. 40; 6. 44; 7. 13; 7. 20; 7. 35; 8. 12; 8. 45; Cf. D.L. 7. 168 (= LS 59C = SVF iii. 493).
82 At Diss. 1. 1. 30–2 Epictetus draws an explicit parallel between an animal’s συν-αίσθησις of its own capacities (παρασκευαί) and the acquisition of moral knowledge in the human case. Cf. also Diss. 1. 1. 4; 1. 6. 37; 1. 20. 1–6. According to Marcus Aurelius (Med. 11. 1), one of the properties of the rational soul is that it sees itself (ἑαυτὴν ὁρᾷ). He goes on to say that one becomes good through conceptions (θεωρήματα) both of universal nature and of the distinctively human constitution (Med. 11. 5).
83 Cf. Schmitz, Cato, 24–5. As a corporeal thing, the ἄλθος is an object of αἴσθησις, and the Stoics do not hesitate to apply a range of normative and aesthetic predicates to the physical structure of πνεῦμα that constitutes virtue in human agents (Stob. 2. 62–3 = SVF iii. 78; Cic. Tusc. 4. 13. 30 = SVF iii. 79). Appropriate actions are those that ‘contain all the numbers of virtue’ (‘omnes numeros virtutis continent’) in so far as they flow from a ἄλθος whose quantifiable physical properties preserve a harmony with the cosmos (Cic. Fin. 3. 24=LS 64Η = STF iii. 11); Cf. D.L. 7. 100 (= SVF iii. 83) and A. A. Long, ‘The Harmonics of Stoic Virtue’, in id., Stoic Studies, 202–23 at 211.
of *pneuma* that represents the world and controls assent to impressions in rational agents.86 The same use of *tērein* occurs in Marcus Aurelius, who characterizes the *hēgemonikon* as a *daimōn*, which is to say, *pneuma* at the highest level of expression and the embodiment of divine reason in each human agent.57 Both authors appear to identify the preservation of this faculty in the Stoics' technical sense with virtue and right action.88 Nor does this appear to be an innovation of later Stoicism. To preserve one’s *daimōn* is identical, as Diogenes makes clear, to living according to human and cosmic nature, engaging ‘in no activity wont to be forbidden by the universal law, which is the right reason pervading everything’ (D.L. 7. 88 = LS 63C = SVF iii. 4, trans. Long and Sedley).89 The Stoics identify *eudaimonia* quite literally with the perfection of one’s *daimōn*.

It appears, moreover, that the *oikeiōsis* theory defended by Chrysippus was developed within a wider teleological analysis of organisms generally. Though the Stoics do not extend the categories of goodness or *eudaimonia* to animals, they do speak of the *ends* (*telē*) appropriate to animals and of the conditions under which these ends are realized. Cicero’s criticisms of the Stoic *oikeiōsis* theory mention a treatise in which Chrysippus offered a general survey of animal species, then proceeded to discuss the end appropriate to each (*Fin. 4. 28* = SVF iii. 20).90 Epictetus similarly maintains that ‘of beings whose constitutions [*kataskeuai*] are different, the works [*erga*] and ends [*telē*] are likewise different’ (*Diss. 1. 6. 16–17*). A. A. Long emphasizes the following neglected passage from Hierocles’ treatise on marriage:

> [E]very [non-human] animal lives consistently with its own natural constitution [*τῇ ἑαυτοῦ φυσικῇ κατασκευῇ*]—and every plant indeed too according

---

86 *Diss. 1. 15. 4; 2. 2. 1; 2. 2. 20; 2. 8. 21–3; 2. 16. 28; 3. 4. 9; 3. 6. 3; 3. 10. 16; 4. 5. 6; Ench. 4.*
87 See esp. Marc. Aur. Med. 7. 17; cf. 2. 17; 3. 6; 3. 12; 6. 30; 9. 41.
88 See esp. Epict. *Diss. 2. 2. 1–4; 3. 6. 3–4; 3. 10. 16; 4. 5. 6; Ench. 4; Marc. Aur. Med. 7. 17; 2. 17. A kind of contrapositive principle appears in the *Discourses*, where inappropriate action is said to destroy the characteristic features of a human being: e.g., *Diss. 2. 4. 1–4; 2. 10. 10–18; 2. 22. 15–21; 2. 23. 17–19; 3. 7. 36. I am grateful to Tad Brennan for pointing out several of these references.
The Stoic Argument from \(\text{oikeiōsis}\) to the plants’ so-called life—except that they do not make use of any calculation or counting or acts of selection that depend on testing things: plants live on the basis of bare nature, and [non-human] animals on the basis both of representations that draw them towards things appropriate and of urges that drive them away. (Stob. 4. 502)\(^{91}\)

It therefore seems clear that the older Stoics gave some account of the ends of animals and that they supposed, in addition, that an organism’s constitution determines the character of its end. An organism’s end answers to its natural impulse to preserve its constitution, and the content of its end depends on the distinctive features of the constitution it aims to preserve.

It is important, however, to distinguish two ways of understanding the teleological framework behind the \(\text{oikeiōsis}\) account. If the Stoics regard the integrity of the \(\text{hēgemonikon}\) as a condition that guarantees appropriate action in non-rational animals, as I have argued, a crucial question is whether they also regard it as sufficient to ensure that a non-rational animal \textit{achieves its end}. Clarity on this point is important for making sense of Stoic appeals to \(\text{oikeiōsis}\) as a basis for ethical theorizing since, as I have noted, Cicero and Alexander characterize the \(\text{prōton oikeion}\) as something that is correlative to the account of the end adopted by each school, so that the object of motivational attachment observable in animals and infants corresponds to the end to which a rational agent \textit{ought} to be attached.\(^{92}\)

\(^{91}\) Quoted and translated in A. A. Long, ‘The Logical Basis of Stoic Ethics’, in \textit{id.}, \textit{Stoic Studies}, 134–55 at 133–4. As Long observes, the passage closely resembles Diogenes’ brief account of the \(\text{oikeiōsis}\) doctrine, which refers to Chrysippus’ treatise \textit{On Ends}.

\(^{92}\) The reliability of Alexander’s report, influenced as it is by Carneades and by Alexander’s own Peripatetic aims, is open to question. Yet Cicero’s consistent agreement on this point (\textit{Fin.} 3. 17; 4. 15–16; 4. 19; 4. 25; 4. 32–4; 5. 17 = LS 64G; 5. 23–4; 5. 55) and the likelihood that the early Stoic theory of \(\text{oikeiōsis}\) was developed as a counterpoint to the Epicurean cradle argument tend to confirm Alexander’s claim. Moreover, the basically orthodox Hierocles also says that an account of the \(\text{πρῶτον οἰκεῖον}\) is an appropriate starting-point for a treatise on ethics (\textit{El. Eth.}, col. 11, 34–7). This appears to mean not that a treatise on ethics should begin with some remarks on developmental psychology but that an understanding of the earliest, natural object of motivation should constrain an ethical account in substantive ways, informing our conception of the human good. If the Stoics do not regard the object of neonatal motivation as correlative to the rational case, it is hard to understand the extent to which they were prepared to argue for a highly specific account of animal psychology in ethical contexts. For the suggestion that the Stoic theory is a response to Epicurean cradle arguments see Pohlenz, \textit{Grundfragen}, 44–5; \textit{Die Stoa}, 118–19. On the Carneadean arguments in Alexander’s \textit{Mantissa} see G. Striker, ‘Antipater, or the Art of Living’, in \textit{ead.}, \textit{Essays}, 298–315 at 313–14; R. W. Sharples (trans.),
If animals and infants are characterized from birth by an impulse to preserve their governing faculty, and if the satisfaction of this impulse is a sufficient condition of their teleological success, this analysis would appear to support the Stoics’ claim, in the realm of ethics, that virtue is sufficient for happiness.

A standard way of understanding Stoic teleology, however, rather assumes that the Stoics regard external objectives—the prima secundum naturam/prōta kata phusin that figure prominently in sources associated with Carneades—as essential to the end of non-rational animals, so that the human end differs, in this fundamental respect, from that of lower animals. This picture is strongly implied by Cicero’s account of oikeiōsis in De finibus 3, which represents human motivation as shifting in the course of development from a concern with external objectives to a singular concern with right action:

A human being’s earliest concern is for what is in accordance with nature. But as soon as one has gained some understanding, or rather ‘conception’ (what the Stoics call ennoia), and sees an order and as it were concordance in the things which one ought to do, one then values that concordance much more highly than those first objects of affection. (Fin. 3. 21 = LS 59D = SVF iii. 188, trans. Woolf)

Cicero’s language in this passage is striking inasmuch as it suggests that the Stoics, of all people, endorse a motivational shift away from what is seen to accord with nature at the earliest stages of development. The starkness of this motivational change is then reinforced with an analogy: though we begin, like other animals, with an attachment to objectives conducive to our physical flourishing, these introduce us in turn to the exercise of wisdom, which we eventually come to esteem more highly, as though we had been introduced to a second, more congenial friend (Fin. 3. 23 = SVF iii. 186). The oikeiōsis account of De finibus 3 thus describes and underscores a basic discontinuity between the objects of non-rational impulse and the aims of fully rational motivation.

It is easy to conclude from Cicero’s account that the Stoics accept this motivational picture, and therefore that they suppose that te-


93 On the lack of evidence for clearly Stoic uses of these terms see esp. Inwood, Ethics and Human Action, 218–23. As Inwood notes, ‘it is very doubtful whether anyone, let alone a Stoic, used the term [τὰ πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν] before Carneades’ day’ (226).

94 Cf. also Fin. 4. 41.
leological success in non-rational animals depends on external conditions that, by the Stoics’ own lights, make no difference to the happiness of rational human agents. This implication—present but not quite stated in De finibus 3—is in fact made explicit in De finibus 4, where Cicero argues that teleological success requires the actual possession of external objectives:

How and where did you suddenly abandon the body and all those things that are in accordance with nature but not in our power, finally discarding appropriate action itself? How is it that so many of the things originally commended by nature are suddenly forsaken by wisdom? Even if we were seeking the supreme good not of a human being but of some living creature who had nothing but a mind, . . . this mind would not accept the end you are proposing. It would want health and freedom from pain, and would also desire its own preservation as well as the security of those goods I just mentioned. It would establish as its end a life in accordance with nature, and this means, as I said, possession [habere] of things that are in accordance with nature, either all of them or as many as possible of the most important. (Fin. 4. 26–7 = LS 64K, trans. Woolf, emphasis added)

As Cicero here represents the Stoic view, the earliest objects of motivation are ‘forsaken by wisdom’ in human beings, so that the content of the human end fails to correspond to the objects of impulse in animals and human infants. The change in motivation that follows the development of reason brings with it a radical restructuring of the end itself, a corresponding shift in the basic criteria of teleological success and an abandonment of objectives that are essential to the end of every other kind of organism.

Since Pohlenz, commentators have taken from Cicero’s account a crucial assumption about the kind-relative nature of the teleology that underlies the Stoic theory: they have assumed, in particular, that in addition to fixing the range of activities appropriate to an organism, the character of an organism’s constitution determines whether the performance of these activities is itself a sufficient condition of teleological success. On this assumption about the kind-

---

95 Cf. Goldschmidt, Système stoïcien, 131–2.
96 See Pohlenz, Grundfragen, 44–5; Die Stoa, 118–19. Pembroke writes that when the notion of goodness is formed by human beings ‘the whole range of natural things which led up to it is not merely downgraded to a position of secondary importance but ceases to matter at all’ (’Oikeiōsis’, 206). According to Brennan, ‘It makes sense that food, health, and so on are essential to maintaining the constitution of an animal, but a rational being is constituted by reason, and its impulses ought to be directed towards the maintenance of that reason, by acting rationally, that is, virtuously. I
relative character of ends, the non-rational constitution of lower animals is supposed to explain why their telos depends on external conditions and objectives that sustain their physical life as organisms. By contrast, the fact that human beings possess a rational constitution, belonging to the highest division of kinds marked out by Diogenes, is supposed to explain why external conditions are indifferent to the human good and why the end for human beings consists wholly in virtue, a condition of the rational human hēge-monikon. We might call this the first-order interpretation of Stoic teleology in that it assumes that the end of non-rational animals depends on the satisfaction of their first-order impulses and, accordingly, on the presence of favourable external circumstances. On this account, the conditions of teleological success in non-rational animals are sharply discontinuous with those of rational human beings. Whereas the human telos depends on virtue alone, the telos of non-rational animals will depend, at least in part, on favourable external circumstances.

Apart from Cicero, however, no source requires us to adopt this view, and there are indications that a different teleological scheme lies behind the oikeiosis account as Chrysippus developed it. What Diogenes’ report emphasizes, in fact, is a stricter parallel that holds across all three of the natural kinds he distinguishes. Though they differ with respect to the character and complexity of their hēge-monikon, Diogenes emphasizes that plants, animals, and humans alike conform to nature just in case they are correctly administered by this faculty. In particular, Diogenes does not identify the natural life for animals with achieving a set of external conditions, but rather with their appropriate administration via the mechanism of impulse: that is, with the condition in which their actions are correctly governed and co-ordinated by representations and impulses originating in their leading faculty, which is continuous with the

---

The Stoic Argument from oikeiosis

*pneuma* that structures the physical cosmos. Though animals go looking for what is appropriate and avoid what is not, nothing in the passage suggests that Chrysippus held that an animal’s *telos* depends on anything more than the integrity of its *hēgemonikon* and the appropriate modes of action this secures. As Inwood observes, there is no evidence ‘that the early Stoics said that an animal is ever oriented to anything but its constitution’ (Ethics and Human Action, 219). Stoic sources sometimes speak of external objectives as *oikeia*, but this is presumably because an animal’s awareness of and dominant impulse to preserve its *σύστασις*—the *πρῶτον οἰκείον* or primary object of *oikeiōsis*—determines a range of first-order affiliations and impulses towards what is appropriate (*oikeion*) in a derivative sense (Inwood, Ethics and Human Action, 194–5). Cf. nn. 102 and 104 below.

Though the *hēgemonikon* is the faculty by which an animal governs its own motions, it is also the faculty by which cosmic reason governs it. The resulting picture is that of *pneuma* working in and through each kind of thing, establishing it as the kind of thing it is and bringing about the activities appropriate to it, moving it towards what is *oikeion* and away from what is *allotrian*. Such an account fits suggestively with Sextus’ remark that the Stoics believe it can be shown, on the basis of animal behaviour, that only the fine is good (M. 11. 99–100 = SVF iii. 38).

We might suppose, then, that in older Stoic theory something analogous to the sufficiency of virtue for human beings applies at every level of the *scala naturae*, so that the end of each kind of organism is achieved through the preservation of its *hēgemonikon*. There are, to be sure, significant differences between non-rational animals and rational human beings in Stoic theory: the sophistication of their concepts, the capacity for language, and the mechanism of assent being the most salient examples. These differences determine, for the Stoics, a set of evaluative categories that apply to rational agents alone, including especially those of happiness, goodness, and justice. A central reason why they do so, however, is that the conceptual sophistication of rational cognition enables human beings to mirror in the structure of their own cognitions—as animals cannot—the order and beauty instantiated in the cosmos itself. The capacity for assent that accompanies this conceptual sophistication moreover allows human beings to be artificers of this order, together with Zeus, by apprehending and assenting to it. On this point see esp. Epict. Diss. 1. 6. 18–22 and 2. 8. According to Epictetus, the fundamental difference between humans and non-rational animals is not the capacity to use impressions correctly but the capacity to understand this use. Epictetus says, very strikingly, that if animals understood their own use of impressions the cat-
differences all depend on complexities internal to the human hēgemonikon, however, and there is little reason to suppose that they are intended to account for basic differences in the criteria of teleological success that apply across species. It is consistent with our sources to suppose that what is transformed by the development of reason, according to Stoic theory, is not the actual value of external circumstances nor the actual conditions of teleological success. It is rather the capacity to appreciate and assent to patterns of action already present in the rationally organized cosmos.

This way of understanding Stoic teleology assumes that although the range of activities appropriate to an animal (kathēkonta) will vary with its constitution, the preservation of its constitution remains, for each kind of organism, sufficient to achieve its end. On this interpretation, when Epictetus asserts that the works and ends for each animal are relative to its constitution (kataskeuē), he does not mean that the basic conditions of teleological success vary widely across species. He means only that the activities in which an organism’s end consists are determined by the set of functional capacities it possesses by nature: on whether, for instance, it was designed by nature for co-operation with other members of its own kind, as human agents manifestly are (Cic. Fin. 3. 63–4 = LS 57F; Off. 1. 12; Leg. 1. 27; cf. Xen. Mem. 1. 4. 12). Under this construal, the telos of a non-rational animal no more depends on external conditions than does the human telos. It rather consists in the integrity of the animal’s hēgemonikon and in the performance of appropriate functions (kathēkonta), which the animal’s capacity for self-perception enables it to grasp. We might call this the higher-order interpretation of Stoic teleology: it implies that although the range of activities appropriate to an organism may vary from case to case, the telos depends, for each kind of organism, on the satisfaction of its higher-order impulse to preserve the constitution given to it by nature.

Pembroke writes that there is ‘a definite emphasis [in Stoic texts] on the continuity of childhood with maturity, just as there is elsewhere on that of animal behaviour with human life . . . [T]he line drawn is evaluative rather than descriptive, and ultimately, the continuity is more important than the point of demarcation’ (‘Oikeiōsis’, 121).
The Stoic Argument from oikeiōsis

Each of these interpretations of Stoic teleology has a significant consequence for our understanding of Stoic theory and of the oikeiōsis account in particular. The first-order construal of Stoic teleology may seem to spoil the inductive character of Stoic appeals to animal behaviour, as Cicero points out when he speaks for Antiochus. If Cicero’s report in De finibus 4 is correct, the older Stoics must have acknowledged that rational human maturity is marked by an abandonment of objectives that, by the Stoics’ own admission, matter to the telos of non-rational creatures (and perhaps that of pre-rational humans). When a human being acquires her rational nature, she acquires an end that excludes as indifferent resources and conditions essential to the telos of all other animals (Fin. 4. 28).

If the Stoics were prepared to grant the strongly discontinuous account of animal and human ends implied by De finibus 4, their appeal to animal behaviour seems wrong-headed from the start. On this account of Stoic teleology, it is difficult to understand why Stoic arguments for the human good place so much emphasis on the animal case and why Hierocles and Seneca take such pains to refute rival analyses of animal behaviour.

The higher-order construal of Stoic teleology has a consequence of another sort: it requires us to suppose that, at least when he is speaking for Antiochus, Cicero is sometimes prepared to distort or conceal older Stoic views in substantive ways. If the Chrysippean theory of oikeiōsis identified the aim of an animal’s basic motivational impulse with the regulation of appropriate activity rather than the satisfaction of its physical needs, then Cicero’s report in De finibus 4 significantly mischaracterizes the psychological claims that are the starting-point of the oikeiōsis theory, replacing the Stoics’ own analysis of non-rational motivation with an account that points to Antiochean conclusions about the human telos. Since Cicero offers us one of our few windows into Stoic theory, this means we must treat a substantial portion of our evidence as a misleading guide to this aspect of older Stoicism. This is a disheartening result.

On balance, however, I believe we should accept the higher-order framework suggested by Diogenes’ account, for three reasons. First, there are indications, internal to De finibus, that the asymmetry between animal and human ends insinuated by Antiochus is a vestige of dialectical exchanges between the Stoics and the Academy rather than a feature of older Stoic theory.¹⁰¹ As Inwood

¹⁰¹ Cicero understood the doctrinal core of Stoic theory very well, but he is cap-
has emphasized, the sharp division between soul and body foregrounded throughout book 4 of *De finibus* suggests that Cicero is operating with a broadly Academic account of the soul–body relation in view and that he may simply be ignoring, at this stage in his dialectical argument, the different physical analysis that underpins the Stoic’ own account. The psychological starting-points of the Stoic theory as Cicero represents them in *De finibus* 3 are not especially clear, but they are clear enough to register an important point of difference between the Stoic theory and the Antiochean versions of *De finibus* 4 and 5. In *De finibus* 3 Cato says clearly that an animal’s primary attachment is to its own constitution (‘ad suum statum’) and that it is in virtue of perceiving and caring for its constitution that an animal possesses impulses towards what is external. By contrast, though Piso also speaks of the motive of

able of neglecting or distorting the older Stoic account in substantive philosophical ways. An adequate defence of this claim would require a book, but three salient examples may help to substantiate it. (1) Susanne Bobzien has shown how Cicero’s examples of co-fated events (Fat. 30) spoil the logic of Chrysippus’ response to the Idle Argument when they are substituted for Chrysippus’ own illustrations, and this is in a context in which Cicero apparently aims to be charitable to Chrysippus. See Bobzien, *Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy* (Oxford, 2001), 198–217 and esp. 216–17. (2) At Tusc. 4. 10–11 Cicero frames the Stoic theory of *nôth* by reference to a Platonic account of psychic partition, a highly misleading association given the psychic monism of orthodox Stoicism. As Margaret Graver notes, the association ‘gives Cicero a rhetorical advantage’ but ‘threatens the integrity of the account’. See Graver, *Cicero on the Emotions* (Chicago, 2002), 135, and cf. Inwood, ‘Walking and Talking’, 76–7. (3) At Fin. 4. 14–15 (= SVF iii. 13) Cicero presents a polemical Carneadean caricature of the Stoic τέλος—that the end is to live enjoying the objects that accord with nature—as though it were an interpretation of the τέλος the Stoics themselves accept. But this formulation is very far from the orthodox Stoic view, as Cicero is well aware. Cf. Cic. Acad. 2. 136 (= SVF i. 181); Tusc. 5. 84–5; Fin. 4. 15; 5. 20 (= LS 646–7 SVF iii. 44). See further R. Woolf (trans.), *Cicero: On Moral Ends* (Cambridge, 2001), 95–6 n. 15.


Though this important difference is not sufficient, in my view, to show that the account of *De finibus* 3 is free of Academic distortions. Cicero is there operating in a dialectical context that is intended to prepare the reader for a critique of Stoicism, and his account of self-perception and self-appropriation at 3. 16 is poorly connected to his characterization of the things first recommended to us by nature, whose abandonment is then described at 3. 21 and heavily emphasized in book 4. As Schmitz observes, Cicero’s brief mention of self-perception ‘spielt . . . in der folgenden Erörterung keine Rolle mehr’ (*Cato*, 26). Most puzzling of all, perhaps, is the material at 3. 17–18 (= SVF iii. 189). Cicero there treats true representational states of the ἡγεμονικόν, *cognitones* (καταλήψεις) and *artes* (τέχναι)—which Stobaeus classifies as goods—as objects of our basic motivational affinities and things to be taken for
self-preservation, this motivation is not analysed in cognitive terms or with explicit reference to the hēgemonikon of the organism, as it is in the Stoic scheme. It is rather analysed with reference to an organism’s nature as a whole and to the physical needs that answer to this nature, holistically conceived. On Cato’s account, an animal pursues what is external because it first perceives and is appropriated to its leading faculty and the functions this implies. On Piso’s account, an animal pursues external objectives because it is immediately appropriated to them: its self-awareness follows rather than precedes its impulse towards what is external (Fin. 5. 24).

When Piso accuses the Stoics of abandoning the things recommended by nature, therefore, he appears not to be working with the Stoics’ own technical account of the prōton oikeion as hēgemonikon but instead assuming an account according to which animal impulse is straightforwardly directed at external objectives such as food or safety, without the prior phenomena of self-perception and self-appropriation. Such an analysis corresponds closely to the formulation of the end Carneades is said to have defended against the Stoics and which Cicero himself occasionally and misleadingly represents as the Stoic view: that “the highest good is to enjoy the primary objects nature has recommended” (Acad. 2. 131, trans. Brittain).

A second consideration is this: Galen preserves a fragment of their own sake. This material sounds very Stoic indeed, and it fits well with Sextus’ observation that the Stoics locate the goods of the soul in the hēgemonikon itself (M. 7. 235–6). It fits poorly, however, with the emphasis on primary natural things in which it is embedded. We may suppose that, for the Stoics, kataleipēs are indeed objects of the primary oikeiōsis relation in fully rational human agents, since they are physical states of the hēgemonikon (cf. Cic. Acad. 2. 31 = LS 46N) and components of virtue. Externals, though pursued by animals and human agent alike, are pursued derivatively, as constituents of the kathēkōn that flow from the hēgemonikon (cf. n. 98 above). More generally, the cosmic framework so evident in Diogenes Laertius has all but disappeared from Cicero’s version of the Stoic theory (cf. Inwood, Ethics after Aristotle, 63–4; Radice, Oikeiosis, 186). For disconcerting parallels between Cicero’s De fminbus 5 account and Peripatetic versions of oikeiōsis see Schmitz, Cato, 16–38.

104 “[T]he object of every living creature’s desire . . . is to be found in what is adapted to its nature” (Fin. 5. 24, trans. Woolf).

105 Structured as it is by the Carneadia divisio, Piso’s account of the Stoic position does not even acknowledge an organism’s constitution as a possible object of initial impulse. It is notably and deliberately omitted from the possible starting-points acknowledged by the divisio, and hence from the list of plausible accounts of the good. At Fin. 5. 18 pleasure, the absence of pain, and the primary natural things are given as the only possible objects of an animal’s primary or initial desire. The account preserved at D.L. 7. 85 (= LS 75A–SVF iii. 178) is not even recognized in this scheme.

106 Cf. Cic. Tusc. 5. 84–5; Fin. 4. 15, 60; 5. 20 (= LS 64G).
Posidonius attributing to Chrysippus the view that we have by nature an ‘oikeiōsis relationship to the fine alone’ (fr. 169=PHP 5. 5. 8=LS 65M). This claim, if Chrysippus made it, is filtered through Posidonius’ Platonizing account of the human soul and Galen’s own polemical commentary, but it fits well with the supposition that the primary object of appropriation, for animals and humans alike, is the hēgemonikon itself. Sources closely associated with Chrysippus regularly align the predicate oikeion with the condition of virtue and with the activities that flow from a constitution that conforms to nature. By contrast, the focus of the Carneadean account is not on appropriate activities but on the external objectives or fruits of nature that answer to the Carneadean conception of the end. The interpretation I have proposed makes sense of this evidence. If the Stoics identify the prōton oikeion with the faculty that controls perception and impulse, and if the aim of the primary impulse is to preserve this faculty as nature intends, the primary oikeiōsis relationship will indeed be directed, in the case of the sage, at what is fine, at the perfected rational hēgemonikon and the activities to which it gives rise. This means, in turn, that the primary object of oikeiōsis will be correlative to the Stoic conception of the telos, according to which happiness consists in virtue and virtuous activity. On this account, the Stoic argument fits the broader pattern of Hellenistic appeals to neonatal motivation.

The third and most compelling reason, however, is that the higher-order construal of Stoic teleology supplies the Stoics with an argument for the human good that is intelligible against the background of the cosmological theory developed by Chrysippus. In general Stoic teleology appears to be carefully calibrated to accommodate the Stoics’ cosmobiology and the interlocking relation of part to whole. Nature as a whole realizes its purpose even when the parts do not. But the parts too realize their ends when there is no impediment to the governing faculty through which nature works (Cic. ND 2. 35; Tusc. 5. 37–8; Marc. Aur.

107 Compare, for instance, the use of oikeiōn Plutarch ascribes to Chrysippus at Stoic. repugn. 153 b (=LS 57E=SVF iii. 179) and 153 b (=SVF iii. 211) with D.L. 7. 109 (=SVF i. 230, iii. 495) and Marcus Aurelius’ use of oikeiōn at Med. 11. 13. In these passages virtue and its activities—not external objects—are said to be oikeiōn. Cf. also Stob. 2. 69 (=SVF iii. 86); S.E. M. 7. 12 (=SVF i. 356); Epict. Diss. 3. 24. 67–9; and especially Galen, PHP 5. 5. 8–20 (Posid. fr. 169=LS 65M).

108 On the wide influence of the Carneadean critique see Inwood, Ethics after Aristotle, ch. 3.
The Stoic Argument from oikeiōsis

Med. 8. 41; cf. Nemesius, Nat. hom. 35. 258=SVF ii. 991). The account I have proposed attributes to the Stoics the view that the same conditions of teleological success obtain at every level of the scala naturae, and it therefore explains the dialectical point of Stoic appeals to animal self-perception and self-appropriation. Every organism goes through the motions of fate, but it may do so either as a segment of pneuma whose representations and impulses are preserved in a condition of conformity to nature or as one in which they are not. It appears that Chrysippus is largely responsible for the role assigned to pneuma as a basic postulate of this account. The evidence suggests that he took pains to a remarkable degree to integrate Stoic cosmogony and cosmology with new developments in the vitalist medical theories of the third century. In Chrysippus’ hands, the theory of pneuma provided a unifying basis for Stoic cosmology and biology, allowing the Stoics to characterize the motions (kinēseis) of individual organisms both as movements of distinct souls and as movements of the breath that suffuses and sustains the cosmos as a whole (e.g. Epict. Diss. 1. 14. 6–7).

7. The Stoic argument from oikeiōsis

If this cosmological background provided the context for a Chrysippean theory of oikeiōsis, the many puzzling examples of animal self-perception and self-preservation can be understood as part of a unified teleological analysis. Such a framework yields an argument that is structurally parallel to what is known of the Epicurean ‘cradle argument’ and of the developmental account associated with Antiochus. It moves, that is to say, from the teleological success conditions of non-rational animals to conclusions

about the human good. Since accurate perception and appropriate impulse do not depend on circumstances, the Stoic account implies that it is possible for each creature to act appropriately regardless of external conditions, as Seneca’s turtle does when it struggles to right itself (*Ep. 121. 8=LS 57B*). This element of the Stoics’ account supports the claim that the human good consists in virtue alone. At the same time, the Stoics argue that animal behaviour cannot be explained by the external stimulus of pleasure. Animals perform the functions appropriate to their make-up even when it is painful for them to do so, and this behaviour can be explained only by the mechanisms of self-perception and self-appropriation (Sen. *Ep. 121. 7–8=LS 57B; S.E. M. 11. 99–100*). This element of the Stoics’ account supports the claim that virtue consists in a form of cognition, a grasp of oneself and of the cosmos as a whole.

Such an interpretation fits closely with the fact that the category of appropriate (*kathēkon*) activity applies to organisms quite generally and with the metaphysical claim that an organism’s *hēgemonikon* is the most immediate expression of divine activity in the physical cosmos, directing its activities in a manner suited to its kind. An animal of course does not recognize the conditions under which its own end is achieved, as rational humans may. Yet the patterns apparent in animal activity evidently provide a model, within the Stoic scheme, of the psychological coherence and consistency that is supposed to govern human cognition and action.

It is hard to credit Cicero’s implication, advanced in a polemical context, that the Stoics treat the conditions of teleological success for human agents as sharply discontinuous with those that apply elsewhere in the *scala naturae*. In particular, it is difficult to believe that the Stoics treat external conditions indifferent to human happiness as essential to the *telos* of non-rational animals, regarding an animal’s failures to realize these external conditions as teleological failures.

If this reconstruction is correct, it has two consequences for

110 Contrast Galen, *PHP* 5. 5. 3–7.

111 Seneca especially compares the form of cognition implanted in animals by nature to the technical knowledge that constitutes virtue in the human case (*Ep. 121. 21–4*), on which see Inwood, *Seneca*, 343–6; Origen, *Princ. 3. 1. 2–3* (LS 53A= SVF ii. 988).

112 This is not to suggest that non-rational animals conceive of external things as indifferent or pursue them under this description, on the Stoic account, merely that external things make no more difference to the *telos* of animals than to the human *telos*, in the Stoics’ view. The Stoics do emphasize, however, that animals and infants perform the functions appropriate to them with a certain disregard for painful
understanding the Stoic doctrine of oikeiōsis. First, it helps to explain why the Stoics do not appear to offer a derivation of the sort commentators have sought of other-regarding obligations from an animal’s appropriation to self. Though self-appropriation gives rise to behaviours associated with self-preservation in the ordinary sense, it also explains a broader range of teleologically appropriate activities. These include, most saliently, an animal’s care and concern for its own offspring and, in some cases, its co-operation with other animals both within and across species. In the human case, the leading feature of the rational constitution is its suitability for social co-operation, evidenced most clearly in the capacity for language. According to Cicero and Marcus, we are constituted (constitutum esse/kateskeuasthai) for justice and fellowship, and recognition of this fact grounds our awareness of obligations towards others (Cic. Leg. 1. 28=SVF iii. 343; Marc. Aur. Med. 2. 1; 5. 16; 5. 30; 11. 21). Though the impulse to preserve one’s own constitution is, strictly speaking, a self-directed one, it is doubtful that the Stoics ever treated it as co-ordinate with the first-order impulses associated with so-called social oikeiōsis or as one that could enter into conflict with them. The sources do not support a tidy association of social oikeiōsis with the presence of reason, nor do they restrict the primary impulse to self-preservation to non-rational animals. Self- and other-regarding forms of motivation cut across the distinction between rational and non-rational agency. Both are rooted in the mechanisms of self-perception and self-appropriation that ground the full range of activities appropriate to animate organisms.

Second, this analysis brings out a basic respect in which the Stoic account of animal psychology is supposed to be normative for the rational case. In rational agents the character of impulse is conditioned by the discursive and inferential abilities that underwrite higher-order modes of phantasia and, crucially, by the capacity to pass judgement on phantasiai the soul consciously entertains. These or pleasurable results (Sen. Ep. 121. 8=LS 57B; S.E. M. 11. 99–100=SVF iii. 38). Cf Goldschmidt, Système stoïcien, 128–9.

113 Cf. Plut. De amore 495 c: ‘But in man, whom she made a rational and political being, inclining him to justice, law, religion, building of cities, and friendship, [Nature] has placed the seeds of those things that are excellent, beautiful, and fruitful—that is, the love of their children—following the first principles which entered into the very constitution of their bodies [τῶν σωμάτων κατασκευαίς]’ (trans. after Brown).
cognitive capacities are constitutive of the rational faculty that is a privileged expression of divine reason, in the Stoics’ view, but they also bring with them increased scope for representational error, with the result that rational agents are liable to stray from nature in ways non-rational animals do not. Nothing is more contrary to nature than a false assent, Cicero maintains, in that it deforms both the cognitions of the soul and the impulses to which they give rise (Fin. 3. 18 = SVF iii. 189). There is a suggestion in several texts that in respect of representational accuracy, if not conceptual refinement, the *pneuma* of an animal’s soul adheres more reliably and consistently than that of human agents to the contours of the world. This point helps to explain why the Stoics regard the precisely consistent activities of non-rational animals—performed on the basis of factive and largely automatic representations—as a structural model of the cognitive conformity to nature that is supposed to obtain in human beings.

Such a reconstruction is consonant with the prominent place given to the *oikeiōsis* doctrine in even cursory allusions to Stoic ethical theory, and it supplies the Stoics with the sort of ethical foundation they need: one that makes the end for each creature consist in the functions appropriate to it in virtue of the kind of creature it is. Under this interpretation, the Stoics are no longer saddled with the burden of explaining how narrowly egoistic motivation is supplanted in human beings by rational motivation of a fundamentally different character. Instead, they are building an inductive case for an analysis of teleological functioning that applies throughout the *scala naturae*. With this account in view, we can see how Stoic appeals to *oikeiōsis* might have figured in a defence of justice, as Porphyry and the anonymous commentator on the *Theaetetus* affirm, and as passages in Marcus Aurelius and Cicero independently suggest.

What is most striking about the Stoic theory, perhaps, is the

---

114 See esp. Stob. 4. 502 (quoted above); 2. 85. 13 (= LS 59B = SVF iii. 494); Cic. Tusc. 5. 38; cf. also Plut. *De amore* 493 c–e.

115 According to Goldschmidt, ‘Au sens le plus général du mot, le devoir (*καθήκον*) est le “convenable”, ce qui est en accord avec la nature de l’agent. Cette conformité s’établit spontanément, comme une conséquence (*ἀκόλουθον*) naturelle, dans le comportement de l’animal; elle existe même chez l’homme, au niveau de la tendance (*ὁρμή*). Plus tard, lors du développement de la nature spécifique de l’homme (la raison) cette convenance ne se fait plus spontanément, mais résulte d’un choix réfléchi... on a vu que le devoir chez l’animal est parfait d’emblée’ (*Système stoïcien*, 125–6).
degree to which the Stoics are prepared to integrate psychological principles within a cosmic framework and interpret their significance in cosmic terms. As Pembroke observes, discussions of \textit{oikeiōsis} have tended ‘to isolate Stoic ethics from other aspects of their thinking, but Nature is not a specifically ethical term’.” That the \textit{oikeiōsis} doctrine is embedded in this way within a cosmic teleological scheme is in keeping with the Stoics’ Socratic inheritance through Xenophon, Plato, and Antisthenes. Antecedents to Stoic conclusions about animal psychology appear in the \textit{Cyropaedia}, and it is known from the reports of Sextus and Diogenes that Zeno adopted teleological arguments found in the \textit{Memorabilia} (Xen. \textit{Cyr.} 2. 3. 9; \textit{Mem.} 1. 4. 3–18; S.E. \textit{M.} 9. 101–4; D.L. 7. 1–2 = \textit{SVF} i. 1; cf. Cic. \textit{ND} 2. 18; 3. 27). ‘I beg you to learn from Chrysippus’, says Epictetus, ‘what is the administration \textit{[dioikēsis]} of the universe, and what place therein the rational animal has’ (\textit{Diss.} 1. 10. 10, trans. Oldfather). On the interpretation I have offered, Chrysippus argued that the administration of the cosmos is such that the end for each creature consists in the performance of the activities assigned to it and in the perfection of the governing faculty from which they flow.

\textit{Colgate University}

\textbf{BIBLIOGRAPHY}


Bees, R., \textit{Die Oikeiosislehre der Stoa: Rekonstruktion ihres Inhaltes} (Würzburg, 2004).


Jacob Klein


The Stoic Argument from oikeiōsis


Hahm, D., *The Origins of Stoic Cosmology* (Columbus, Ohio, 1977).


Pohlenz, M., Die Stoa (Göttingen, 1948).

Pohlenz, M., Grundfragen der stoischen Philosophie [Grundfragen] (Göttingen, 1940).


Ramelli, I., Hierocles the Stoic: Elements of Ethics [Hierocles], trans. D. Konstan (Atlanta, 2009).
Von Arnim, H., Arius Didymus’ Abriß der peripatetischen Ethik (Vienna, 1926).