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- SLF

[editor- Shannon Young]
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The arguments presented in this paper, and the 1979 parliamentary elections in general, are more relevant than ever for Americans in the wake of the 2008 election. With dismal economic news mounting and a massive shift in the electoral map, Margaret Thatcher’s electoral strategy and the keys to her successes provide important lessons for both parties. In particular, the Republican Party is in need of a coherent message and fresh electoral successes. Some have argued that a return to truly conservative ideals is what that party needs, while others say the party must move to the center and seek a wider audience, like the modern British Conservatives under David Cameron. Whatever the solution for the nation and for our political parties, however, it is clear that the lessons of history provide much insight.

In 1979, the Conservative Party under Margaret Thatcher’s leadership won a stunning victory. In total, there was a 5.2 percent swing in the total number of former Labour voters who moved to Thatcher’s Tories, the biggest shift in voting patterns since Churchill’s stunning defeat in 1945. The new prime minister, who pledged massive changes in economic and related policy, had accomplished a dramatic feat. Her election marked the end of what some have called the post-World War II consensus, which most prominently featured support for the welfare state, high taxes, nationalized industry, and strong trade unions.

Scholars have extensively debated the reasons the Tory victory in 1979. There is general agreement that the results were based almost entirely on economic discontent, and all evidence confirms the validity of this theory. Of course, some scholars disagree, including Andrew Gamble, who says that Thatcher’s toughness on communism set the stage for equal toughness on the economy. There is yet more dispute among the majority of scholars who identity economics as the primary reason for the 1979 upset.

The economy in 1979 was a depressing sight indeed. The many problems included stagnant growth, increasing unemployment, double-digit inflation, high labor costs as negotiated by trade unions, a command economy of nationalized industry, and high taxes for an expansive welfare state. Of these many issues, scholarly discussion centers around which single issue or combination of issues had the greatest political effect. Some, like Helmut Norpoth, argue that inflation and union excess combined had the greatest impact. Others, including Dennis Kavanagh,
posit that it all of the economic issues combined into a “politics of decline” which altered the electoral landscape. Finally, yet other scholars argue that 1979 was a watershed year which marked large-scale ideological change, including Ivor Crewe and Donald Searing. This last theory may have some truth to it, but it is only applicable in the context of economic crisis.

This paper will argue that while inflation and unemployment may have in fact been most detrimental to the British economy in 1979, it was instead the combination of public dissatisfaction over high taxes, continued nationalization of industry, and trade union power perceived as excessive that were most politically persuasive in leading to the Conservative victory in 1979. These issues were presented persuasively as part of a wider free-market strategy, and were perceived in a new light after the Winter of Discontent in late 1978 and early 1979.

**Unemployment and Inflation**

Unemployment was high in 1979, and inflation was rampant. Normally, these issues in combination would serve as an intoxicating electoral tonic, but in that year they proved less influential than would normally be expected, especially considering the Tories’ vigorous attempts to make an issue of runaway inflation, and a post-war consensus which had led to low unemployment becoming the norm.

Combating inflation was a key plank in the 1979 Conservative platform, and yet it netted little benefit for the party in the election. In fact, it was so central to the party’s strategy that year that it was the very first policy item listed in the 1979 Conservative election manifesto, which was carefully designed to highlight the party’s record on fighting inflation.¹ The manifesto, a statement of the party’s positions on issues it deems critical to the health of the nation, is both a guide for what the party will do once in power and a tool used by the party to attract voters. Despite this emphasis, however, the issue seems to have resulted in a figurative wash for the Tories. Helmut Norpoth states that it was “a major irony that Mrs. Thatcher staked her 1979 campaign on an issue where Labour actually rated higher in public esteem.”² It is clear that the Conservatives hoped to gain traction here from general public unhappiness about the state of the economy, instead of discontent about inflation specifically.

Certainly, inflation and the constant increase in consumer prices worried British voters, but much of this sentiment was vented on trade unions instead of inflation-control policy itself. This was likely because inflation was closely linked by many to the pay policies and demands of unions. Many British voters felt that “the central problem faced by the government [was] holding down the rise in labour costs,”³ and that those same costs were a result of incessant pay negotiations by increasingly powerful unions. As

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industrial pay rose, so did prices across the country, dragging down the average real pay for families from £70.20 in 1973 to £63.10 in 1977. This represented real financial problems from working- and middle-class families across the country. In this case, however, inflation was overrun by other problems perceived as more serious.

Unemployment increased massively during the 1970s, but despite their emphasis on economic issues, Thatcher’s Conservatives did not seize on it as a plank. In fact, the Tories in 1979 may have even welcomed moderate levels of unemployment, disavowing as they did Keynesian full employment theories. The party’s manifesto of that year did not even mention unemployment as one of the problems the party saw as a priority. David Robertson argues that the members of the Conservative party most closely aligned with Thatcher even thought that “government insurance and benefit programs in 1979 too generously rewarded citizens for not working.” In the eyes of the Tories, unemployment, while increasing, was the next best thing from a non-issue.

Dissent against high levels of unemployment also appeared to have diminished from its levels in the decades prior. At an earlier time, unemployment ranging between one and two million would have been politically unimaginable. In the late 1970s, however, increasing unemployment was met with only mild resistance, and then only from the unions. This must have been an encouraging sign for the Tories, and helped lead to their decision to minimize opposition to increasing unemployment as a political gambit.

It is indeed an irony that unemployment was a relatively minor issue, especially given the importance full employment had in the so-called post-war consensus. John Maynard Keynes had argued that true economic success was concurrent with full employment, and that the government had to take corrective action when unemployment grew. As Peter Jenkins argued, as unemployment grew without major public opposition, “the cornerstone itself of the Post-war settlement was crumbling.” Keynes also argued that excessive saving was a problem, and thus British Keynesianism encouraged high levels of consumer spending, leading to inflation, another problem government could work to prevent through wage caps. It is therefore also ironic that inflation was not a major issue in the 1979 campaign. Nonetheless, these issues seemed less pressing to average citizens when compared to other threats to Britain’s economic recovery.

In 1978, the year prior to the election, rates of unemployment and inflation appeared to be improving. Of course, this not only meant that the

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7 Jenkins, 17.
economy had simply gone from dismal to slightly less dismal, but it also meant that Conservatives became nervous about what had begun to appear to be an almost certain victory come next election. Its unintended consequence was even more crucial, however. Slight improvements in the economy made the following winter’s economic and social upheavals appear even more dramatic. In fact, this may have been the area in which unemployment and inflation had the greatest impact for the Tories: by improving ever so slightly, the remaining issues surrounding high taxation, trade union activism, and nationalized industry appeared even worse.⁸

To be sure, unemployment and inflation were bad for both the British economy and workers. Unemployment, however, was never a major part of the Tory platform and inflation was less successful of a tactic than other issues.

**Taxation**

Thatcher made lowering taxes a key proposition in the Conservative agenda for 1979. Not only did it figure prominently in the election manifesto, but Thatcher made sure she pounded in the point on the floor of the House of Commons, when she said to Labour Prime Minister Callaghan, “go anywhere in the country and the demand will be for two things – less tax and more law and order.”⁹ Lower taxes were key to the new Tory free market platform, and after years of growing acceptance by voters, were key in the 1979 upset.

Though many Britons generally opposed lowering taxes if it meant reducing social services, the Tories emphasized instead taxes as an engine for economic growth and increased government revenues, and thus benefited from the issue. Polls showed that voters did not want attendant welfare cuts, but they were strikingly in favor of cutting business taxes to enable investment, and were prepared to offer Thatcher leeway in individual tax cuts on the basis of the party’s free market argument.¹⁰ For a country that had emphasized Socialist policies for decades, this was a meaningful shift.

This shift towards the acceptance of lower taxes was both a long-term trend and uniquely British within Europe. In general, European electorates favored high taxes to fund high cost welfare programs. In Britain, this idea was certainly accepted but with less enthusiasm. A 1976 poll among member countries showed that fifty-four percent of other European Economic Community nation’s voters thought their governments did too little for the poor. In Britain, however, this number was only thirty-six percent. Similar research on general attitudes toward taxation also showed that tax cutting enthusiasm was highest in countries which had the greatest tax increases since World War II, which was certainly valid in the United Kingdom.¹¹ These somewhat surprising public attitudes gave Thatcher an opening to call for lower taxes, even if it meant lower government spending.

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⁸ Gamble, 99; Jenkins, 19.
⁹ Jenkins, 22.
The Conservatives who were closely allied with Thatcher were absolute on the issue of tax-cutting: they believed it must be done to create economic growth. This was an appealing and easily explained issue to the electorate, especially when presented with the enthusiasm and clear conviction of the Iron Lady. Indeed, lower taxes appeared to be a Tory “article of faith.” For Britons ready for a change in economic fortunes, fresh ideas were tempting.

Still, the Tories had to publicly admit that certain elements of the welfare state would have to go or at least be reduced, but this notion was met with surprisingly low amounts of opposition. Research conducted by Ivor Crewe and Donald Searing showed that in 1974, only thirty-four percent of Britons thought welfare benefits had “gone too far.” By 1979, the proportion had increased to fifty percent. For a country which had operated under a consensus favoring high levels of welfare spending, this once again marked major change and a trend in the Tories’ favor.

Britons found Thatcher’s ideas of economic growth through more moderate tax rates a welcome suggestion, particularly given the immediate past’s economic stagnation. As such, it served as one of the major reasons for Thatcher’s victory.

Nationalization of Industry

British voters had long held opinions which favored nationalizing either profitable or failing businesses, for various reasons. In the 1979 election, however, they showed that the tide of public opinion had turned, and Thatcher’s support for privatizing many of these industries back proved important in the election, especially in the context of free markets.

By 1979, many of Britain’s major industrial companies were nationalized, meaning they were owned in whole or in part by the state. The state often chose the choicest and most profitable companies to nationalize, including British Telecom, British Airways, Rolls Royce, British Steel, British Leyland, and MG Rover. In course, these companies often lost the efficiency brought by productivity in turn motivated by market competitiveness and began to lose money. Government subsidies made up the difference with tax dollars. Post-war governments also got into the habit of buying failing companies with large work-forces or prestige in order to save them from bankruptcy or to save political face. This was a further drain on the treasury. Worst of all in the eyes of Conservatives was the massive stake of real estate and council houses owned by the government.

With much of the same fervor that accompanied tax cuts, Thatcher actively campaigned to denationalize key industries and release them once more into free economic competition. The election manifesto called for denationalization, and said that any further movements towards “nationalisation would further

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13 Crewe and Searing, 376.
impoverish us and further undermine our freedom.”

The document especially decried the Labour Party’s plans for further nationalization. These assertions fit nicely with free market ideals and a path to economic recovery promoted by the Tories.

In general, British voters favored either privatization or at least maintenance of the status quo, which proved advantageous to the Tories. The political tide was clearly turning against nationalization. Polls showed that support for privatizing some industries increased sixteen percent between 1974 and 1979, surely a product of both economic downturn and passionate Conservative campaigning. It appears that, at first, privatization was an elite driven phenomenon, but it gradually picked up popular support. Ian McAllister and Donley Studlar argue that the convictions of the elite, which supported privatization in the name of economic growth, eventually became imbedded of the consciousness of much of the electorate.

Following this model, by 1979, a majority of Britons favored at least a small amount of denationalization. Once again, this feeling contributed to the positive support for Tory free market policies and was simultaneously buttressed by those same Tory policies. A Gallup Poll also showed that seventy-seven percent of voters were in favor of privatization or were at least opposed to Labour ideas for further nationalization. This same poll demonstrated an eighteen percent increase in support from privatization from only a decade before. It was yet another Tory gain on an important issue.

In fact, many British voters seemed to recognize nationalization for what it was: an attempt to rescue major industry from the throes of trade union and economic inflexibility-induced financial distress. As such, they saw privatization and the Tories’ other free-market policies as proceeding hand-in-hand.

Trade Union Power

Opposition to the enormous political influence of trade unions was the most compelling reason for voters’ shift toward the Thatcher’s party. The Conservatives took a much harder line against unions, which were among the most powerful political forces in the county. This hard line was especially evident in contrast to the Labour Party’s conceived bond with unionism. As the unions and their actions became increasingly unpopular, curbing union’s power became a tide-turning question for the Tories.

Trade unions run amok, more than any other one issue, encapsulated the electorates’ concern with Labour policies and attraction to Tory free market strategy. As Norpoth asserts, “it was...industrial relations that proved pivotal for Labour’s defeat.”

16 Crewe and Searing, 376.
18 Ibid, 160.
20 Norpoth, 209-10.
had long claimed to have a “special relationship” with unions, which implied a certain amount of control over them. As events would prove, Labour in fact had little control over the unions. Quite the opposite seemed to be the case.

The 1970s had been banner years for unions, and they grew during that decade into influential political actors. From 1964 to 1979, union membership increased from 10.2 million to 13.4 million, and this in a country that was already heavily unionized.21 With this increased membership, their power was augmented as well, to a level where they appeared the most powerful force in the nation for a time. In 1975, a Gallup poll asked British voters who they thought the most powerful man in the country was: “52 percent thought Jack Jones [leader of the Transport and General Workers’ Union] the most powerful man in the country, only 34 percent the Prime Minister.”22 This set up a dangerous political situation for Labour.

The situation got out of hand for the Labour government when it appeared that they could no longer control the unions, and this accrued to the Tories’ benefit. As inflation spun out of control, the government attempted to institute pay increase restrictions, which was naturally met with staunch union resistance. Unfortunately, the unions proved so committed and powerful that their resistance “led to a series of major confrontations with the unions and often to embarrassing climbdowns for the government.”23 It illustrated for the public an image of organized labor out of control.

Another reason for general public animosity towards unions was the extreme far-left character of their leadership. A Market and Opinion Research International Poll from 1976 found that sixty-four percent of voters felt that “most trade unions today are controlled by a few extremists and militants.”24 Though unions were largely not popular, the continued perception was that Labour governments did little to curtail their activities.

Even worse for Labour – and better for Thatcher’s Tories – were general public sentiments which largely blamed unions for the persistent economic malaise. In 1979, industrial workers, through intense negotiations by their unions, made more than service or public sector employees.25 Additionally, the same opinion poll above from 1976 showed several startling conclusions. A majority of respondents believed that unions were the main contributors to Britain’s economic crisis. Further, seventy-four percent felt that British unions had far too much power.26 By 1979, this number reached eighty-two percent.27 Clearly, unions were unpopular enough to become a major campaign issue.

In late 1978, Britain entered what would become known as the Winter of Discontent. Unions began striking across the country in response to a £5 per week

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21 Hyman, 353.
22 Jenkins, 16.
23 Gamble, 83.
25 Jenkins, 22.
26 De Boer, 123.
27 Crewe and Searing, 376.
cap on any union negotiated pay increase. Schools closed, hospitals majorly scaled back operations, refuse piled up in the streets, and major transit systems were shut down. Coming on the heels of a decade of economic decline, this seemed to many Britons the ultimate insult. Even worse were the unions’ actions beyond simply calling strikes. They practiced what was called “secondary picketing,” or the picketing of institutions not directly involved in the strikes as employers, including power and police stations.\textsuperscript{28} While this was intended to pressure the government to take action, it instead resulted in adverse effects on the lives of average citizens – and voters – including members of the working class who normally voted for Labour.

As a result of these actions and as the direct cause of this Winter of Discontent, “the unions reached new heights of unpopularity, and Labour’s claim to have a ‘special relationship’ with the unions was destroyed.”\textsuperscript{29} With elections scheduled for the following spring, Labour’s defeat seemed all but assured.

Indeed, the government had worked itself into a corner with the unions, and Margaret Thatcher made sure to take full advantage of public perceptions to push her free market solutions and hard charging anti-union style as an alternative. After all, “government could act in what it took to be the national interest and appeal to the electorate only by defying the Labour Movement: it could appease the party and the unions only by alienating the country.”\textsuperscript{30} Thatcher used this opportunity to promote “the events of that winter of 1978-79 as a symbol of the bankruptcy of social democracy.”\textsuperscript{31} Her gambit seemed to have work, with Tory victory in May as evidence.

\textbf{Conclusion}

This paper attempted to distill the reasons behind the 1979 election results. Certainly, many factors played into the results as they happened. For example, Thatcher herself made a priority of crime prevention. Nonetheless, these seemed to have minimal effects when compared to issues that went to the core of Thatcherism and its emphasis on free markets: reducing unions’ power, lowering taxes, and privatizing key national industries.

Assuredly, none of these three issues would have been as powerful or effective for the Tories if the British economy had not been in general crisis in almost every economic indicator. After all, Britain had already suffered the humiliation of accepting a conditional loan from the IMF, a dubious honor normally reserved for the developing nations of Asia, South America and Africa.\textsuperscript{32} The three issues highlighted here would not have been as persuasive if they had not been given an “edge [by] the critical state of the British economy in the 1970s.”\textsuperscript{33} Clearly, though, other issues did not have the impact of the three argued here, regardless of wider economic problems.

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{28} De Boer, 125.
\bibitem{29} Kavanagh, 130-1.
\bibitem{30} Jenkins, 20.
\bibitem{31} Gamble, 103.
\bibitem{32} Jenkins, 18.
\bibitem{33} Gamble, 99.
\end{thebibliography}
In many ways, however, the Winter of Discontent crystallized these three issues in a coherent argument for massive changes and a destruction of the post-war socialist consensus, almost doing Thatcher’s work for her. High taxes were seen as a result of inflation, which was in turn the fault of the unions for demanding ever-higher wages. Nationalization stunk of crass socialism and protectionism, a scheme which was both antithetical to free markets and boldly supported by trade unions and the lapdog Labour government, perceived as a union lapdog. And opposition to unions, as stated above, proved most influential of all. For years, unions had appeared to be getting unconditional freedoms and powers, and Thatcher offered an attractive alternative.

Still, it is difficult to assert solitary reasons for shift in voter preferences. Politics is a complicated affair which relies on perceptions and vagaries. As hard as scholars have tried to fit voters’ intentions and actions into a neat framework of ranked preferences and clear desires, politics will not comply. Voters rely on a complex matrix of values, needs, and opinions to vote as they do, and any attempt to simplify their intentions will necessarily meet with contradiction. In the case of 1979, general economic malaise was a major problem in voters’ eyes. Of these issues, though, high taxes, trade union power run amok, and excessive nationalization of industry represented the most acute of Britain’s problems, and account for the massive change in British politics which occurred in 1979.

Bibliography
The Ineluctable Intentionality of Mental Phenomena

Luke Connolly, 2009

Franz Brentano, in attempting to distinguish between mental and physical phenomena, uses “presentation” to be the single defining characteristic of mental phenomena. Specifically, Brentano identifies the “acts of presentation” as necessarily mental phenomena, and in so doing identifies a structure in which the mental activity is always “intentional” insofar as it refers toward some object. Thus, for a given state to be considered mental, it must necessarily be considered an act of presentation and as directed towards some content. A large number of conscious states which appear to be obviously mental share this feature. Certain emotional states, however, seem to lack the same intentional structure, and reveal themselves as fault lines in this touchstone of mental phenomena. Beyond sealing these vulnerable surface fractures, it is also important to consider whether the overall method of developing the distinction between mental and physical phenomenon is apposite at all.

Some clarification is necessary in order to properly consider Brentano’s position. Most importantly, the concept of “object” must be clarified, since it is both so natural and inappropriate to equate it with the colloquial signification of the word. The object of a given intentional state is simply understood as that in which the state is fundamentally presented. Brentano argues that the objects of mental states are not necessarily external objects. Hope, which Brentano explicitly defines as a mental phenomenon, can have this type of internal intentional object. The expression of a hope for something is clearly intentional, while a general feeling of hopefulness may seem to lack a specific intentional object. In spite of this, if we accept Brentano’s concept of “presentation” it is clear that hope does indeed have intentional structure. Put simply, the state which we claim to be in is the act of presentation itself. Indeed, for Brentano, the claim that hope is “present” to the subject at all reveals a commitment to the very same act of presentation necessary to identify it as a mental phenomenon. To declare something as present to a subject, even if it is considered to be fused with or contained in the subject, is to claim that which Brentano calls its “mental in-existence.”¹ Thus, just as the hopeful subject is said to have hope, the subject’s hopefulness is precisely a presentation of that hope, and therefore demonstrates an intentional structure.

It may be easier to understand Brentano’s position if we abstract intentional relationships from other more obvious mental states. Consider, as Brentano does, the pleasure in the hearing of a harmonious sound. It is clear that this pleasure is intentionally

¹ Franz Brentano Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint. Oskar Kraus, ed. Routledge. op. cit. pg. 88
directed towards something, but it is less obvious what this object is. For Brentano, it is not the sound itself that is the object of this pleasure, but the act hearing the sound. This seems to make perfect sense, in that there is nothing pleasurable contained within the sound, but it is rather that the pleasure is intended towards the very hearing of the sound which we delight in. To expand upon Brentano’s example, consider two people enjoying the same chord. The chord itself can be said to be exactly identical for both subjects, except for minute differences caused by the position of the subject in relation to the source of the sound. The objects of each person’s pleasure, nonetheless, are completely distinct from each other in that they have their existence only in the act of presentation within the consciousness of the subject. In the interest of accuracy, one might say “I am pleased by hearing that chord” instead of “I am pleased by that chord,” even though it would be impossible to be pleased by the sound of a chord without hearing it.

Analogously, the word hope and all of its dictionary definitions can be understood as the musical chord itself, while the subject’s general feeling of hope, however abstract and seemingly undirected, is in fact another presentation and therefore the object of their hoping. Here it is important to note once again that “presentation” is understood as the “act of presentation.” Therefore in feeling of a most general kind of hope, the intentional object is the presentation of hope itself. As Brentano suggests, such an object is necessary to speak meaningfully about a “subject” whatsoever. Consider, for example, a person observing a painting in a museum. If there is no painting to speak of, the concept of a subject as the person viewing the painting loses its content. Assuming all mental phenomena are the phenomena of a conscious subject, it is therefore a necessary condition to have some intentional object in order for any state to be considered mental.

If we want to adopt this system for distinguishing mental from physical phenomena, we must entertain the idea that we are simply projecting this intentional structure onto something which does not necessarily possess such a structure. Perhaps if we take a truly empirical standpoint we will find that there is nothing in the feeling of an emotion which has something as its object, and that intentionality is entirely inappropriate for identifying this type of phenomena. In order to dispel this concern, it is important to understand the way in which the structure was originally discovered.

Much in the way that scientific theories are developed from observed phenomena, intentionality has at its foundation the very phenomena of what we normally consider to be mental or conscious. Imagine, for example, a blue square. In this very act of imagination, we are positing the existence of some blue square which we have imagined; a blue square is conceived and beheld entirely within consciousness. If we consider imagining a blue square while denying the existence of a mentally “in-existent” object, we are essentially considering the imagination of a non-

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2 Franz Brentano. op. cit. pg. 90
object, which is absurd. Thus, this intentional relationship of subject and object has not been created, but rather understood as an essential aspect of such a mental act.

Intentionality is less obvious in the context of emotional states. Still, we arrive at intentionality as an indispensable characteristic of these emotional states in the same manner as when we consider mental phenomena which have a more obviously intentional structure. Let us consider what it truly means to be hopeful. Hope itself involves an expectation that something will transpire in the future. A more general feeling of hopefulness, however, seems to be something founded not in any particular hope or expectation, but rather in the sensation that something about the future is generally promising. Surely, one aspect of such hopefulness is that it posits the existence of a future in which something is valuable. It would seem then, that in the general sensation of hopefulness the intentional object is the presentation of a future worth holding out for. To deny the existence (or, put more appropriately, the “mental in-existence”) of any such object is to deny the very content of hope. It seems an essential aspect of hoping that there is some object towards which it is directed and from which it gains its content. To say that one is hopeful while denying the existence of an intentional object for such hope is similar to saying that one can feel courageous without a threatening force to be courageous against. Thus, if we posit a meaning to either of the two terms, we must accept their objects as necessary parts of that meaning’s content.

Another way of justifying intentionality as a criterion for a phenomenon to be considered mental is by comparison with the theories of natural science. A strong example to consider is that of Bohr’s atomic model. Based upon what we now know regarding the electron “cloud” that surrounds the nucleus of an atom, Bohr’s diagram depicting electrons with circular orbits is overly simple and now functionally obsolete. While all of these models are simply systems created by scientists to explain certain physical phenomenon, it is this very process of hypothesis and re-evaluation that makes the system functionally tenable. For example, adjusting the diagram to include the unpredictability of individual electrons does not falsify the theory, but rather simply adds a level of nuance which allows the model to more accurately depict the observed phenomena.

This is precisely what Brentano has done with his model of intentionality. The predictable nucleus of his theory consists of the protons and neutrons of thoughts and the more obviously-intentional emotional states. Simply because the electrons of complicated emotions require a more nuanced understanding does not mean that the intentional structure fails to apply to them. If it could be proven that Brentano’s position is merely a system developed to describe the phenomena, its ability to do so accurately and predictably reveals the value in such a model.

The “intentional in-existence” of mental phenomena is something that Brentano claims is never present in
physical phenomena. This is essentially the argument that objects of mental phenomena are contained within the phenomena, while physical phenomena are directed towards an external object. Any state in which the intentional object can be said to be contained within the phenomenon of that state is therefore a mental state. In this conclusion we discover the true weight of Brentano’s position. It offers an explanation for why mental phenomena are private to each individual consciousness and prevents physical phenomena from becoming the mere illusions of idealism. For any state that is considered to be mental, we can discover an intentional structure and the “in-existence” of an object within the consciousness of the experiencing subject.

Brentano has developed a theory which fails only in its breadth. Until each state we deem to be mental is identified as intentionally structured, there will be questions as to whether it can be used to distinguish any member of the class of mental phenomena from those normally considered to be physical. Still, his position sheds light upon how the acts of consciousness are actually structured and offers a reliable means of distinguishing mental from physical acts without appealing to our preconceived notion of them. Until a strong example is provided of a mental phenomenon without intentional object or of a physical phenomenon in which the object is contained within the act itself, Brentano’s theory serves at the very least as a system of designation for the mental and the physical. Also, the manner in which he approaches the original problem, namely by starting with the empirical phenomena and moving towards the abstracted connection, is something worthy of attention. Future theories about the distinction between the mental and physical will need to display the same rigorous avoidance of a theory created independently from the experience of such phenomena, a fact which testifies to its value and significance. Whether it is accepted or rejected as a functional system, Brentano’s position cannot be ignored.

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3 Franz Brentano. op. cit. pg. 89
The Role of Narrative, Plot, and Abstract Discussion in Turgenev’s *Fathers and Sons*

Thomas Hedges, 2012

The Russian social critic Dmitry I. Pisarev writes in his essay Bazarov that "Turgenev's novel, in addition to its artistic beauty, is remarkable for the fact that it stirs the mind, leads to reflection, although, it does not solve a single problem itself". The novel's brilliance does not reside in the situations we witness, but in the author's attitudes toward those situations. Pisarev notes that the author's attitude "leads to reflection precisely because everything is permeated with the most complete and most touching sincerity" (Pisarev 186).

Ivan Turgenev's novel Fathers and Sons is not a complete story. The novel does not recount a remarkable event, its ending is ambiguous and after having finished the book the reader does not experience a catharsis. Nothing is resolved. Pisarev says that "the events" in the novel "are not particularly entertaining and that the idea is not startlingly true. The novel has neither plot nor denouement, nor a particularly well-considered structure" (185). But Fathers and Sons does not rely on the plot to make any of the over-arching arguments. Similar to the central character Bazarov's view of life, the novel is made up of abstract scenes that do not hold any particular significance. These scenes, instead of adding to the storyline, develop the characters' personalities. But after having finished the book, the reader is touched by what the narrator has to say about the condition of life. The abstract discussions in Fathers and Sons, however disjointed they seem, imitate life's inconsistencies.

"One will observe a queer feature of Turgenev's structure," writes the famous Russian literary critic Vladimir Nabokov in his book Lectures on Russian Literature. "He takes tremendous trouble to introduce his characters properly," notes Nabokov, "endowing them with pedigrees and recognizable traits, but when he has finally assembled them all, lo and behold the tale is finished and the curtain has gone down whilst a ponderous epilogue takes care of whatever is supposed to happen to his invented creatures beyond the horizon of his novel" (Nabokov 73). Turgenev spends much of his time setting up his scenes and illustrating his characters' personalities rather than making them act. The core of the novel is located in the characters' emotions and features, not in their life story. This is not to say that there are no events in Fathers and Sons. "On the contrary, this novel is replete with action", admits Nabokov. There are quarrels and other clashes, there is even a duel—and a good deal of
rich drama attends Bazarov's death. But one will notice that all the time throughout the development of the action...the past lives of the characters are being pruned and improved by the author, and all the time he is terribly concerned with bringing out their souls and minds and temperaments by means of functional illustrations, for instance the way simple folks are attached to Bazarov or the way Arkady tries to live up to his friend's new-found wisdom. (73)

Turgenev includes these events only to better illustrate his characters' traits and mannerisms. They demonstrate the characters' personalities, and don't serve to develop a fluid narrative that captivates the reader. The reader is almost dissatisfied with the novel's ending. There is no resolution. There is no answer.

Turgenev's narrator is the vehicle for conveying the "sincerity" that Pisarev mentions. The narrator does not fully understand the conversations we hear throughout the novel. He will often admit that he knows even less than the reader and the characters, suggesting that these characters have broken away of Turgenev's control. During Anna Sergeevna's discussion with Bazarov in chapter XXV, the narrator says that "they both thought they were telling the truth. Was the truth, the whole truth, contained in their words? They didn't know, and the author knows even less" (Turgenev 134). By admitting that he does not understand the motives of Anna and Bazarov, the narrator adds a level of unsolved depth to his characters. And this accurately reflects reality, for we will never understand people's motives and experiences. Since the characters in the novel retain human mystery, they come to life. The human emotion in their dialogue "is deeply felt; this feeling breaks through against the will and realization of the author himself and suffuses the objective narration, instead of merely expressing itself in lyric digressions" (Pisarev 186).

The narrator does not understand the psychology of his characters and can only describe their conversations objectively. He says that their motives and intentions are foreign to him as well as the reader. The narrative, according to Pisarev, is not particularly entertaining or important. And perhaps the very lack of a structured narrative is a point in itself. The abstract discussions and dialogue between the characters reveal what we do not comprehend in life. The author, in depicting these seemingly random circumstances, points out that our lives will not solve any problems. The characters struggle with the same questions of love and suffering as any other human being. Turgenev depends on the reader's ability to feel for the characters and understand their condition, not their psychology.

One could say that the novel consists of vignettes, little discussions characters have with one another. In each vignette we are exposed more and more to each character's personality. We then begin to form an image or picture that encompasses all of the people in the novel. We consider their anger, pain, love, happiness and philosophies on life. The narrative in these vignettes does not tell the story of someone's life or of a noteworthy episode, but of several people in the countryside that happen to
be struggling with the meaning of existence. We could then consider Fathers and Sons a work of existentialism. Turgenev presents to us these abstract scenes without explaining their importance. The clarity and meaning of the novel is in the decisions the characters make. The reader can concretely observe one person's actions in response to life's absurdity. Bazarov tries to make sense of life in chapter XXVI, when he is talking to Arkady before his death:

It turns out there's empty space in my suitcase and I'm stuffing hay into it. That's just how it is in the suitcase of our lives; it doesn't matter what you stuff in, as long as there's no empty space. (Turgenev 140)

Bazarov has chosen a life that faces a hard truth. Those who seek happiness he says abuse themselves; "but we find all this boring—give us someone else! We've got to smash someone else! You're a soft, liberal gentleman," he says to Arkady, who has taken the route of happiness and love. In this way choices govern people's essence. The situations we are put in are neutral. They are abstract. We can either chose to live in comfort like Arkady or to live in defiance of the establishment like Bazarov.

Vladimir Nabokov says in his lecture on Fathers and Sons that in letting Bazarov die, Turgenev "takes his creature out of a self-imposed pattern and places him in the normal world of chance." This world does not follow our conventional narrative. It defies human expectation. Nabokov continues in saying that Turgenev "lets Bazarov die not from any peculiar inner development of Bazarov's nature, but by the blind decree of fate" (Nabokov 71). Turgenev understands that life is random and absurd. The reader would not expect Bazarov to die from typhus but from some consequence of his nihilistic view on life.

Nabokov mentions in his lecture the irony in Bazarov's death from typhus. Earlier in the novel, Turgenev describes a relationship that forms between Bazarov and Fenechka, the charming mistress. It is that "casual flirtation that brings on a duel" between Bazarov and Pavel Kirsanov, Arkady's uncle. "However, not Fenichka but typhus" writes Nabokov, "will be the cause of Bazarov's death" (73). In a world where the author has control over what happens to the characters, it seems paradoxical that Bazarov’s death comes not as a result of his nihilism, but from his efforts to help a dying man.

Turgenev, however, takes a position in between the young Bazarov and the old Pavel and Nikolai. He acknowledges life's confusion like Bazarov, but points to love as a place of stability like the older generation. It is what has given meaning to the relationships between the sons and their fathers. In the last scene we see that Bazarov's life has not been in vain. His parents have come to visit his grave:

They can't forsake this place where they seem to feel closer to their son, to their memories of him...Can it be that their prayers and tears are futile? Can it really be that love, sacred, devoted love is not all-powerful? Oh, no! However passionate, sinful, rebellious the heart
buried in this grave, the flowers growing on it look out at us serenely with their innocent eyes: they tell us not only of that eternal peace, that great peace of "indifferent" nature; they tell us also of eternal reconciliation and life everlasting… (Turgenev 157)

For the first time in the novel the narrator asserts his opinion in saying "Oh, no!" to the nihilism of Bazarov. Bazarov's interaction with his parents before his death, while it neither formed a considerable narrative nor deciphered any mysteries of our existence, embodies life's essence. The image of these "two feeble old people" who "walk with a heavy step" and then "fall on their knees…weeping bitterly, gazing attentively at the headstone under which their son is buried" touches the reader because it is nothing extraordinary, yet it captures the pain and compassion that define pure essence (156-157).

The moments in both the novel and life that do not hold any particular significance create its meaning. In the midst of the confusion of life, individuals must act in some way. Bazarov, while he rejects attributing any value to his existence, has made decisions that establish meaning between his parents, Arkady, Anna Sergeevna and even Pavel. Dmitry I. Pisarev writes at the end of his essay that the Bazarovs in life do not know how to suffer. They will only feel that life is "empty, boring, drab and meaningless". They understand that their existence is not accompanied with a magnificent narrative that will replace their boredom. Pisarev then asks "What is to be done? We must live while we are alive", he answers, "eat dry bread if there is no roast beef, know many women if it is not possible to love a woman, and, in general, we must not dream about orange trees and palms, when under foot are snowdrifts and the cold tundra" (206).

Works Cited


In SOSC 491: The Upstate Law Project, students are required to write a policy paper on the topic of their choosing. I chose to write about the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) because I am deeply interested in how the government can help individuals escape the cyclical nature of poverty. This paper is significant because it addresses the normative question of whether it is the federal government’s responsibility to protect low-income children’s health. After exploring both sides of the issue in light of the debate over SCHIP’s reauthorization, I argue that the federal government ought to extend health care coverage to needy children.

When it comes to America’s youth, who is responsible for protecting children’s health, the federal government or individual families? In 1997, Congress addressed this question by authorizing The State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) to provide coverage for children living in families too poor to afford private health insurance, but too rich to qualify for Medicaid. Currently, SCHIP provides health insurance to over six million children and adults, but the federal funding for the program expired on September 30, 2007. While both chambers of Congress agreed to reauthorize and expand the program, President George W. Bush threatened to veto any bill that would increase SCHIP’s funding. Bush feared that additional funds would buy health insurance for those already covered by private programs, rather than extend coverage to those in need. On October 3, 2007 and November 16, 2007, President Bush stuck to his word and vetoed the bills that would reauthorize and allot $60 billion to SCHIP. If Congress is not able to override Bush’s veto, millions of children’s health insurance coverage will be in jeopardy.

In debating SCHIP’s reauthorization, lawmakers have revealed that politics have the ability to trump the needs of America’s youth. However, it is not clear whether children’s social welfare should even be a political question. Without health insurance, children are likely to forgo routine medical visits, dental care, immunizations, and treatment for maladies. The far-reaching life and death consequences of receiving proper health care as a child place the debate on funding SCHIP in a distinct category. This paper explores to what extent the

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1 Baumann, Matt and Devon Herrick. SCHIP Expansion: Robin Hood in Reverse. (National Center for Policy Analysis: July 31, 2007)
federal government should invest in America’s future, its children. To frame the debate, it is necessary to begin by explaining the purpose, structure, and history of SCHIP. Next, the opinions of leading scholars from competing paradigms will be reviewed. This will be followed by a cost-benefit analysis and an argument made in support of expanding SCHIP. Finally, recommendations on how to extend SCHIP’s coverage to maximize its effectiveness will be presented.

Background: The History and Future of SCHIP

The State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) was authorized in 1997 to provide health care to low-income, uninsured children. Prior to SCHIP’s conception, the United States Government Accountability Office reported that while nineteen million children already received Medicaid benefits, over eleven million children were uninsured because their families were not eligible for Medicaid and could not afford private health insurance. Scholars found that without health insurance, children are less likely to receive routine medical care. In a hearing before Congress, John O’Shea of the Heritage Foundation reported that only forty-six percent of uninsured children receive annual check-ups and thirty percent never obtain any type of pediatric care. Lawmakers responded to this data in August of 1997 by passing the Balanced Budget Act that created SCHIP, under title XXI of the Social Security Act.

SCHIP is a federal-state partnership that provides states the opportunity to reduce the number of uninsured children living with families whose incomes are too high to qualify for Medicaid (above 133 percent of the Federal Poverty Line), yet too low to purchase health insurance. SCHIP is similar to Medicaid in that the federal government appropriates the program funds and offers each state a matching rate. Unlike Medicaid’s matching rate of 50 percent, SCHIP’s matching rate ranges between 65 and 83 percent to encourage states to establish a program. SCHIP also differs from Medicaid in that it is not a limitless entitlement program. Rather in 1997, Congress allotted $40 billion to be rationed among states’ children’s health insurance program over the course of ten years. Each fiscal year, states receive at least $2

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3 The State Children’s Health Insurance Program, Congress of the United States: Congressional Budget Office, May 2007, VII
4 ibid.
7 Congressional Budget Office, VII
8 United States General Accounting Office MEDICAID AND SCHIP Comparisons of Outreach, Enrollment Practices, and Benefits, April 14, 2000, p. 3
9 Allen, Kathryn. State Experiences in Implementing SCHIP and Considerations For Reauthorization, Testimony before the Committee on Finance in the US Senate, March 12, 2007, 5
10 Cook, Allison and Genevieve Kenney. “Coverage Patterns among SCHIP-Eligible Children and Their Parents.” (The Urban Institute: No. 15, February 2007), 1
11 Hill, Ian and Holly Stockdale, and Bigette Courtot. Squeezing SCHIP: States Use Flexibility to Respond to the Ongoing Budget Crisis. (The Urban Institute: Series A, No. A-65, June 2004), 1
million for their programs and the Department of Health and Human Services determines how much additional money each program receives through a complex formula known as Current Population Survey (CPS).\textsuperscript{12} Based on data from the Bureau of Census, CPS accounts for how much health insurance costs in the state, how many uninsured children under age nineteen live in the state, and how many of these children reside with low-income families.\textsuperscript{13} Once federal money is allocated, states must use their federal funds within three years. If states do not use their federal appropriations within this timeframe, then the excess funds are redistributed to the states that express a need for additional funding.\textsuperscript{14} States must use redistributed funds within one year or else these funds revert to the Department of Treasury.\textsuperscript{15}

In addition to possessing a unique financing structure, SCHIP functions under broad federal guidelines that decentralize the program to maximize state preferences. With regards to eligibility requirements, the federal government prescribes two regulations. The federal government first stipulates that an individual may qualify for SCHIP if he or she is under age nineteen.\textsuperscript{16} However, being under age nineteen is not sufficient to receive SCHIP benefits. A child must also meet a second requirement: his or her family’s income can be no more than 50 percent above the state’s Medicaid threshold. Initially, states could only cover children living with families below 200 percent above the federal poverty line (FPL). However, Congress changed this criterion in 2001 to account for each state’s varying conditions of poverty.\textsuperscript{17} Consequently, seven states have been able to cover children in families with incomes of 300 percent of the FPL and New Jersey has surpassed this mark by covering children in families with incomes up to 350 percent of the FPL.\textsuperscript{18} In addition, fourteen states have been able to extend coverage to pregnant women and the parents of children eligible for SCHIP because these states have proven in a Social Security 1115 waiver that covering adults is cost-effective.\textsuperscript{19} Given the breadth of federal eligibility requirements, states have the potential to extend coverage in a manner that best suits the needs of their constituents.

Besides providing the state with broad eligibility requirements, the federal government also permits each state to determine the shape of its children’s health insurance program. While all plans are subject to the approval of the Secretary of Health and Human Services, each state can choose among three SCHIP plans that the federal government offers: an extended Medicaid program, a separate children’s health program, or a hybrid of the two.\textsuperscript{20} As of January 2007, ten states plus the District of Columbia chose to expand their Medicaid program.\textsuperscript{21} Under this option, children’s

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{12} Congressional Budget Office, 5
\item \textsuperscript{13} ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{14} General Accounting Office, 4
\item \textsuperscript{15} General Accounting Office, 5
\item \textsuperscript{16} Congressional Budget Office, 7
\item \textsuperscript{17} Allen, 16
\item \textsuperscript{18} Panaritis, Maria. “NJ Sues over Health Insurance Cuts.” (The Philadelphia Inquirer: October 2, 2007), B06
\item \textsuperscript{19} Allen, 12
\item \textsuperscript{20} Government Accountability Office, 5-6
\item \textsuperscript{21} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
health insurance plans must adhere to Medicaid’s eligibility rules and benefits.\(^\text{22}\) This plan is advantageous for the beneficiaries because Medicaid does not permit cost sharing and provides services that might not be offered by a separate children’s health program.\(^\text{23}\) Furthermore, an expanded Medicaid program is advantageous for the state because the state is eligible for the Medicaid matching rate even after the state exhausts its federal funds for SCHIP.\(^\text{24}\)

Comparedly, eighteen states established separate children’s health programs. Although this option does not permit states to obtain federal matching after they exhaust their SCHIP funds, states have more control over determining eligibility requirements, the size of their program, and the benefits of their plan.\(^\text{25}\) Because states do not adhere to Medicaid’s standards, states also have the right to introduce a minimal cost-sharing plan.\(^\text{26}\) Despite the advantages of both plans, twenty-one states chose to develop a unique, hybrid plan.

Despite states’ ability to tailor SCHIP to fit their specific needs, SCHIP was not immediately successful. From 1997 to 2001, states struggled to establish their programs. In its first year of operation, SCHIP only enrolled 660,000 people across the nation, which was a small percentage of the population eligible for benefits.\(^\text{27}\) Accordingly, states annual spending of federal funds was lower than their annual allotment. In 1998, states only spent $0.12 billion of their allotted $4.24 billion.\(^\text{28}\) In response to this data, states actively publicized SCHIP and restructured the program by accepting applications via mail, reducing proof of income requirements, covering beneficiaries for a continuous 12-month period, and simultaneously vetting applications for Medicaid and SCHIP.\(^\text{29}\) These methods of reform proved successful for SCHIP, as enrollment grew by 90 percent between 1999 and 2000, and the number of children covered under Medicaid increased as well.\(^\text{30}\)

By fiscal year 2002, SCHIP’s success was no longer a question of whether the program had the ability to provide coverage, but rather a question of whether SCHIP had the funds necessary to sustain itself. In 2002, states covered 5.4 million people and began spending more money than the federal government allocated.\(^\text{31}\) Even though the program experienced substantial growth from 1999-2001, Congress reduced SCHIP’s funding in 2002 from $4.25 billion to $3.12 billion because of budgetary problems that arose from the Iraq war.\(^\text{32}\) This cut in federal funding did not slow SCHIP’s growth. Rather, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) reports that since 2002, SCHIP’s spending and enrollment has increased at a rate of 10 percent each.

\(^\text{22}\) Congressional Budget Office, 13
\(^\text{23}\) Government Accountability Office, 14-15
\(^\text{24}\) Hill, Ian and Amy Lutzky. *Getting In and Not Getting In and Why*. (The Urban Institute, Occasional Paer Number 66), 1-2
\(^\text{25}\) Government Accountability Office, 16-17
\(^\text{26}\) Allen, 12
\(^\text{27}\) Committee on Child Health Financing, Implementation Principles and Strategies for the State Children’s Health Insurance Program. Pediatrics Vol. 107 No. 5 May 2001 pp. 1214-1220
\(^\text{28}\) Allen, 27
\(^\text{29}\) Hill and Stockdale, 1
\(^\text{30}\) Ibid, 31
\(^\text{31}\) Allen, 9
\(^\text{32}\) Congressional Budget Office, 26
year. Consequently, more states have exhausted their federal appropriations and have relied on the pool of redistributed funds. While only twelve states depended on redistributed funds prior to 2002, forty states expressed a need for these funds subsequent to the federal budgetary cuts. As a result, the funds available for reallocation shrank from $2.82 billion in 1999 to $0.17 billion in 2003. If SCHIP was to meet the needs of the people, the program would require additional monetary support.

At various times in SCHIP’s history, lawmakers have recognized SCHIP’s fast-paced growth and consequent need for supplementary funding. In 2000, Congress passed the Medicare, Medicaid and SCHIP Benefits Improvement and Protection Act (BIPA), which aimed to prevent redistributed federal funds from reverting to the US Treasury. BIPA permitted states to retain half of their unused funds and extended the time in which redistributed funds from 1998 and 2001 had to be used. Regardless of Congressional attempts to provide additional monetary support for SCHIP, states annual funding continued to exceed the federal appropriation. In 2005, Congress acted on states behalf once again by passing the Deficit Reduction Act, which provided SCHIP an additional $283 million to cover states’ expected losses in fiscal year 2006.

However, this federal aid to states’ programs does not appear to be enough. In January of 2007, CBO reported that thirty-five states will exhaust their funds by the end of this fiscal year and of these states, eleven would require an additional $646 million to avoid a deficit. CBO further predicted that, SCHIP, as a whole, would need an additional $14 billion over the next five years just to sustain its existing programs. Considering that SCHIP currently provides coverage to over four million children each day and six million children each year, the shortfalls in funding SCHIP are problematic.

With SCHIP slated for reauthorization in 2007, lawmakers sought not only to reaccredit the program, but also to increase SCHIP’s federal appropriations. Today, states are not just struggling to finance their existing programs, but states are also not covering all those who are eligible for SCHIP. A study completed by the Urban Institute in February of 2007 reported that 13.3 million children are eligible for SCHIP, but of these children, only 3.9 million receive SCHIP benefits, 6.6 million have employer-sponsored insurance, and 2 million are uninsured. In response to these findings, Congress introduced bill H.R. 976, “The State Children’s Health Insurance Program

33 Congressional Budget Office, 25
34 Hill and Luzky, 1
35 Allen, 28
36 Government Accountability Office, 12
37 Allen, 29
38 Congressional Budget Office, 34
39 Kenney, Genevieve and Allison Cook. Coverage Patterns among SCHIP-Eligible Children and their Parents. February 2007, the Urban Institute, 3
40 Congressional Budget Office, 15
41 Kenney, Genevieve. The Children’s Health Insurance Program in Action: A state’ perspective on CHIP, before the committee on Finance, 1
42 Kenney and Cook, 3
Reauthorization Act of 2007,” which called for an additional $35 billion to be allocated to SCHIP over the next five years. By bringing SCHIP’s total federal allotment to $60 billion, Congress would expand the number of children covered by SCHIP by four million. The passage of H.R. 976 specifically targets the children of low to middle-income families by prohibiting SCHIP from covering children in families above 300 percent of the FPL. Additionally, the bill intends to protect the federal budget from strain by increasing the tax on tobacco products by as much as 150 percent. In July and August of 2007, H.R. 976 passed in the House of Representatives and Senate with a respective vote of 265 to 159 and 67 to 29. Despite the bill’s bipartisan support, President George W. Bush vetoed H.R. 976 on October 3, 2007. Consequently, SCHIP was neither reauthorized nor expanded. Yet, because of the passage of a stopgap resolution, funding for SCHIP will continue until November 16, 2007.

President Bush is not opposed to the reauthorization of SCHIP. However, he is opposed to expanding the program by $35 billion. Bush fears that an expansion of SCHIP would induce a crowd-out effect where people would leave their private carriers to obtain SCHIP benefits. In a public address, Bush stated that an expansion of SCHIP would be “an incremental step toward [the Democrat’s] goal of government-run health care for every-American.” This claim is based on various studies that report “for every 100 SCHIP enrollees, private coverage is reduced for 60 children.” To prevent crowding out, Bush would like to reauthorize SCHIP and expand it by only $5 billion. Because Congress currently lacks the votes to override Bush’s veto, compromise on SCHIP seems likely. Some potential areas of the program that Congress could redefine to maintain the SCHIP without a substantial increase in federal funding include: the target population, eligibility requirements, Social Security 1115 waivers, the federal matching rate, rules for redistributing funds, and the benefits of the program.

If the federal government does not reauthorize SCHIP and appropriate the program money, then the health insurance of over six million children and adults’ may be in jeopardy. States may have no choice but to either abandon or independently fund SCHIP. Without federal funding, some states fear that

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43 2007 Bill Tracking H.R. 976, 110th Congress, 1st Session, United States of America
44 ibid.
45 ibid.
46 Joint Committee on Taxation, Senate Committee on Finance Description of the Revenue provisions for markup of the state children’s health insurance program July 17, 2007, 3
47 2007 Bill Tracking H.R. 976, 110th Congress, 1st Session, Congressional Research Service
48 Sean Lengell, SCHIP’s on Table, President tells Hill. The Washington Times, October 7, 2007, A01
50 Kenney and Cook, 3
51 ibid.
53 2007 Bill Tracking H.R. 976, 110th Congress, 1st Session, Congressional Research Service
54 Congressional Budget Office, 14-17
their operating budgets will not be able to sustain their existing children’s health insurance programs. Seven states, led by Governor Corzine of New Jersey, have already expressed their concern by filing a lawsuit against the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services over SCHIP’s loss of federal funding. States, however, have a history of coping with federal budgetary cuts made to their children’s health insurance programs. The history of SCHIP in Florida, Texas, and North Carolina, particularly demonstrate state’s resilience. When federal appropriations for SCHIP were reduced in 2002, Florida was able to maintain its program by capping the size of its program through implementing waiting lists and eliminating outreach programs. Texas also adjusted its program in response to the federal budgetary cuts of 2002; however, Texas assumed a different strategy. Texas altered the eligibility requirements and reduced the benefits offered by its children’s health insurance program. This move curbed the growth and costs of Texas’s program and provided coverage to those with the greatest need. North Carolina’s program also proved to be uniquely resourceful in 2004 when it overenrolled children due to an accounting error. To reduce the size and costs of its program, North Carolina moved children under the age of five from SCHIP, into Medicaid. While the cases of Florida, Texas, and North Carolina demonstrate states’ adaptability, states have always relied on federal funding to some extent. It is unknown how states’ programs will respond without a federal-state partnership.

In its ten-year history, SCHIP has established itself as a thriving program, enrolling over six million uninsured, low-income Americans. The program’s financial history, however, has always been a topic of debate for policy makers. While lawmakers agree that SCHIP needs to be reauthorized, to what extent the federal government should increase its expenditures on children’s health care remains a point of contention. Before this issue is analyzed, it is necessary to review how leading scholars assess SCHIP’s potential expansion.

Literature Review

In addressing whether SCHIP should be expanded, scholars are divided on two salient issues: whether SCHIP properly targets low-income children and whether SCHIP is effective in terms of the cost and quality of care provided. From this litmus test, scholars can be categorized into one of two competing schools of thought, “welfare traditionalists” and “welfare activists.”

Welfare traditionalists are those who oppose any further expansion of SCHIP. These scholars often assume a conservative theoretical framework and belong to the epistemic communities of The Heritage Foundation and American Enterprise Institute. Welfare traditionalists answer the litmus test with the following analysis. First, Welfare traditionalists claim that an expansion of SCHIP would target

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55 Panaritis, B06
56 Hill, 5
57 Hill, 4
58 Government Accountability Office, 44
59 Government Accountability Office, 49
children of the upper and middle classes who may already have private health insurance.\textsuperscript{60} Subsequently, this camp opposes SCHIP’s expansion on the basis that the program would go beyond its intended scope.\textsuperscript{61} Moreover, welfare traditionalists advance that increasing the program’s federal allocations is economically viable only if the federal government substantially increases taxes. For the welfare traditionalist, raising taxes in response to an expansion of SCHIP is unwarranted because there is no pressing need to purchase health insurance for families that could afford private carriers.\textsuperscript{62} In light of these arguments, welfare traditionalists propose that while SCHIP should be reauthorized, coverage should be provided only to those below 200 percent of the FPL.\textsuperscript{63} Some welfare expansionists further recommend that families between 200 and 300 percent of the FPL receive a tax incentive to obtain private health insurance for their children.\textsuperscript{64} Contrary to the welfare traditionalist, the welfare activist champions SCHIP’s expansion. Typically, many of these scholars assume a liberal mindset and work for

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{} ibid.
\end{thebibliography}
increment SCHIP’s funding. While proponents of SCHIP’s growth assert that the program would target low-income children and would be effective in terms of the quality and cost of the care provided, opponents claim the converse. Given the importance of receiving health care as a child, this debate requires a resolution.

**Analysis: Finding a Cure to America’s Political Illness**

For policy makers, “The State Children’s Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2007,” has exhumed the question of whether it is in the federal government’s purview to extend health coverage to the children of low to middle class families. Currently, policy makers have two options before them. Either they can accept the status quo by reauthorizing the program, or they can further extend SCHIP’s coverage by increasing the program’s federal funding. Although scholars are divided, this debate can be resolved by addressing who would benefit from an extension of SCHIP’s coverage, how the program’s expansion would be financed, and what would be the consequences and implications be if the federal government did not expand SCHIP. From analyzing these issue areas, it will become clear that the federal government should increase its expenditures on SCHIP to further cover for the children of the less well off.

In tackling the current debate on SCHIP, it is necessary to begin by addressing who would benefit from SCHIP’s growth. An expansion of SCHIP may extend coverage to children who already have private health insurance. If Congress’s current proposal is enacted, then only children below 300 percent of the FPL would be eligible for SCHIP. Prime facie, this policy prescription may seem problematic. The CBO reports, “77 percent of children between 200 and 300 percent of the FPL already have health insurance.” This data has caused some scholars like Nicola Moore of the Heritage Foundation to fear that children insured by private carriers will drop their plans to obtain coverage through SCHIP. Moore writes, “Covering [median-income earners] under SCHIP would go well beyond the original objective of helping truly low-income families, effectively creating a new middle-class entitlement of government run health care.” When SCHIP was authorized in 1997, it was not intended to compete with private insurance companies. Rather, the goal of SCHIP was to provide for America’s low-income, uninsured children because this demographic did not have the means to provide for themselves. The middle class does not explicitly meet this criterion, for families between 200 and 300 percent of the FPL can afford private health insurance. Thus, if the program were extended to median-income earners, then SCHIP may be in direct competition with private carriers and might induce a crowd-out effect. Consequently, an expansion of SCHIP would be detrimental not only to insurance companies, who would lose 60

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71 Franc
72 Moore, No. 1540
73 Miller
customers for every 100 people enrolled in SCHIP, but it would also channel federal aid away from where it is needed most: children who are the least well-off.\textsuperscript{74}

Although an expansion of SCHIP might benefit some who are able to afford private health insurance, this is not problematic for three reasons. First, SCHIP would continue to primarily target the least well-off. The Congressional Research Service indicates that if SCHIP were expanded, 78 percent of the children covered by SCHIP would be below 200 percent of the FPL.\textsuperscript{75} Since the majority of SCHIP’s funding would be allotted to the children with the greatest need, welfare activists are not justified in their claim that an expansion of SCHIP improperly targets the least well off. Additionally, Congress’s proposal to change income eligibility requirements could be perceived as a necessary, corrective measure.\textsuperscript{76} Because states currently have the ability to cover individuals who are no more than 50 percentage points above their Medicaid threshold, some states have extended coverage to what is arguably the upper-middle class.\textsuperscript{77} This runs counter to the objective of SCHIP. By mandating that states only cover children in families that are below 300 percent of the FPL, Congress would prohibit wealthier families from obtaining coverage through SCHIP and thus prevent the program’s initial goal from being perverted.

Second, SCHIP’s growth would not extend beyond the program’s intended scope. While SCHIP was explicitly authorized to provide for low-income, uninsured children, the program was implicitly created to meet the pressing needs of America’s youth.\textsuperscript{78} As the costs of private insurance rise, making it difficult for middle class families to obtain health insurance, the children of median-income earners have expressed dire need for affordable health care.\textsuperscript{79} Thus, an expansion of SCHIP is not a move towards government-run health care, but rather a logical extension of the program’s goal to fill the gap between the ability to obtain health insurance and the need for affordable health care. At the point where families must make the rational choice between protecting their children’s health and saving a large percentage of their earnings to cover basic living expenses, it seems necessary that the federal government intervene. In expanding SCHIP, policy makers would help bridge the gap between wealthy and poor by permitting lower-middle class families who obtain SCHIP instead of private insurance to retain more of their income and consequently enjoy a higher standard of living.

Third, it is not problematic for SCHIP to with private carriers because this competition will be beneficial to society at large. It is important to note

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{74} Kenney and Cook, 3
\item \textsuperscript{75} Kenney, Genevieve, Allison Cook, and Jennifer Pelletier. “SCHIP Reauthorization: How Will Low Income Kids Benefit under House and Senate Bills” September 2007, The Urban Institute
\item \textsuperscript{76} Winfree, Web Memo
\item \textsuperscript{78} Government Accountability Office, 1-5
\item \textsuperscript{79} Winfree, Web Memo
\end{itemize}
that SCHIP is not likely to eliminate private insurance companies. Families below 300 percent of the FPL are not mandated to drop their private carriers for SCHIP benefits. Instead, families of this income bracket would be given the choice between receiving coverage under a social welfare program and purchasing private health insurance. Therefore, what would result from an expanded children’s health insurance program is a competitive market, where rational actors can select the cheapest program that offers the greatest benefits. In differentiating SCHIP from private insurance companies, there is a trade-off between the minimal cost-sharing requirements of SCHIP and the perception of receiving better quality and access to care under a private carrier. As the government becomes a viable competitor in the health insurance industry, private carriers will have incentive to reassess the costs and benefits of their plans, if they want to maintain control of the market. As a result, the price of private insurance may significantly decline and the benefits offered by private carriers may improve as well. Thus, the development of a competitive health insurance market would drive innovation and progress.

Overall, the benefits of covering more low-income children by expanding SCHIP outweigh the potential problem of covering some who already have private health insurance. SCHIP’s growth would ultimately minimize the number of uninsured children living in America. According to the Congressional Research Service, over half of America’s uninsured youth lives with families who are between 200 and 300 percent of the Federal Poverty Line. This data suggests that families in this income bracket may not be willing to pay the high out-of-pocket costs for health insurance. If the children of low to middle class families were eligible for SCHIP benefits, then these families could enroll in SCHIP and avoid the choice between retaining a high percentage of their earnings and insuring the livelihood of their children. Genevieve Kenney of the Urban Institute affirms, “Adopting broader Medicaid/SCHIP eligibility policies that encompass higher income children may also raise enrollment among the millions of low-income uninsured children who are eligible … but not enrolled.” By expanding SCHIP on the federal level, policy makers would further decrease the number of uninsured children living in America.

Even if an expansion of SCHIP targets the right demographic, the program’s growth could be opposed if it is not economically sustainable. Under Congress’s current proposal, the federal government’s annual cost of covering an uninsured child would range from $1,612 to $4,008; this amount is over three and half times the average cost of covering a

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80 O’Shea, Web Memo
82 Congressional Research Service. SCHIP Original Allotments: Description and Analysis. October 31, 2006
83 Zuckerman, Stephen and Cynthia Perry. “Concerns about parents Dropping Employer Affordability September 2007, The Urban Institute
84 Kenney, 6
child through private insurance.\textsuperscript{85} While Congress plans to balance the federal budget by placing a tax on tobacco products, econometric data from the Heritage Foundation predicts that 22 million additional smokers would be needed to offset the funds allotted to SCHIP.\textsuperscript{86} Given the federal government’s current campaign to encourage people to quit smoking, it seems ironic and unlikely for Congress’s financial solution to work. Realistically, SCHIP is likely to be financed through income taxes. The CBO estimates that if SCHIP is expanded, the middle-class is likely to pay 66 percent of their income in taxes by 2050.\textsuperscript{87} Unless SCHIP mandates a cost-sharing plan, there does not seem to be any viable alternative for securing the funds needed to expand SCHIP.

Although Congress’s proposal to raise tobacco taxes to fund SCHIP is unattainable, it is not problematic to increase income taxes to expand SCHIP. Traditionally, the tax system in America has been adjusted to reflect the state of society. As the cost of health insurance undergoes a fast rate of inflation, health insurance is becoming a commodity exclusively for the rich.\textsuperscript{88} In a testimony before the House of Representatives in October of 2007, Leonard Burman of the Urban Institute explained, “Rising health care costs translate into higher health insurance premiums, which prices health insurance out of the reach of more and more workers.”\textsuperscript{89} This is adverse to one’s intuitions, considering that the upper class can afford to pay the high out-of-pocket cost of health care, while the lower and middle classes can barely cover their basic living expenses. Instead of continuously pandering to the rich, the American government should raise taxes to provide coverage for the less well off. Thus, an expansion of SCHIP would help reduce the growing disparity between the lives of the rich and the poor.

The third area of analysis, the implications and consequences of maintaining the status quo, also offers good reason to increase SCHIP’s federal appropriations. If federal funding is not significantly increased, then the program is likely to depreciate. Without additional funding, SCHIP will not be able to sustain its current enrollment and programs. This is problematic, given the growing popularity and subsequent demand for SCHIP. The Kaiser Foundation predicts that if SCHIP is not expanded, then, “It will be difficult for states to move forward to address the growing number of uninsured children and some of the 6 million children currently covered could be at risk of joining the ranks of the uninsured.”\textsuperscript{90} Given the life and death consequences of obtaining health care as a child, it is in the federal government’s interest to insure the livelihood of the next generation by allotting more money to SCHIP. At first glance, an expansion of SCHIP seems to set the dangerous precedent that the federal government

\textsuperscript{87}Congressional Budget Office, 15
\textsuperscript{88}Burman, Web Memo
\textsuperscript{89}ibid.
\textsuperscript{90}The Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and Uninsured, 4
will entitle any capped program that continuously runs a deficit. Nina Owcharenko of The Heritage Foundation expresses her concern, writing, "Congress should not provide [states with] another bailout… States know their federal SCHIP contributions and should plan accordingly." However, this complaint is unfounded, for the federal government is not implying that states abandon fiscal responsibility. By further extending SCHIP’s coverage, the federal government would demonstrate that it recognizes its responsibility to identify and meet the needs of the American people. Because the children of low to middle class families express dire need for health care, the federal government would further demonstrate its accountability to the American people by expanding SCHIP.

Moreover, it is necessary to expand SCHIP, for proposed alternatives would not be as effective. Some who oppose an expansion of SCHIP have called for the federal government to provide tax credits to middle class families who insure their children through private carriers. Robert Helms of the American Enterprise Institute recommends, “Refundable credits or credits… for lower-income families … to purchase private health insurance, and offer an important alternative to further expanding government-run health care programs.” Even though this policy prescription offers families’ incentive to obtain private health insurance for their children and greater control over their plans, lower and middle class families would still endure the burden of paying high out-of-pocket costs for health insurance. Under a tax-credit system, it does not follow that families between 200 and 300 percent of the FPL would be more likely to obtain private health insurance. Burman elucidates this point, writing, “Most people would like to have insurance [only] if they can get it at a reasonable price because it protects them from a major financial risk.”

While a tax-credit system does not substantially offset the financial burden entailed by obtaining health insurance, SCHIP does. Subsequently, SCHIP is superior to its leading alternative.

In light of this analysis, the federal government should not only reauthorize SCHIP, but also substantially increase SCHIP’s federal allocations. An expanded children’s health insurance program will primarily benefit children whose families cannot afford private health insurance or who would be financially overstretched if private health insurance was purchased. Even though SCHIP’s growth would probably be financed by income taxes in the long-run, this is not problematic, given the widening disparity between the lives of the rich and the poor. If SCHIP is not reauthorized and expanded, then the program is likely to deteriorate and creating new programs with goals similar to those of SCHIP are not likely to be effective. Thus, SCHIP requires expansion to meet the needs of the children of lower and middle class. In the

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93 Burman, Web Memo
following section, three recommendations will be provided on how to further extend SCHIP’s coverage and increase enrollment.

**Recommendations**

First, it is recommended that the legislative and the executive branches of the federal government cooperate with one another to reauthorize SCHIP and provide the program with an additional $35 billion over the next five years. States should receive additional levels of funding to sustain their current enrollment and health care plans; states should also have the monetary means necessary to cover more of America’s uninsured, low-income children. To finance SCHIP, the federal government should raise the tax on tobacco products and consider raising income taxes as well. It is also recommended that the federal government help states avoid further shortfalls in funding by creating a counter-cyclical financial plan, where the federal government would increase federal appropriations to SCHIP during times of economic decline.\(^94\)

Second, it is recommended that states award SCHIP benefits only to the children of families below 300 percent of the FPL. If a state is not covering children at this threshold, then states should either lower or raise their income eligibility requirements. It is important for states to specifically target the children below 300 percent of the FPL, for the most uninsured children reside with families between 200 and 300 percent of the FPL and the children living in families below 200 percent of the FPL are those with the greatest need for public health care.

Third, it is recommended that states increase their outreach efforts and remove barriers to SCHIP enrollment. States should implement community-based campaigns to educate the public about SCHIP and consequently enroll more of America’s uninsured children. Health care should not be forgone because families did not know about SCHIP.\(^95\) Furthermore, it is suggested that states reassess SCHIP’s application procedure to ensure that no barriers deter participation. While states have already simplified the application procedure, states could further streamline the process by coordinating enrollment with other public benefit programs.

Since its authorization in 1997, The State Children’s Health Insurance Program has become an integral part of the welfare system, insuring the lives of over six million citizens. While SCHIP is a thriving program, the program currently faces shortfalls in funding and there is still much progress that could be made in reducing the number of uninsured children that live in America. If these three recommendations are enacted en bloc, then states’ children’s health insurance programs will have sufficient funding not only to sustain their current programs, but also to further enroll America’s uninsured, youth.

**Summation**

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\(^{95}\) Building on Success of Children’s Coverage Through SCHIP and Medicaid. Center for Children and Families. December 12, 2006
As Congress attempted to reauthorize SCHIP and provide SCHIP with additional monetary support, policy makers have commenced debated on the extent to which the federal government should be responsible for the lives of America’s youth. This debate, however, has been muddled by partisan politics. While Congress passed a bill to reauthorize SCHIP and provide the program with an additional $35 billion, President Bush vetoed this measure to expand SCHIP, fearing that America would take on the shape of a socialist state. Even after policy makers returned to the drawing board to negotiate SCHIP’s expansion, on November 16, 2007, President Bush issued another veto.96 The fate of America’s youth now lies in the hands of Congressmen to work together to muster enough votes to override Bush’s veto; it is imperative that they do so.

Throughout this paper, it has been argued that President Bush should not prevent SCHIP from flourishing. SCHIP has made great strides in reducing the number of uninsured children and should continue to do so by further extending its coverage. Growth in the program would benefit those in need, be economically sustainable, and be demonstrative of governmental accountability. It is recommended that the federal government cooperate and award SCHIP an additional $35 billion, redefine income eligibility requirements, and encourage states to increase their enrollment. By expanding SCHIP to this extent, SCHIP will not only insure the lives of millions of children, but also ensure America that the next generation will grow up to be healthy and productive members of society.

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Works Cited


I wrote this paper, Death Through Myth, for Comparative Cosmologies in Spring 2008. In it, I examine three creation myths: the Maya *Popol Vuh*, the Andean *Huarochiri*, and the Japanese *Kojiki*. Through a close reading of the text, I sought to understand each culture’s view on death, with particular emphasis on the soul and its connection to the body. It is my belief that through reading these texts, we as modern interpreters may begin to understand each culture’s concept of death, and perhaps even better understand our own. This paper, despite its esoteric focus, does have broader implications for the human understanding. Death is one of the great questions of the human condition, and these myths show that it has been so since the dawn of history, if not humanity itself. In reading the three disparate creation myths, I believe that I found some common threads of belief, and I definitely found similarities in the more specific concerns about death. Through reading these myths and others, perhaps we as modern, scientific observers, can begin to understand more the psychology which has driven thousands of generations of humans to question something that may well never be understood.

The question of what happens upon death is one that has plagued people seemingly since the dawn of time. Even today in our society of learning and science, we have no better idea of what happens to a person when the light leaves the eyes of their body than our distant ancestors did. In many creation stories, the writers sought to explain what happens after death, and the connection of a person’s body to their soul. Each culture treated death differently, though there are some interesting similarities in emphasis. Three such creation stories that deal with death are the Japanese myth *Kojiki*, the Andean *Huarochiri*, and the Maya *Popol Vuh*. It is my belief that these stories do not only discuss the burial practices of these cultures, but also give a broader look at their views on the body and soul, in both life and death.

I will begin my paper with a brief explanation of the relevant passages in each of the creation myths, describing burial practices, ceremonies, taboos and myths surrounding death. Next, I will try to show how these practices and stories have a greater relevance within the entirety of the myths themselves, and how the burial and death can relate to the overall views of the people as communicated in their myths. Finally, I will compare the passages regarding death and examine what their similarities and differences can tell us about the cultures whence they came.

The first myth I will examine is the *Kojiki*, a myth from Japan. In this myth, creation occurs through sexual creators, with Izanagi-Nö-Mikötö and
Izanami-Nō-Mikōtō creating most of the features of the world, and particularly the many islands of Japan. Death enters the scene when Izanami, the female deity, gives birth to a fire deity which makes it so that “her genitals were burned and she lay down sick… Thus at last, [Izanami], because she had borne the fire-deity, divinely passed away.”

After she dies, her divine consort is distraught and decides to bring her back from the underworld. When Izanagi meets his wife at the gate of Yōmī, the underworld, she says that she cannot return because she has consumed food in the underworld, much as in the Greek myth about Persephone. She tells him, however, that she “will go and discuss for a while with the gods of Yōmī my desire to return.”

She admonishes that he not look upon her body. Izanagi grows impatient, however, and lights a fire. He sees her rotting, maggoty corpse and flees, horrified.

I believe that much can be gleaned from this short segment of text describing Izanagi’s trip to the underworld. First of all, there is a great emphasis on things that are taboo. Even though Izanami seems to love her husband as much as he loves her prior to this episode, once he has shamed her by looking upon her putrid corpse she sends out the hags of Yōmī to pursue him for his misstep. This emphasis on what is divinely sanctioned or not seems to pervade the rest of the narrative as well. For example, in the next chapter, Izanagi, having escaped his pursuers, says that he must purify himself because he emerged from “a most unpleasant land, a horrible, unclean land.”

Even having not to do with death, the Japanese appeared meticulous with regard to things that were considered unclean. Later in the narrative, there is a description of one of the women building a partition hut for when she gives birth. It is described as being many yards long and without a door. She seals herself in it with clay. According to Philippi, this was because the birthing hut was considered to be a forbidden chamber and therefore could have no apertures. Thus, obviously the Japanese obsession with what is taboo or unclean does not merely apply to death and the dead, but also with birth and other facets of life.

Philippi mentions in an additional note that the Japanese held a sunny view of the now, and thus they were “indifferent to anything as uncertain and morbid as the life after death.” I believe based on the episodes involving the underworld that the Japanese actually did have more of a concept of body and soul in relation to than Philippi and other scholars seem to give them credit for, however. While I have not had their extensive background of research on the Japanese, it seems as though this story, as in the case of most others, is simply trying to be heard. I think that many things regarding the Japanese view on how the body and the soul are linked can be found within the Kojiki.

For example, it seems as though the Japanese believed that even after

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1 Donald L. Philippi, trans. Kojiki. (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1968), 57 ll. 18 and 22
2 Philippi 62 l 3.
death, the body and the soul are linked. First of all, Izanami (and presumably her soul, or whatever the Japanese saw as making her who she was) became tied to the underworld through a corporeal act, that of eating. This is the first piece of evidence I see that supports the idea that the Japanese may have thought that the dead traveled bodily to Yömī, or at least that their gods did. Also supporting this idea is the way in which Izanagi sees Izanami’s body. It seems as though Izanami’s soul has gone to bargain with the lords of Yömī while her body has remained in the dark with her husband. Thus, he is able to see her putrescent corpse before she returns to speak to him. So, it seems that while both Izanami’s body and soul were present in the underworld, they were no longer necessarily attached as they once had been. Perhaps from this it could be extrapolated that the Japanese believed that once a person’s body was disposed of, the soul came free from it, but was still connected in some way. This would help to explain why seeing a corpse was taboo, because if the soul were not somehow still tied to the body it would not matter what happened to the body after death. Since they are still connected, seeing the body can still shame the person who was once connected to it. Obviously, there is much about Japanese burial and the afterlife ensconced within just a few short chapters of the narrative.

Similarly, much can be learned about the Inca beliefs regarding death and the joining of the body and the soul from their creation myth, the Huarochiri. Chapters 27 and 28 of this narrative talk about how death used to exist, and what burial practices contemporary with the writing were. It describes how in the past, peoples’ souls would leave their bodies for five days, but would then return. Because of this, the population skyrocketed and there were many problems because of overcrowding. This harsh immortality ended when one man was a day late and his wife threw a corn cob at him in anger. “Since that time, not a single dead person has ever come back,” the narrative relates. After that, an elaborate ritual evolved which incorporated into it the old superstitions. Involved in it were several times at which the dead were fed, and a vigil was held in case the spirit did return after five days. The participants would work to ensure that the spirit did not return to take them as well, and they would seek to appease the huaca which caused the person’s death.

These tales do fit into the larger narrative, though they seem to break from it to describe unrelated customs. One major way in which they fit in is the dichotomy between what was and what is, and that between Christianity and the older pagan religion. One other example of such a story told relating the past to the present is in Chapter 7. This chapter explains why a particular group of people worship Chuqui Suso. It explains how she appeared to them at a feast time in old days after they finished clearing out the canals. Now, because of Christian influence, a woman dresses as Chuqui Suso on major Christian holidays to remember her coming in the old days.

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8 Salomon 130-131
In a similar way, the ceremonies of feeding the dead are rationalized for the newly Christian world. The less-than-devoutly Christian natives compared the Day of the Dead to their own more wide-spread celebrations for the dead, and decided that rather than rebelling, they should “go to church. Let us feed our own dead.” In this way, they are blending the old and the new, and incorporating their own rites into those of Christianity. This amalgamation of cultures seemed very prevalent throughout the Huarochiri.

As in the Kojiki, much can be gleaned about the beliefs of the Inca people from this story. In this myth too, special attention seems to be paid to the relation of the mind and body. The Inca waited until the corpse began to rot before disposing of it, because they apparently believed that the flies gathering around the corpse held the soul of the deceased. As it says in the text, “At Yaru Tini, as the sun was rising, the dead spirit would arrive. In the old times, two or three big flies… would light on the garment she brought.”

Salomon notes that the point of this scene was that the body must be left out long enough for it to begin to rot and breed worms in order that it may release the soul in the form of flies.

Another major point that is made by the chapter regarding the burial ceremony is that the body is still tied to the soul in some way after the departure of the flies. This is shown in how much the mourners cared for the body, and the care that they took to feed it. In the

footnotes it is noted that the Andeans believed that when their ancestors were buried in proper Christian graveyards, they would starve from lack of food and attention they would receive if they had been enclosed in caves in the Andean manner. Apparently, the initial feeding of the dead was repeated on All Saints Day, when an elaborate feast was prepared for the dead, because “It’s likely that the dead do eat.”

The Andeans also seemed to believe that the dead could influence the lives of the living. This is indicated when the woman throws a pebble out after an elaborate dance, telling the spirit, “You go back now. It’s not time for us to die yet.” Because they have to say this, I believe that they thought that the spirits could come back to bring the living to join them in death. This idea is also supported by the fact that they sometimes believed mummies to be huacas. Based on the Huarochiri, the modern reader can deduce how the Andeans viewed their dead, and what their burial practices were.

The Popol Vuh too has many hints of how the Maya viewed the afterlife and the dead. Of course, a lot of the action takes place in Xibalba, the land of the dead. The section I wish to focus on, however, is that in which Blood Moon is impregnated. While the scenes in Xibalba are quite vivid and reveal that the Maya believed that the world of the dead and the world of the living are extremely close to each other, the scene with Blood Moon has more to say about the way in which the body

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9 Salomon 130 l. 364  
10 Salomon 130-131, l 367  
11 Salomon 131, footnote 703  
12 Salomon 130 footnote 699  
13 Salomon 131 l 371  
14 Salomon 131 l 369
and the soul are connected, and has much that resonates with the narrative as a whole. In this scene, Blood Moon, the daughter of one of the lords of Xibalba, is impregnated by the head of One Hunahpu, and through him his brother Seven Hunahpu. After spitting on her hand and therefore impregnating her, One Hunahpu explains to Blood Moon that the son is like the father in essence, and is his continuation after the father dies.

This scene echoes one of the major themes of the narrative as a whole. Succession and how it is achieved is a huge part of the Popol Vuh. Throughout the narrative, there are many scenes in which the deeds of the sons mirror those of the father(s). In many of those parallel scenes, the sons achieve where the fathers failed. One example of this is when the Hero Twins are taken down to Xibalba to face the Lords of Death in the ball game. Their fathers faced the same situation, but failed so dismally that they never even got to the ball game. The Hero Twins, however, succeed, and eventually manage to defeat the Lords of Xibalba forever. In this, they are the mirror of their fathers, but they have learned from their fathers’ mistakes, and go on. This seems to have been the natural progression for the Maya; that each generation would echo the last, but also learn from it and be a brighter mirror compared to the past. This theme is continued even further when the first people go on pilgrimage to follow in the footsteps of their creators.

In my view, the key to this scene is what One Hunahpu tells Blood Moon about succession. He says, “The son is like his saliva, his spittle, in his being… The father does not disappear, but goes on being fulfilled. Neither dimmed nor destroyed is the face of a lord, a warrior, craftsman, orator.” This speech gives invaluable clues to what the Maya thought about death and rebirth. This statement seems to indicate some sort of reincarnation belief among the Maya. I do not know that it is exactly like our modern conceptions of reincarnation, but it definitely had a great impact on Maya beliefs. This speech shows that the Maya thought that traits and strengths were passed down from father to son. Thus, the son of a great king would be a great king himself. This is a motif that was much played on later in the Spanish Conquest, when the Maya believed that one of their great lords would be reincarnated in order that he might save them from the Conquistadors and their equally harsh offspring.

I believe that this passage also shows that the Maya did not place much importance on the body. One Hunahpu says that “it’s just the flesh that makes his face look good. And when he dies, people get frightened by his bones.” This seems to indicate that the Maya believed that it was the life that made someone important, not the bones which were the framework on which the life was placed. The bones themselves were perhaps seen as a horrific thing, not something to be venerated as the Inca did. Though the dialogue and action between Blood Moon and One and Seven Hunahpu are short, they reveal

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16 Tedlock 99
17 Tedlock 99
much about what the Maya thought regarding death and the body and soul.

Despite the fact that these three stories were from different societies at different places and times, they do hold some common threads. For example, all of the stories allude to how the people at the time regarded the body. For the Japanese, the body was a revolting and, more importantly, an unclean thing to judge from the *Kojiki*. To them, there was nothing worse than looking upon a maggoty corpse, and the shame that would bring to both the deceased and the person viewing them. The Maya as well did not appear to venerate the body, based on the *Popol Vuh*. If anything, they feared the bones and perhaps their similarity to the Xibalban lords’ bodies. On the other hand, the Inca revered the bodies of their deceased, bringing them lavish feasts and sometimes worshipping them as *huacas*.

While the three had different views on the body, all of the cultures seemed to have the idea that the body and the soul are two distinct entities, as common thought seems to be today. Again, the three differ in their treatment of the separation between body and soul, but it is interesting that three such diverse cultures saw that divide as such as distinct entity. It seems as though in Japan, the soul became more detached from the body upon death, but that they were still connected enough that dishonor incurred upon the body would transfer to the soul. Similarly, the Inca believed that the soul left the body in the form of a fly, but was still connected enough to merit fêting. The Maya seemed to have more of a divide upon death, where some aspect of the parent would be transferred to the child, yet the soul was obviously still connected to the body when One Hunahpu spoke to Blood Moon. Despite the subtle differences, all of the cultures appeared to believe that in some way the soul was no longer completely bound to the body on death, but still maintained ties.

Another similarity between the three portrayals of death is that all seem to tie death into a cycle, making it a necessary part of life and cyclic time. Perhaps the least obvious of the three in this regard is the *Kojiki*. I believe however, that it is no exception. I think it is no mistake that one of the world’s givers of life dies while giving birth to a particularly volatile element. In this way, life and death are inextricably bound together. Also, when Izanagi attempts to break the cycle and bring Izanami back from the dead, even she ends up turning on him, and he is chased violently from Yömī. In the *Huarochiri*, there are strong ties to cyclic time. Death is obviously part of the cycle of life, because when it was not, the people “lived in great suffering, miserably gathering their food.”18 After the cycle was corrected, death was even more incorporated into cyclic time, with yearly celebrations held in honor of the dead. Even after the arrival of the Christians, the cyclic time remained, with the feasts for the dead merely moved into Christian sacred time. In the *Popol Vuh*, death is tied to the cycle of life with reincarnation and inheritance at the fore. A person’s line can only continue if both they are dead and they have offspring. Thus, the Hunahpu

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18 Salomon 129 l 361.
brothers needed to fix the cycle by posthumously impregnating Blood Moon. But, just as they could not pass on their traits without children, they could also not bequeath their talents, and perhaps knowledge, without having died. In all of these stories, it is very obvious that death was intimately tied to many cycles, and was a natural part of life, not necessarily an end.

An interesting aspect to examine in these stories is how they compare to modern cosmology. The modern scientific theory of the birth of the universe makes no mention of death, but perhaps some ideas on the modern perspective can be gleaned as they could be through the relatively small passages in the other creation myths I have examined. There is less emphasis placed on humans in our cosmology, so perhaps it is not surprising that no attention is paid to the journeys and travails of individual souls. The emphasis is instead on the Universe, for which there are speculations regarding death. One of the major ideas about the death of the Universe is that it will continue to expand into infinity, until it is so massive that it becomes an unbearably cold netherworld. The other hypothesis seems no more cheery, with the Universe eventually reaching a critical size that causes it to collapse back on itself and perhaps rejuvenate in an endless cycle of collapses, Big Bangs, and expansions.\(^{19}\)

So what does this say about our own society and life-view? Because we do believe that there will be something that occurs, we believe in the cyclic nature of time as much as the ancients did. While the first hypothesis could be said to have time stretching ad infinitum in both directions with no beginning or end, the fact is there was a point of concentrated nothingness, where nothing could live and there was chaos, and there will be an eternity of widespread nothingness, where nothing can live and there is a chaos of non-being. Another thing that the modern cosmology can tell us is that we believe that death itself is beyond science. Our cosmology is built on logic, science, and hard evidence. Like the matter that goes into a black hole, however, death is so unknowable and beyond our measuring that we can only make guesses that are not backed up by any numbers or universal truths. In essence, as with the ancient people, we can only try to make sense of our world in the best way we know how, and live and die according to those models.

What happens upon death, and how the body and soul are related are questions that have plagued mankind since humans’ first steps, and they remain unanswered even today. In most cosmologies there is evidence of the culture’s struggle to understand death and how it can relate to life. Much can be deduced from these accounts, both about the different societies’ views on death and on life overall. Some themes seem to pervade many diverse cultures, such as the fact that there indeed is a division between the body and the soul, and that death fits in with the cyclic nature of life and time overall. Even after all of this searching, we have not found a definitive answer to these major questions, and maybe we never will. Perhaps, however, it is ultimately

comforting that, in a succession similar to that of the Maya, as humans we are still asking the same fundamental questions about the nature of life and the Universe. Perhaps nothing truly is lost with death.
A news piece run by *The Times* on April 30, 1831 reported the sighting of two rooks – a pair of ‘aristocratic’ birds – at Wood-street in London, at just about the time when Lord John Russell presented the first Reform Bill to the House of Commons. The newspaper speculated that this appearance was an omen for the choice that lay in front of the British aristocracy of the time – whether they have “nothing to fear from citizens if the Bill passed…or if gentlemen will find it highly advantageous to obtain superior articles (popular support) at fair prices?”¹ This report, in a light hearted manner, underscored the brewing tensions in Britain over popular calls to reform the corrupt and aristocratic representative system of the 1830s. British public opinion was affecting national politics in an unprecedented manner. Spurred on by a vibrant press, the public seemed determined to influence politicians by manifesting their concerns and expectations. People “devoured the daily paper to read on the progress of the reform bill and watch the representatives they sent to Parliament to express their feelings.”² In this paper, I will argue that public opinion in Britain during the 1830s was the most crucial factor in ensuring the passage of Great Reform Act of 1832. I intend to validate this claim by contending that the alteration in relationship between the House of Commons and the House of Lords, the split within the Tories, the Whig response and King William IV’s role were direct outcomes of the popular agitation in Britain between 1831 and 1832. Alternative impetus for reform, including an inherent parliamentary dynamism and competence of British politicians and monarch will be also shown to be inadequate, in the absence of a public will, to explain the passage of the Reform.

This paper uses *The Times*, a traditionally conservative leading British daily established in 1785 as the primary source for defending its thesis. A series of 20 articles, including reports parliamentary proceedings, public meetings, commentaries by individual readers and editorial pieces, between March 1831 and June 1835 provide insight into the changing public mood as the Reform Bill was debated in the Parliament. With rapid improvement in newspaper printing by the 1820s, *The Times* was read by a large number of Britons, including middle class urbanites, mercantile groups and Church officials and often closely reflected popular views.³ In an editorial published on

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³ This spectrum of readers is seen in the letters received by *The Times* from businessmen
August 16, 1831, *The Times* claimed that, in light of the public spirit, it supported the Reform Bill “not because it was the bill of Ministers, but as being a bill for reform”. Although it stated that its support for Whig Prime Minister Lord Grey was contingent upon his pursuit of reforms, this comment exposes the strong bias of the newspaper towards the Bill and its proponents. While this bias is consistently present in the publications, *The Times* still manages to provide comprehensive accounts of developments during the period. The surprising fact that *The Times*, despite its conservative leaning, endorsed the Reform Bill actually allows for the study of a stronger case for reform as the daily presented its coverage of the 1832 Reform Bill.

The bill, formally known as An Act to Amend the Representation of the People in England and Wales, sought to restructure the existing electoral system by redistributing seats and extending enfranchisement to the public. First presented on March 1, 1831 soon after the election of a Whig government under Lord Grey, the bill failed twice to pass through the House of Commons and the House of Lords. The repeated rejection of the reforms fuelled public agitation, resulting in violent unrest in Derby and other places. *The Times*, echoing popular sentiments, did not hesitate to shift the blame for these riots on the “obstinacy of the Lords” who were acting to preserve “every political and moral degradation” of the political status quo.  

Amidst a national crisis after the Duke of Wellington failed to form a government, King William IV finally gave royal assent to the bill on June 7, 1832. *The Times*, welcoming the news of the passage, printed clauses from the Act; it read "Be it enacted that all male persons of full age, seized of and in any lands or tenements of at least the yearly value of 10l, shall have a right to vote in the elections in all future parliament." provision such as these effectively increased the franchise by lowering the property threshold and included 217,000 new voters to expand the electorate to 650,000. Of equal importance was the effort to do away with rotten and pocket boroughs which had bred corruption in the electoral process. The Bill instead allowed for representation of larger population centers such as Manchester, Birmingham and Leeds. Both these measures were responding to popular demands for a reduction in the influence of aristocrats in the Parliament and to accommodate a burgeoning British middle class. When Lord Russell defined the objective of the Grey government was to “(pass a measure which) every reasonable man in the country should be

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7 Rotten boroughs were constituencies which had a very small population but were still returning members to Parliament, while pocket boroughs were constituencies which were under direct patronage of the British aristocrats.
satisfied with”, he was arguably playing to these very public sentiments. 8

Primary sources reveal that the British public was acting in an unprecedented manner to alter the relationship between the House of Commons and the House of Lords. At its roots, such popular agitation was influenced by a heightened sense of expectation in a reformed Parliament, as reported in The Times. 9 Speakers at a pro-reform county meeting in Essex argued that an unreformed House prevented the people from having the “object of their choice” and compromised a “just estimate of public rights.” 10 The public right in question was the entitlement of British citizens to be represented by parliamentarians who could protect constituent interests against unpopular legislations, such as the Corn Laws and the 1829 Catholic Relief Act. 11 The problem, as perceived by the public, was that the House of Commons was entirely controlled by the peers in the House of Lords, rendering it unresponsive to popular concerns. The Times reminded its readers that “the House of Commons is said to be the people’s house”. 12 The legitimacy of any government, whether under the Duke of Wellington or Lord Grey, depended on the support of the people. What is remarkable about this time period in British politics is the strong belief that the House of Commons should serve the people – the time had come when “no House of Commons dare defy popular opinion.” 13 The public was increasingly less receptive to the idea of a House of Commons as mere political instruments of the House of Lords. On the other hand, the House of Lords was blamed to be dangerously defying calls for extending franchise and eliminating corruption. An editorial, echoing the calls in pro-reform county meetings across the country, argued that the peerage in the House was failing to realize that “their own greatness is dependent on the general welfare and happiness of the people.” 14 By spending exorbitant amounts to send handpicked members to the Commons and thereby ‘pocketing’ constituencies, the Lords were effectively preventing “honorable men of moderate fortune” to run for public office and thereby rendering the Lower House of Parliament dysfunctional. 15 The common expectation was that “with a reformed Parliament, (such) abuses will die a natural death”. 16 Thus, it is clear the public actively anticipated and advocated against these abuses, which were a

8 Editorial, The Times, Feb 20, 1837, 4.
10 Editorial, The Times, March 17, 1831, 2.
11 The Corn Laws imposed tariff on grain import, raising food prices for the general public while allowing for business owners to earn large profits. Similarly, the Catholic Relief Act was unpopular for removing restrictions on opportunities for Catholics such as the holding of public offices.
12 Editorial, The Times, April 21, 1831, 5.
14 Editorial, The Times, July 08, 1831, 4.
16 This heightened expectation sheds light not only into the motivations behind violent riots that broke out every time the Reform Bill was rejected by the Parliament, but also explains the alliances of disparate interest groups which were driving the Reform movement, see Editorial, The Times, March 28, 1831, 2.
product of the working relationship between the Houses of Parliament. With the House of Lords controlling the actions of the House of Commons, it is improbable that any other cause, such as an inherent dynamism in the parliamentary structure of the 1830s could have pushed for this change in the institutional setup. Alternatively, this alteration could have been attributed as a conscious move by the Lords to compromise with members in the House of Commons and hence, consolidate their position against popular opinion. However, this explanation does not lend itself to an independent cause of the change in parliamentary setup – the Lords actions were arguably were still a reaction to the ominous public agitation. Hence public pressure to revive the House of Commons as a popular institution, and not leave it as a pawn of the peers, was critical to introduce the Reform Bill in 1831.

The political split within the Tories was heavily influenced by the way in which the party handled public opinion during the early 1830s. In a speech to the House of Commons in 1830, Tory Prime Minister Duke of Wellington had asserted to the House of Commons that the system of representation in the status quo was sufficiently representative and possessed the nation’s confidence; he deemed it as his duty to oppose all reforms. A reading of the Duke of Wellington’s biography shows that he held that the “people are rotten to the core” and thus was opposed to allow ordinary middle class Britons a voice in Parliament. The Duke’s arrogance marked a certain disconnect of the ruling Tories from the prevailing public mood outside Westminster. Similarly, readings from traditional Tory periodicals show that pro-Wellington Tories dismissed the popular calls for reform as an ‘evanescent, periodical excitement’ and any measures toward reform as a futile attempt to reach a political utopia. The public received the Tory indifference to calls for reform negatively; a satirical prose in The Times mocking the Duke and his ministers summed up the popular perception of the Prime Minister, “Because / I scorn the people, and deny their claims/The Bill is therefore bad! / The Bill is therefore bad!”

A section of the Duke’s Ministry, the ultra-Tories who had realized that their conservative interests could only be protected through a compromise and not by the Duke’s contempt of the public, decided to split and support the Reform Bill in April 1830. Shortly thereafter, the Wellington government collapsed and new elections were announced; pressures of public opinion evidently caused the divide within the ruling party. It may be contended that this Tory split was a

20 Arts and Entertainment, “Poetical Protest of the Duke of Wellington Against the Second Reading of the Reform Bill,” The Times, April 19, 1832, 2.
result of well intentioned desires by certain Tory Ministers to make Parliament more representative, and was not necessarily a product of public pressure. However, an examination of reports in *The Times* suggests differently. An ultra-Tory leader in Bury stated that he did not necessarily “approve of (reform), but admitted that it was the absolute necessity,” referring to the public indignation over rejection of the Bill.\(^21\) This Tory faction still strongly advocated for ‘closed boroughs’, believed that it was an inherent right of the aristocracy to dominate Parliament and thus insisted that the interests of the ‘landed classes’ must be protected.\(^22\) However, these politicians realized that without reform, the only option left was a popular and almost inevitable ruining of their privileges had they not acquiesced to public demands. Hence, what is seen here is that the split amongst the Tories was a direct outcome of public agitation and not a result of any political desire to reform the electoral system.

In contrast to its Tory predecessors, the Whig government safely positioned themselves as the proponents of reform. In the ensuing debates after the Bill was first placed, the Whig Prime Minister Lord Grey made clear his intention to pass the reforms, adding that “I will stand or fall with the bill.”\(^23\) Lord John Russell had already promised the nation ‘every reasonable man’ would gain from the Reform Bill, hinting that it would cater to the demands of the middle class which was advocating for reform.\(^24\) A reading from a pro-Whig journal reveals that the government was working to ensure that “all sections of people would be merged into one (political system)” and that no section will be endowed with separate political privileges.\(^25\) Importantly, the Whig government was simultaneously making attempts to secure the support of local political unions to consolidate its power at a time of turbulent popular movements. Civil society groups, such as the Birmingham Political Union, represented alliances between disparate interest groups such as anti-slavery activists, free trade proponents, business guilds as well as ordinary workers; *The Times* called it the “barometer of the Reform feeling throughout England.”\(^26\)

The Whigs viewed an alliance with these groups as crucial for its survival in office, especially after the Tory government collapsed for ignoring public opinion. *The Times* reported on a series of meetings between Lord John Russell and Mr. Gregson, leader of the Birmingham Political Union, over the inclusion of a clause to prevent artificial tenantry.\(^27\)

\(^{23}\) News, *The Times*, April 25, 1832, 3.  
\(^{27}\) Editorial, *The Times*, July 05, 1831, 3.
Correspondences such as these allowed the government, and specifically the Prime Minister, to be seen in consultation with civil society members who were in direct contact with the wider public. It is fair to argue here that the Whig government’s confidence to call for new elections after the House of Lords blocked the Reform Bill in late 1831 was a result of its success in securing popular support. Once again, it is evident that public opinion not only helped Lord Grey and ministers to hold on to power during a turbulent first term in office, but provided it political capital to win a second term and carry the Reform Bill using an affirmed mandate. A critical response to this argument may point to the fact that the Grey government might not actually have enjoyed such strong popular backing, as was portrayed in the pro-reform *The Times*. In fact, many of the Whig-backed Reform measures of 1831-32 resulted in complicated voter registration processes and poorly defined county divisions – boroughs like Southwark in Surrey with a population of 91,501 people risked being disenfranchised. However, the strong alliances that Grey and his ministers had built up with political unions allowed the government to survive the problems that arose from these electoral inconsistencies of the Bill. This was evident in the reports of celebration, where speakers at public gatherings confirmed that “the people supported the present Ministry”, displaying deference for the Lord Grey and his government.\(^{29}\) Hence, the Whig rule was validated by popular support and was provided the impetus with to eventually pass the Reform Bill in 1832.

An interesting proposition to examine in defending the original thesis is the role of the monarchy amidst the crisis and passage of the 1832 Reform Bill. King William IV assumed power after the death of King George IV in June 1830 amidst the constitutional crisis over reforms. Despite being new to the throne, the king played an influential role in initially opposing the Bill before finally assenting to the third draft in 1832 after the Duke of Wellington failed to form a government and block Lord Grey’s reform agenda.\(^{30}\) Importantly, he agreed to employ the Whig plan to create new peers in the event that the third Reform Bill was rejected and dilute the strength of the conservative Lords through ‘peer-making’.\(^{31}\) There appears to be a contradiction in *The Times* and secondary sources over whether the King was supporting reform (and thus being responsive to public opinion) from the onset of his succession to the throne. Reports from a Sussex County meeting in April, 1831 showed reformers expressing reverence for the monarch, claiming the King to be “generous” and wishing to “restore the people their just

\[^{28}\text{Letters to the Editor, “Reform Act, A Freeholder of Southwark,” The Times, August 08, 1832, 3.}\]

\[^{29}\text{News, “London Almhouse Anniversary Celebrate the Passing of the Reform Bill,” The Times, June 08, 1835, 3.}\]


and undoubted rights.”  

Interestingly, this piece appeared at a time when secondary sources reveal that the King was in fact opposed to any parliamentary reform, upon advice from the House of Lords. Thus it becomes imperative to establish whether public opinion had any impact on the King’s decision to eventually resolve the crisis. In the period between 1830 and mid-1831, primary sources, such as news from the April 1831 County meeting at Sussex, depict him as favoring reform – and only calls upon the King to create new peers. The primary sources show that none of King’s initial inaction or active opposition to reform measures created public discontent. Hence, critics may contend that public opinion had little to do with the monarch’s decisions, including his eventual assent to the passing of the Bill. However, it is crucial to understand that when William IV did decide to use the prospect of ‘peer-creation’, he was acting reluctantly and only in the face of active pressure from the Whigs in government. The King had asked the Duke of Wellington to form a government in mid-1831 as a last attempt to hinder the passage of the Reform Bill; the attempt failed due to a lack of confidence in a new Wellington government. Thus the fact that only the Whigs commanded significant public support must not have been lost on the King in 1832. As the Bill was passed, The Times claimed that the monarch had sought to “to restore to his people those rights and liberties of which they have been so long deprived” – such deference amidst the volatile political environment of 1832 was arguably conditional upon the King’s willingness to respond to popular demands for reform. In fact, in hindsight, William’s decision to consider a redistribution of power within the House of Lord and consequently putting at risk his own position of authority only lends credibility to the sheer impact of public opinion which bound the king to allow for the reforms.

Critics have claimed that the Great Reform Act of 1832 may have well been the single most influential piece of legislation in British politics in the 19th century. Any inherent dynamism of British political institutions, competence of its politicians or even the astuteness of the monarch could have hardly provided such an impetus to ensure the passage of the 1832 Reform Bill and to restore the House of Commons as a representative body. Perhaps, it is not surprising that eventually it was public opinion which revived the nation’s most influential popular institution, the House of Commons and affirmed ordinary Britons’ stake in national politics in the decades following the eventful years of 1830-32.

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I used a series of articles in The Times between March 1831 and June 1835 from The Times Digital Archive 1785-1985 on

32 Politics and Government, “Reform Bill, Sussex County Meeting.”, The Times, April 09, 1831, 3.


Le grand Autre: The Symbolic Order of Ideology

Javier Padilla, 2010

On the 19th of April, 2008, after decades of seclusion and abuse, Elisabeth Fritzl and her six children were liberated from the basement of her father’s house in Amstetten, Austria. The kids had been born in confinement, and had never been out in the real world. The Police chief reported that “they communicated with noises that were a mixture of growling and cooing” that was unintelligible to others. The question this unsettling anecdote poses is why these children could not communicate. Had they been dislocated from their position to the Other? If so, what, who, or where is this Other? The Other is the place that interpellates the subject into the symbolic order of ideology.

But we seem to be getting ahead of ourselves. The only praxis that can solve the problematic nature of the Fritzl case is Psychoanalysis. The Fritzl children seem to exist in a pre-linguistic order, closer to the instinctive, unconscious drives of animals than to the sphere of human symbols. The discovery of Psychoanalysis by Sigmund Freud was the radical discovery that individual identity is based on the perpetual fragmentation or disintegration of the self wrought by the unconscious. As such, Freud’s contribution can be said to have inverted the Platonic world of ideas by locating them in the imaginary realm of distorted mirror images. Yet, for all of Freud’s contributions his theories have several loopholes and have been fraught with misinterpretations. Chief among these is the erroneous assumption that the unconscious is located deep within the confines of the individual’s brain. The unconscious is the place, according to popular psychology, where individuals hide their darkest desires. For ego-psychologists, for instance, the ego can be strengthened so that it can cope with the unquenchable unconscious. However, they fail to understand that desire is inherently the desire of the Other.

Constructing a framework whose aim is to save the radical elements of Freudian Psychoanalysis, Jacques Lacan holds that desire is intrinsically a social phenomenon that is articulated in language. ¹ Yet, in order for the subject to enter this symbolic dimension of desire it must first go through what he calls the mirror stage:

We have only to understand the mirror stage as an identification, in the full sense that analysis gives to the term: namely, the transformation that takes place in the subject when he assumes an image - whose predestination to this phase-effect is sufficiently

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indicated by the use, in analytic theory, of the ancient term *imago*.

As such, this narcissistic encounter with reflection is constitutive of the subject in the imaginary order. The child becomes a little man—Lacan calls it a *hommellete*—and mis-recognizes himself as a unified entity. Yet, this is an untenable illusion that at once constitutes and de-centers the human subject. After this extremely formative *Meconnaissance* in which the subject first ‘otherizes’ his own image, what role does the entrance of language into the human equation play? A very central one Lacan might answer. Reinvigorating Freud’s Oedipus complex, Lacan posits that the entrance of the Father signals a break in the child’s libidinal relationship with the Mother, and the child is “inserted into a structured world of symbolic meaning—a world that shapes all interactions between the self and others.” Yet, can he articulate his identity using a system filled with gaps and based on a play of differences and deferrals? Can the child mirror, as it were, the imaginary plenitude with these new sounds he has learned from the Other? Not at all, Lacan holds, and desire, insofar as it is the impossible search for imaginary completeness, becomes inscribed in language.

Consequently, the Symbolic order is that which is constitutive of the subject by means of the Other. The problem, however, is that Lacan himself refuses to define the Other in strict terms. And yet, this very fact signals one to a number of characteristics that describe it. Speaking about transference Lacan writes that “the Other, latent or not, is, even beforehand, present in the subjective revelation, It is already there, when something has begun to yield itself from the unconscious.” In other words, the Other is omnipresent in non-metaphysical terms. When a person interviews another person, for example, it is not as if an ‘other’ is interviewing an ‘other.’ They can communicate because the Other is there, already at work before they have begun speaking: “The Other, the capital Other, is already there in every opening of the unconscious.” In other words, the Symbolic order, constituted by the Other, is what places the de-centered subject in the chain of intersubjectivity. “The Other,” Lacan explains, “is the locus in which is situated in the chain of the signifier that governs whatever may be made present of the subject.” Outside of the Other nothing can be made present. The Fritzl kids, having no relation to the intersubjective chain of the Other, could not communicate. Inhabiting a private language that does not ‘mean,’ they had entered into the realm of psychosis.

Indeed, the astonishing gesture of Lacanian Psychoanalysis is that it unveils the endemic symbolic quality of social life. Therefore, Lacanian theory lends itself to social and cultural theory, and this is precisely what Louis Althusser does. Combining Psychoanalysis and Marxist theory he

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2 http://social.chass.nesu.edu/wyrick/debclass/lacan.htm
4 Lacan, 130.
5 Lacan, 203.
holds that “there is no ideology except by the subject and for subjects.”

Ideology can be understood here as the inscription of the subject into the Law and language. Inherent in the nature of ideology is “the function (which defines it) of ‘constituting’ concrete individuals as subjects.” It establishes an imaginary relationship between the subject and the symbolic social network. Inscribed in its nature is the very fabric of the imaginary-symbolic to the Other, and—much like the infant in front of the mirror—the subject misrecognizes himself in the Symbolic order of ideology. Like the Other, which is already there in every opening of the unconscious, ideological subjects are always already subjects participating, recreating, and inhabiting the omnipresence of ideology. As Althusser explains, ideology “has no outside (for itself), but at the same time that it is nothing but outside (for science and reality).”

There is no reality outside the realm of ideology. Nevertheless, once again we seem to be caught in the velocity of the Symbolic. One might ask how the subject becomes inscribed, interpellated in this overbearing Other. This is where things become problematic in Althusser’s argument. He holds that the “interpellation of individuals as subjects presupposes the ‘existence’ of a Unique and central Other Subject,” which makes the very idea of a pre-ideological subject an impossibility. The problem here is that Althusser presupposes the subject’s ability to recognize himself in the Symbolic order of ideology, and overdetermines the subject’s interpellation. As Anthony Elliot explains, in the Althusserian order “subjects are serenely inserted into the process of interpellation, and the possibilities for individual and political agency in turn vanish.” Thus, the objection is not merely political, but that the fragmentation of the self—constitutive to Psychoanalysis itself—is dangerously simplified or forgotten. Desire and lack are left out of the Althusserian equation of ideology with the symbolic order.

Faced with this problematic relationship between Marxist theory and Psychoanalysis, Slavoj Zizek proposes a new connection beyond the Althusserian interpellation. For Zizek “ideology is not something which just magically goes to work on individuals, assigning social identities and roles in the act of producing itself, but is rather an overdetermined field of passionate assumptions and commitments.”

Ideology is ‘beyond’ in the sense that it is that which makes subjectivity possible, and can never be reduced to the cultural reproduction of meaning. In order to sustain this argument Zizek reformulates the idea of ideology by maintaining that it is an inherently paradoxical structure. The passage from the imaginary to the symbolic denotes a traumatic dimension that is never truly resolved and which is found in the nature

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7 Ibid.
8 Ibid. (Althusser’s emphasis.)
9 Ibid.
10 Elliot, 105.
11 Elliot, 108.
of ideology itself. As Robert Pfaller explains:

Since interpellation never seems to succeed totally, the subject seems to remain at a certain distance towards his/her “meaningful” identity given to him/her by interpellation, and precisely this meaningless remainder should be regarded as a condition of the subject’s submission to the “meaningless” command of the ideological rituals and apparatuses.\textsuperscript{12}

This gulf between the meaningless and the meaningful is that which constitutes the subject’s passage from the imaginary to the symbolic, and it is the paradox of ideological inscription. The relationship to the Other—for all its pervasiveness and omnipresence—is inherently fragile.

As such, one might be tempted to conclude that Zizek proposes a seductive ‘return to Lacan’ in his conception of ideological interpellation. Central to the Lacanian edifice is the concept of \textit{Langue}, or Lack, which Lacan himself translates to the English neologism ‘want-to-be.’\textsuperscript{13} Lack, is therefore ‘central’ to the formation of the de-centered subject in the sense that it entails the subject’s desire for the unity of his being. It follows that lack would be central to the ideological edifice of symbolic intersubjectivity. Ideology is that which satisfies the lack in the interpellated subject by providing a structure that paradoxically fulfills and denies unity. The result of this paradox is that “the big Other is fragile, insubstantial, properly virtual, in the sense that its status is that of a subjective presupposition,” for “It exists only insofar as subjects act as if it exists.”\textsuperscript{14} This is why ideologies that seem to be fraught with contradictions—the American dream and the \textit{lack} of social mobility, proletarian revolution and the \textit{lack} of equality among workers, religious belief and the \textit{lack} of religious piety—thrive, even in the midst of incompleteness. Ideology, therefore, is related to the Other insofar as it provides subjects “the ultimate horizon of meaning to their lives, something for which these individuals are ready to give their lives, yet the only thing that really exists are these individuals and their activity.”\textsuperscript{15} It is better to be mystified by the Other’s paradoxical truths than to inhabit the realms of psychosis.

Consequently, Zizek’s conclusion is a very dark one. It is ultimately a position that renders “the ideological world empty of meaning.” While it seems to offer a place for a potentially seductive attack on the apparatuses of ideology, “it offers no basis for understanding the richly ambiguous links between desire and social action.”\textsuperscript{16} By debasing the subject to the perverse will of the Other, Zizek eliminates the possibility of a meaningful place for human identity.

Yet, we must now return to Austria, and to the problem of the children dislocated from the Other. It has

\textsuperscript{13} Lacan, 281.

\textsuperscript{14} Slavoj Zizek, \textit{Empty Gestures and Performatives: Lacan Confronts the CIA Plot} http://www.lacan.com/zizciap.html
\textsuperscript{15} Zizek, http://www.lacan.com/zizciap.html
\textsuperscript{16} Elliot, 110.
been shown that, for Lacan, desire is decidedly shaped by a subject’s relationship to the Other’s desire. As such, the Austrian children can be said to lack the inscription in the intersubjectivity of the linguistic symbolic order. Moreover, Althusser would claim that they have not yet been interpellated into the ideology of the multitude. Zizek would elaborate on this and say that they have not yet been inscribed into the virtual, paradoxical world of the ideological Other. Lastly, one might be tempted to ask: why does their story frighten us? What is uncanny about someone not inscribed into the symbolic order? Perhaps they remind us of the fragility around our fiction. Perhaps their growls and coos tragically echo our own strivings for a unity that must remain elusive in order to exist. They remind us of a world without the ideological omnipresent, a-historical, eternal Other.


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Free Time

Elora Apantaku, 2011

When I first started writing this paper, the only point I was trying to make was an unconnected thesis that teaching kids how to swim is fun and black children are surprisingly warm and fun to hug. But the ideas grew. As a biracial individual growing up in America, race unfortunately became a big issue for me as soon as I was old enough to realize it was the most notably different thing about me. But this essay explores how I managed to find a safe haven away from the turmoil in the outside world, where race, as I discovered, means a lot more than it should. And because of recent events on campus, I can only assume American racism isn’t dead, despite many claims after Barack Obama clinched nomination on November 4th. This paper is pertinent because it shows the struggle of one person working a summer job and simultaneously finding freedom, somehow, in our world today.

My summer job was hard work: 9 to 5, 5 days a week. I’d be found in a freezing pool lying at the base of my high school’s natatorium. The calories I lost through shivering between shifts I’d attempt to replace with full boxes of honey nut cheerios—they’d get mooched by co-workers, or begged for by the kids with pudgy outstretched hands. I didn’t mind them asking though; I loved them—especially the kids. Even when they cried about getting in or blatantly stated they hated swimming. It was my job to teach them how, and I didn’t mind calming their irrational fears of the water because I, having swam for fourteen years, and having taught swimming for three, knew there was absolutely no way they would drown.

We were called Guards—the teenagers who taught five to twelve year olds how to swim. I still have no idea why. Many of us weren’t Lifeguard certified, so some of us couldn’t actually, if it unfortunately arose, guard a child’s life. I was in that category, but then again, I never intended to be a swim instructor. I was called in by a friend to sub, on one summer’s day with nothing else to offer. Figuring it would be a fast way to make thirty bucks, I accepted. It was nerve-wracking. B and Trish were the managers; one an old man with an unceasing love for candy, despite being a diabetic, who was either plotting a prank against you or was unsatisfactorily cranky, the other a middle-aged woman who when not smiling looked like she might kill you; like Hawkfish would eye me warily from their perches on the deck. One or the other would keep pulling me aside.

“Don’t always say good job. Make your comments constructive.”
“Start them off with the arrow first.” What’s an arrow?

“Smile more.” I can’t. I’m too paralyzed from fear.

That was my first day. I left the locker room shaking, wrapped up in a soaking towel. Once the sun hit my bare shoulders, I promised never to go back. But people kept asking me to sub. Having experienced one day of being a Guard, I knew that they of all people needed days off. I couldn’t say no. So I went back.

I slowly began to find small things to enjoy about the job. B was always managing to send someone’s sack lunch out into the middle of the pool floating precipitously on a kickboard. One small child kept quacking like the legion of rubber ducks we kept in the toy bin. In between lessons, guards would run over to the fiberglass turquoise diving boards and try to “outsplash” each other. One boy named Tomas, who was as old as the number of fingers on his extending hands, who still lisped and dreaded being left alone in the pool, would always run straight out of the locker room and sit on my lap, begging for a lesson from his favorite teacher. Our lessons were not constructive. “I’m a monkey! Ee-ee-oo-ah! I’m a frog! Ribbit!” And he’d push off against me while maintaining a tight safe grasp around my neck. “I’m a cat! Meow! Hiss!” And he’d bare his bright white baby teeth.

The next summer I applied to be a full time Guard.

The job was an escape from the collapse of the usual comfort I could count on from my friends. They didn’t understand me, couldn’t recognize the non-expressible pain I felt from being everything I didn’t choose to be: half-black, diabetic, depressed, female. They judged me on the way I looked, made comments that caused me to cringe and later cry, but refused to be blamed for how their judgments made me feel. Here I was seen and respected for one of the few traits that I had actually strived for. I had actively pursued becoming a better swimmer. And here, the kids and fellow guards respected me for all that I had actively achieved.

There were four lessons given daily, and each lesson was more or less an hour. Thirty minutes of instruction, ten minutes of the holy free time that kids would beg for, pull shorts to demand for, and then twenty minutes of in between time for changing and shuttling around from pool to parents. The class booklet described the program as helping children to:

Develop skills that have lifelong benefits! Beginners will learn correct stroke techniques while they become more comfortable around water. Sessions consist of 30 minutes of instruction (by members of the New Trier Guard) and 10 minutes of free play.

The first hour of the day belonged to the TWIGs. Every year during orientation, we’d sit down along the deck to listen to B overview everything that we’d need to know before we started teaching—what to teach at all the stations, beginning with the novice level one extending to the swim-club ready level six. It was never a long talk. Many things you’d pick up as
you went. He’d be stern about many
tings, but he’d chuckle when he’d talk
about the TWIGs. “They’re a handful,”
then he’d laugh, and the first-timers
would eye each other with nervous
smiles.

The TWIGs, which I later found out
stood for Together We Influence
Growth, were different from the other
classes. For one, they stopped by the
pool for lessons every day, but before
and after, they also engaged in other
camp activities. They knew each other
so well that they were our loudest group.
They didn’t mind yelling across the deck
or the pool to have their fellow campers
watch how well they had learned to a
new aquatic skill. They were also, as
their name tried to suggest, racially
diverse.
The pool is located in an affluent suburb,
where the average income for a family is
$150,000 for a family. The African-
American population is 0.7%. I, myself,
at only 50% African, was still a rarity in
the area. To see fifty black city children
walking, hand in hand, with fifty white
suburban children down the sun bleached
sidewalk to go swimming, here, was like
awaking in some kind of bizarre dream.
And yet they’d always be there the next
day.
Having grown up in the city many were
unable to swim. Their emotions about
the five feet of water stretching out in
front of them ranged from paralyzing
fear to a crazed determination to learn,
no matter what. Often I’d be stuck in the
trenches, teaching the overcrowded level
one. There hardly wasn’t enough room
on the wall to hold all the kids, so they
clung to each other, clung to their
teachers, or climbed out of the pool, and
sat, freezing, on the ledge.

There were two five-year-olds in the
Twig class who were both very small,
but they had big eyes and high pitched
voices prone to enter into louder fits of
laughter. Upon seeing them, I made a
quick prayer that not all black people
looked the same to me. But they were
twins, thank god. Omani and Caylin
were their names. “No, he’s Omani!”
was a common phrase I’d hear on the
pool deck before lesson. They were
constantly engaged by the guards, who
thought they were adorable incarnate.
They couldn’t swim though. After
lesson, one day, B’s adult daughter
offered a theory that they had never
swam before in their lives. I believed it.
Omani spent his lessons curled up
around the sides of his instructor, either
to keep from turning to ice, or to avoid
contact with the water. When he was in
my group, he was my favorite. I’d never
admit this to the kids, but it was
something of a fact that the pool would
become as icy as the arctic sea if you did
nothing but stand around, halfway
submerged in it. I would have to control
myself to smile without chattering teeth.
The less cold I appeared, the warmer
they’d feel. But it was a painful
endeavor. This twin that clutched to me
out of fear was actually the warmest kid
I’d ever held. Come to think of it, of all
the kids I’d ever touched, hugged, or
held, it seemed that the darker the child’s
skin, the more relief they’d give me from
the bleak water. I wondered if this was
true, or if it was all in my mind.
A couple years later, my chemistry professor would define black body radiation as such:

As black objects absorb the most energy, black objects must also emit the most energy.

\[ \lambda_{\text{max}} = \frac{2.90 \times 10^6 \text{ nm} \cdot k}{T_k} \]

I wondered if having experienced so much, they were naturally warmer than other kids. In the years before and since, I have hugged many white kids. It never feels the same; I can never feel that same fever building within them.

My father had been born on a rickety taxi boat out in Leeki Lagoon, an inlet from the Atlantic ocean. As a result of African tribal superstition, he was kept away from bodies of water-least he be taken by water spirits. My mother had been born too late to take advantage of title IX, yet early enough to cheer on her younger sister at swim meets. My dad can float. My mom will sidestroke if properly begged. Despite their sparse aquatic competence, they still bought a house with a backyard pool, to prove how far they’d made it in life.

I myself started swimming when I was five years old. Before this I had been a dancer—of sorts. The grainy home videos testify that it was best that I had stopped. I hadn’t made it into the first swim club I tried out for. I remember being confused and scared at the thought of swimming in a strange pool, without a parent to guide me. Tears streamed down my face. My mom found a club that didn’t have try-outs. Soon I was swimming three times a week.

I was not a fan. It was hard work, especially when I turned nine and had to swim eight times a week in the summer. My skin was dry, and I always reeked like the insides of a Laundromat, chlorine clung to me so. I begged my mom to let me quit. I whined, I complained. “I hate swimming!” I’d yell when I couldn’t imagine going back to the natatorium, ever, again.

“You only have to keep swimming until you turn eleven, then you can quit whenever you want.” She told me, one day, in exasperation. I had jumped up and cheered. At age ten I became part of a state championship relay. Because of this, I thought I had a future in it. I’m still swimming, eight years later, so I guess I guessed right.

My mom made me keep to swimming with more enthusiasm then she applied to making me stick with basketball or soccer. At the time I thought it was because swimming was the most physically demanding sport, invented to torture me. It’s easy to run around with a ball; mundane and exhausting to repetitively stroke from one side of a pool to the next. For an upper level psychology class, a swimmer on my college team asked me why I swam, when very few African-Americans are in the sport (I am barraged by friends and acquaintances with psychology questions, because I am an oddity—half-white, half-black. It seems race relations remain one of the more difficult human
behaviors to understand). I recounted the story of how my mother wouldn’t let me quit.

Later that day, I called my mom, and told her about my conversation. She laughed. Then she told me why she kept pushing me to stay a swimmer. “I wanted you to be in an individual sport, so that coaches couldn’t be biased and keep you from playing in games because you were darker. I thought they’d have to let you swim if your times were the fastest—which they often were.”

I often wondered how my mom felt as the white mother of three, African-American-looking daughters. I’ve seen Guess Who’s Coming to Dinner, seen the scene where the mother of the white woman who’s about to marry a black man explains truthfully, that she doesn’t care who she marries, but doesn’t know if the 100 million Americans who oppose their union in the first place, will ever come to accept their children. I guess my mom had understandable concerns about the way the world might treat us—even if she never spoke of them explicitly to us, the affected.

Back in level one, I had a girl whose fear of drowning was colliding with her determination to swim. The result was frustrating. She could touch the bottom; I had held her small, skinny hands while she momentarily touched down onto the tiled bottom with probing feet, still gasping air like a fish on land. She was seven; she wore a cap to cover her dark braids and a white, Hannah Montana swim suit. I gave her a pair of old goggles that I had gotten for free as a division one swimmer. She loved them. Still she wouldn’t swim to me unless I was holding at least one of her hands the entire time.

I wasn’t easy on her. After each lesson I would get out of the water, kneel down on one knee, look her in the eyes and tell her not to be scared, to just try it, because she could swim, and why didn’t she think she could? She’d be fine. I had been swimming for fourteen years. I had yet to drown. Each time she’d look at me: “I want to learn how to swim”. And I believed her.

And she believed me. She tried everything I told her. Keep your face in the water. Hum to keep water out of your nose. Arms straight. Don’t bend your knees. Even when I wasn’t her teacher, I kept informed on her progress. During free time I would see her tottering from fear and the element, floating in an inner tube, trying to swim solo along a lane line, gripping it tightly, as the waves from the other kids splashing pushed her up and down. With the goggles I had given her, she’d put her face in the water for a few seconds, take it out and look astonished. That’s all I had wanted.

I often wonder what about swimming makes it so mesmerizing; why people think going to the lake or swimming in pools constitutes a luxury. It’s not something people get tired of, perhaps because it is one of the few activities one can never quite adjust to. It is always a novel interaction between just you and the water. You are alone, but you are surrounded. The feeling never dissipates, whether it’s your first time swimming
ever, or if you reckon you’ve been swimming too much for the last decade. The feeling of weightlessness is something I still find mesmerizing—even after spending so much time in pools. At any moment, I think, if the laws of physics were to just go out, I’d be crushed to the bottom. I think that’s why swimming elicits fear and joy simultaneously in young children learning for the first time.

In the outside world, people will treat you like an oddity. I know. I’ve gotten the dumb questions, gotten the weird looks. I’ve heard words that make me feel like giving up; that make me feel uncomfortable being myself. I’m still living in a country where this comment: “Fuck Obama. That nigger ain't ever gonna win. He'll probably get shot down before January,” can remain posted in a blog without being taken down by anyone. In the aftermath of Obama winning the presidency, I still felt dissatisfied by the response of millions of Americans. Hopefully, one day, in the country where a half-black, half-white man can be elected president, people won’t hail it as historic, or extraordinary. It just will be.

At least until then, from 9 to 5, Monday through Friday, most of the summer, I am free. I have found a haven, where the outside world no longer exists. My outward appearance no longer matters. I am just a person, teaching fellow humans how to swim.
Inside the Matrix: Imperfections in Introspection

Jonathan Riedel, 2009

This paper was written for a class entitled Philosophy of Psychology. The main objective of the class is to tackle the question of what to do when neuroscientific evidence conflicts with what ordinary people report of their experience. What happens when the personal explanation is at odds with the subpersonal? One such manifestation of the conflict, dubbed “the interface dilemma,” is introspection: what one reports about their feelings and beliefs, barring a motivation to lie, seems incorrigible. No one can tell me I am wrong when I say I am sad because the only access to that knowledge is through introspection, my private and personal experience.

When I mention terms like “autonomist” and “neuro-computationalist,” I am referring to the different schools of thought about this issue. Autonomists, on one end of the spectrum, believe that the accuracy of first-person reports is inviolable. For them, when I say I am in love and my brain patterns don't match up to what everyone else's do when they are in love, 'love' has to be redefined in the neuroscientist's dictionary, not in people's ordinary usage; people trump science. On the other end of the spectrum are the neuro-computationalists (or the eliminativists), who believe that progressive scientific discoveries will eventually tell us what we need to know about the brain, such that currently ambiguous matters about thoughts, beliefs, and qualitative experience will have a clear definition, much the way that the “folk” notion of the four humors was eventually put to rest by the discovery of microbes as the primary cause of illness. More moderate views exist, but in this context the battle between extreme views is the major concern.

Philosophy of Psychology, and in particular the question of whether introspection is reliable, is very important for how we live our daily lives. Should we trust a scientific report more than a person telling to our faces the details of his or her experience? A serious challenge to introspection, something we take to be so basic to our understanding of ourselves and the world, is definitely a matter worth discussing, and I hope my advocacy of Nisbett and Wilson will allow us to hold on to that faculty while taking into consideration the undoubtedly auspicious progress of science.

What if The Matrix were real? It is certainly provocative to entertain the thought that we are living in a world that we think to be real but is actually not. Despite its intrigue, the sane of us generally regard the film’s premise as false. There is no way that we can be wrong about something so simple as that which is right in front of our noses at all times, and it is even more menacing to think that even our own mental states are subject to inaccuracy – right? Sadly,
scientific studies lead to theories presented by Gopnik, Gordon, and Nisbett and Wilson that we are in a kind of prison of the mind, where introspection is a flawed means of accessing the truth about mental states. Of these particular theorists, however, Nisbett and Wilson present the most clear-cut challenge to introspection without leaving us in absolute skepticism like Gopnik and Gordon do. While all of the above would agree that what we assume to be introspection is imperfect, Nisbett and Wilson argue not to the effect that introspection itself is wrong, but that our conception of it is often mistaken. Instead, the explanation of behavior resides in a priori causal relationships. So, while Gopnik and Gordon take blows at the foundations of epistemology, the latter pair presents a serious challenge to introspection without destroying all talk about the interface dilemma and knowledge in general.

The discussion of behavior explanations begins with simple psychological experiments. For example, the answer to “how did you recall your mother’s maiden name?” is usually along the lines of “I don’t know, it just came to me.” Such an inarticulate answer for this and for similar questions suggests that perceptual and memorial processes have a nebulous underlying structure; perhaps our inability to explain the “higher-order processes” for recalling such facts means that introspection is not a good means of identifying our mental states. This anti-introspectivist view seems problematic for a few reasons, according to Nisbett and Wilson: (1) Inarticulate explanations about perception and memory do not guarantee that all higher-order processing is chaos; (2) Even though questions about recall maybe answered poorly, people generally know how to articulately answer other kinds of questions like “why they behaved as they did in some social situation or why they like or dislike an object or another person”\(^1\); (3) Since introspection is utterly and completely wrong, people can never be correct about their mental states, a highly troubling assertion if certain states are only accessible by this means.

The basis of Nisbett and Wilson’s overall argument is the challenge of these seeming problems. The writers claim that: (1’) Some connections between stimuli and effects which are clearly affecting an experiment go unnoticed by subjects, meaning that “the accuracy of subjective reports is so poor as to suggest that any introspective access that may exist is not sufficient to produce generally correct or reliable reports”\(^2\); (2’) Not just questions about recalling maiden names are subject to confusion – even explanations of preference or acting in social situations may not be given as a result of introspection but what is wrongly assumed to be introspection; (3’) People can be correct, but usually they are correct accidentally. In the most powerful blow to knowledge via introspection, (2’), Nisbett and Wilson

\(^2\) Ibid., 233.
note that people who claim to introspect on reasons for an effect are often in fact using “implicit, a priori theories about the causal connection between stimulus and response.”

In (3’), they assert that people are correct when what would be true as determined by introspection is also true as determined by using the aforementioned sub-personal knowledge of cause and effect relationships. Such accuracy usually occurs when the given information is limited and explicit.

Why, now, should we believe that we are not good at introspecting? Like Gopnik, Nisbett and Wilson show substantial evidence from a plethora of experiments that (1’) is true. Nisbett’s own data on shock subjects, who performed differently depending on whether they had taken a placebo, suggests that deeper cognitive processes affect subjects’ behavior – in this case, tolerance of pain – while their own explanations of their behavior report otherwise. The subjects claim that they were not thinking about the pill at all, but their behavior suggests that at an unconscious level they were using knowledge of having taken a pill. If the implications of such experiments are correct, then it is clear that subjects “cannot report on the existence of influential stimuli. It therefore would be quite impossible for them to describe accurately the role played by these stimuli in influencing their responses.”

Thus, this first facet of their argument is quite compelling.

Their second and third premises deal with statements of the sort, “I came to a stop because the light started to change” and “I played a trump because I had no cards in the suit that was led.” Because the explanation (the part of the sentence after the word “because”) is recalled from memory based on the questions “why did you come to stop?” and “why did you play a trump?”, it feels like a definite result of introspective access. One looks for the answer in some history of mental states and gives an explanation based on what his or her state was that seemed to produce the effect. Nisbett and Wilson, however, assert that the explanations are not actually given via introspection. Rather, our knowledge of pre-existing causal relationships override whatever we understand to be introspection: “the culture or a subculture may have explicit rules stating the relationship between a particular stimulus and a particular response.” What is perceived as the cause of one’s behavior is actually already set. While it is true that I come to a stop because the light started to change, I know that I do this because the relationship between my stopping a car and my seeing a yellow light is already established, and I base my explanations off this relationship.

This position, in my view, is convincing because it provides relief from the injustice of a five year-old's favorite game: asking perpetual “why” questions. The existence of a priori

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3 Ibid.
4 See p. 253, When Will We Be Correct In Our Verbal Reports?
5 I am using the term “unconscious” literally, i.e. the subjects themselves did not recognize the possibility that they were behaving based on having taken the pill.
6 Ibid., 240.
7 Ibid., 248.
8 Ibid.
causal theories means a rest from *ad infinitum* interrogation of the form:

- “Why did you stop?” - “Because the light started to change.”
- “Why did the light’s changing make you stop?” - “Because the law says I should stop.”
- “Why does the law’s saying so motivate you to stop?” - Etc.

In the direct introspective way of evaluating behavior, there is never really an end to *why* one acts the way one acts. If (2’) and (3’) are true, one knows the way one acts is based on causal relationships, and the explanation stops there. Although it may feel like introspection because the information is retrieved internally, it is not. What actually counts as introspection, then, is an independent issue. Nisbett and Wilson’s argument allows for introspection to still be valid, but that our distinction between using introspection and using a priori theories is wrong. Such a claim is ultimately and auspiciously benign.

Furthermore, the argument from Nisbett and Wilson lacks nothing in seriousness, despite its acceptable implications. Like Gopnik and Gordon, they still challenge an individual’s ability to introspect, but the result is not threatening to the idea of knowing the reasons for one’s behavior. In the other authors’ views, it seems that anything we say about explanations for actions is wrong if it comes about internally. Gopnik extrapolates her theory to the broadest degree, questioning whether correct introspection for anyone is even comprehensible. If young children think they are right but are actually so clearly wrong, how do adults know that they are not wrong? In Gopnik’s world, perhaps we are living in the matrix. Gordon’s idea of an egocentric shift is implausible for reasons too expansive to be discussed here.

Nisbett and Wilson, however, do not say that all introspection is wrong, simply that what we think to be introspective access is in fact something else. The division between what “feels like introspection” and “introspection itself” is existent but its boundaries are nebulous. Since they assume that theory-laden belief production is far more prevalent than actual introspection, they still assert that introspective access is not as easy and accurate as one might think. When we try to explain our behavior and get inarticulate results in some cases – “it just felt like it”, “it just came to me” – or articulate results in others – “I played a trump card because...” – we realize that we still can be right but are often not. The conditions under which we are correct “accidentally” are too elaborate to discuss here (see footnote 4).

As a serious challenge to the existence of direct access to mental states, Nisbett and Wilson’s theory has dramatic implications for the interface problem. Autonomy theorists seem to come out on top; if sub-personal explanations (e.g. those discovered via introspection) are flawed, then the autonomists lose nothing in attributing full autonomy to person-level explanations. Furthermore, Nisbett and Wilson’s idea that what we take to be introspection is actually a subtle recall of a priori causal theories *supports*  

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9 (3’) covers this possibility.
autonomy theory because then person-level relations are, at the core, the means to accessing mental states. The idea that personal and sub-personal explanations have no questions in common to answer is perfectly commensurable with Nisbett and Wilson’s theory. Predictably, the neuro-computationalist loses one battle even though the personal-sub-personal distinction is conspicuously sharpened. That certain kind of sub-personal explanation which we rely on so heavily to be accurate is indeed flawed. However, the neuro-computationalist also wins a battle: if people are unaware of their reliance on a priori causal theories in almost 100% of cases – i.e. people wrongly believe they are introspecting – then commonsense psychology is in trouble.

In the full-blown war, autonomy theory can be said to win. Even Nisbett and Wilson themselves speak out against the stubborn reclusiveness of neuro-computational eliminativism. Even if it feels like introspection is “nothing more than judgments of plausibility”, they argue, there are other factors that make it unfair to discredit all introspective reports and ignore all arguments based on them.10 Autonomy theorists would probably support the use of introspection, as long as it avoided affecting person-level characteristics, while the eliminativists would ignore one side altogether.

Independent from its effects on the interface dilemma, the challenge of Nisbett and Wilson that introspection is not exactly what we thought it was is nothing to turn a nose up at. In fact, the reason the challenge is so compelling is because it can exist without questioning all access to knowledge. If explanations of our behavior rely on pre-existing cause and effect relationships, so what? We would certainly like to believe we are right when we internally access a mental state, but if we are not correct, there does not seem to be any harm done. The damage may be done to our egos, but at least there is a way to make sure we are not part of the matrix.

10 Ibid., 255.
“In the beginning, God created the heavens and the earth” (Genesis 1:1). Thus begins the most disputed tale in living memory, the Judeo-Christian story of how the world and its inhabitants began. The conflict between Darwinian theory and Creationist beliefs has raged for well over a century now, and through the generations both sides have progressed through a sort of evolution of their own. Yet the conflict continues to be seen as just that: a battle between two opposing sides, one of which will reign victorious while the other fades into the memory of an unenlightened past. Exaggerated by the media and exacerbated by fundamentalists on both sides, this image of an irresolvable clash is ultimately a counterproductive waste of time. Pure evolutionary theory and pure creationism do indeed appear to be polar opposites; however, in the middle ground between the extremes, there are just as many possibilities for overlap and compatibility as for contradiction and opposition. However, in order to find that middle ground where reconciliation between the two is possible, one must first admit the fallibility not of the Scriptures themselves nor of scientific research and experiments, but of human understanding of these various explanations for the origins of the world and of man. This is not necessarily a compromise; neither side must be forced to give up one principle it holds dear in exchange for keeping another. Rather, this reconciliation stems from conceding that humans err in their understanding both of the divine and of the natural world. Realizing that human comprehension of both will deepen and change over time allows formerly held beliefs and theories to be modified and interwoven to form a more cohesive view of the whole, and that view may someday come close to approximating the truth.

The first step toward reconciliation between scientific and religious versions of human origins is to recognize that science and religion serve two extremely different purposes. The differences are complex and it would be unfair to state that they do not share certain goals, but in the simplest scenario, science seeks to explain how the world came into being, while religion seeks to explain why. This may come as a surprise to some, including a number of Creationists who view the Bible as a sort of encyclopedia, one that holds the precise answers to everything from philosophy to physics. In reality, there is no justification for treating the Bible, divinely inspired though it may be, as a scientific document. Surely both evolutionists and open-minded creationists can agree upon that, regardless of their opinion as to the origins of Scripture. The reason for this
is simple: if Genesis was written over 3,000 years ago, how could one expect the author to command the scientific vocabulary necessary to describe the exact mechanisms of the universe’s formation? More importantly, how could one expect a reader at that time to understand it? Howard J. Van Till, a retired professor emeritus of physics and astronomy at Calvin College, argues that “The human writers inspired by God had no vocabulary for concepts like galactic redshift, thermonuclear fusion, plate tectonics, spacetime metrics... To expect Scriptures to provide us with the kind of statements that would be directly relevant to the evaluation of contemporary scientific theories on the world’s formative history strikes me as profoundly misguided” (151).

On this point, creationists can concede that their understanding of Genesis as a scientific account of creation is potentially misguided, but that concession does not give grounds for evolutionists to declare the Bible to be disproved entirely simply since it has been disproved scientifically. A document does not have to be scientific to be valid. Were that the case, centuries of the world’s greatest literature would suddenly become obsolete because of content that goes against the laws of the natural world. A new way must be found to view Scripture; or perhaps it is an old way, ancient even, the way people understood the Bible before the advent of science. Genesis, and indeed religion as a whole, functions as an explanation of purpose for humans in relation to the divine, to nature, and to each other. The story of the Garden of Eden serves for some as an explanation for why humans are flawed, imperfect, and ultimately mortal. It can be taken literally or as a metaphor for a more vague development of awareness of right and wrong. Yet the fact remains that the nature of Genesis is “a teleological, not chronological, account of God’s ordering of the earth and its life forms. The order here is an order of purpose, not time” (Clouser, 517). Genesis was written to answer the question of why people exist on this earth, not how. Searching it for scientific answers would be no more productive than analyzing the periodic table in search of higher meaning in life. The common misconception of Genesis as the infallible scientific account of the beginning of the world is the fault of human misunderstanding and misinterpretation. Neither evolutionists nor creationists must concede that the Bible is right or wrong, but surely they can agree that for scientific purposes, there are more factual and concrete sources, while for philosophical and literary purposes, the Bible remains an extraordinary and valuable explanation of the nature of man.

In truth, reconciliation between creationism and evolution is not so much a process as it is already a regularly occurring event. Ever since the publication of Darwin’s theory, people who are both religious and reasonable have been seeking a way to reinterpret the Bible so that it is complemented rather than contradicted by the discoveries of modern science. With sufficient creativity, any two things can be reconciled, and little creativity is required to resolve the differences in this case. As early as the fourth century of the common era, St. Augustine of Hippo
suggested that the “days” described in the first chapter of Genesis were not meant to be taken temporally, based on the description of God creating light on the first day but not creating the sun, moon, and stars until the fourth day (Clouser, 517). This is only one of numerous inconsistencies obvious to the thinking readers of Genesis, and those readers have found many ways to demonstrate that reason and faith are not mutually exclusive. From the “gap-theory” of some creationists, which proposes a lapse in time between the first and second verses of Genesis and allowing for the insertion of the time span suggested by the geologic record, to the common dismissal of the problem as time being a human invention and therefore irrelevant to God, there exists an infinite number of ways to resolve the apparent conflict. A classic argument for the irrelevance of the Bible is that the first and second chapters of Genesis tell two different and seemingly contradictory stories. However, this argument only works if the Bible is interpreted as a literal, scientific account of the world’s origins, which is not at all its purpose. As has been shown, Genesis has a very different purpose, one that is ultimately teleological. As such, the two chapters can be seen as giving purpose to different aspects of human time. In a modern reconciliation proposed by Roy Clouser, a professor of philosophy and religion at the College of New Jersey, the first chapter of Genesis represents God’s organization and arrangement of the workweek: “What is religiously important is the ‘first,’ ‘second,’ etc. as contrasted with the ‘seventh,’ not whether the ‘days’ can be construed as geological eras or taken to be twenty-four-hour periods in which the entire universe appeared” (518). On the other hand, the description of the creation of Adam and Eve is interpreted by Clouser to be representative of the creation not of the first humans, but of the first religiously conscious humans. By Clouser’s definition of humanity, the figurative character known as Adam was not truly human until God had “breathed into him,” making the divine presence known to man by communicating with him and awakening at last his religious consciousness. “[Genesis] does not regard ‘human’ as synonymous with any strictly biological structure or capacity, and it is clueless with regard to any biological processes or beings” (521). When Genesis is seen for what it truly is—a religious document—means of reconciliation are simple to find, though convincing others may be more difficult. However, reconciliation is clearly possible if only that first step of admitting imperfect human understanding of sources, regardless of whether they are based in science or faith.

The sheer number of different forms of reconciliation of creationism and evolution shows that no single theory can or will apply to every long-held religious belief and every cutting-edge scientific theory. There is simply too much variation within the beliefs held by creationists and theories maintained by evolutionists, and the latter expands daily as new scientific discoveries are made. The process must be individual, and in the spirit of true modernity, it must consist of each person using his or her own faculties of reason to evaluate
both sides and find a middle ground that compromises neither religion nor reason. For some, this may mean maintaining that the world was created in precisely six days; for others, this may mean denying any sort of miraculous or special creation by some divine power. The extremists will always remain, but the majority will continue to find means of reconciliation. This does not compromise the intelligence of the person who chooses to hold on to religious beliefs in addition to scientific explanations of the world’s origins. In reality, for the average person or even the exceptional person, the theory of evolution must be taken on faith just as much as the story told in Genesis. It is a rare person indeed who is sufficiently qualified in the fields of evolution and religion to speak as an expert on the gray area between the two. Alvin Plantinga states that “The scientists among us don’t ordinarily have a sufficient grasp of the relevant philosophy and theology; the philosophers and theologians don’t know enough science; consequently, hardly anyone is qualified to speak here with real authority” (114). This leaves the possibility of turning to one of the few who is truly an expert and believing without question that expert opinion. However, a more modern course is to examine the evidence of faith and science with sufficient humility to admit that what was previously interpreted in either case might be wrong. Blind faith is not the answer, regardless of where that faith is directed. Reconciliation must take place on an individual, conscious level to be worthwhile, meaningful, and lasting.

Yet this debate currently rages on a far larger scale, one that impedes its being fully resolved on an individual basis. The conflict between religion and evolution, so often portrayed as an epic battle to the death, is one that can only be reconciled when it is removed from the spotlight and judgment of experts trying to find their own version of the absolute truth and inflict it upon the rest of the world. The modern world is full of experts who like nothing better to expound their theories and beliefs as unquestionable fact, and their constant refusal to admit that someone’s contradictory theories or beliefs might be valid is what has perpetuated this conflict. The church has undeniably had a hand in fueling the anger that keeps the battle alive, with its historic antagonism toward scientific discoveries that challenge its interpretation of Scripture. Yet as more and more representative groups of creationists declare their support for not only the study of evolution but the teaching of it in biology classes, the tide seems to turn the other way, and the opposing side takes this as license for just as vicious attacks upon those backwards-thinking individuals who still do not concede that the process of evolution proves the nonexistence of God. In a 1989 book review that appeared in the New York Times, the renowned evolutionist Richard Dawkins said, “It is absolutely safe to say that if you meet someone who claims not to believe in evolution, that person is ignorant, stupid, or insane” (34). Disregarding the venom and astounding arrogance of Dawkins’ claim, which serve only to illustrate the evolutionist version of a pulpit-pounding TV evangelist, one may examine his statement to fully understand the
attitude that obstructs reconciliation between the two sides. It is, in fact, not entirely safe to assume any such thing. Colgate University’s own president, Rebecca Chopp, once served as a minister, and even Richard Dawkins would be hard pressed ever to call her ignorant, much less stupid or insane. Perhaps this is because Dawkins does not elaborate a great deal on what he means by the term evolution. Is he referring to the “Grand Evolutionary Story,” in which all of life evolved from a single organism? Surely not, considering how many highly educated, intelligent, and sane people still harbor doubts about that particular scenario. Or does he perhaps mean so-called microevolution, such as the evolution observed within breeds of dogs or the famous light and dark moths of nineteenth century England? In this case his statement is likely to be far more accurate, though his belligerence is still unwarranted. If creationists can concede that their previous misunderstanding of Genesis as a scientific account was misguided, evolutionists, in order to facilitate reconciliation, must offer the same concession, which is that humans can and do make mistakes in their interpretations. Science is proud of its own falsifiability; that is what makes it true science. This step is not a difficult one, but arrogance will impede it to the point that it cannot be taken.

This reconciliation is by no means the victory of one side over the other. Those who seek to eradicate even a hint of creationist beliefs from the minds of all religious people are no more progressive or enlightened than those fundamentalists who insist that the earth is six thousand years old and flat. Imposing personal beliefs as to the origins of the world upon another person is unforgivable, regardless of whether the source is scientific evidence or divine revelation. Especially in the West, where freedom is so highly praised, individuals must be allowed to reconcile the two sides of this argument for themselves without being declared ignorant, stupid, or insane, much less a heretic or a sinner.

As a teleological document, Genesis cannot in effect be proved “wrong” by modern science; like any great work of literature, it can only be reinterpreted according to changing human comprehension of its contents. Yet it takes courage to admit the possibility of having misinterpreted something; it takes an unnatural humility to admit having done so for thousands of years. Scientists and theologians alike loathe the thought of being fallible when it comes to their areas of expertise, but faith in God is not dependent on whether humans were right in their interpretation of Genesis as a literal account of the world’s origins, nor is the power of science overturned by the thought that science cannot explain quite everything. Reconciliation originates in setting aside pride and admitting that human interpretation is just that—one, but arrogance will impede it to the point that it cannot be taken.

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In today’s age of expanding urbanization, it seems that no corner of the world is spared from sprouting metropolises - all aspiring to emulate the modern American city. In this aspiration, these cities direct all available resources to creating a solid infrastructure, advancing and developing technologically, building ample job opportunities, fostering as much capital as possible and so forth, all with the singular goal of cultivating a flourishing economy. The capitalist model has well extended from its status as an economic model to become the ideal model for modern society as a whole. This means that today, society is primarily striving to achieve a state of ever-increasing economic growth, as per capitalism. Regardless of its feasibility, such a goal entails a society that is principally centered on personal gain. But with this immense focus on the individual and individual wealth, are we compromising something even bigger than the individual? Using Dubai as a case study, this essay argues that indeed, modernization is diminishing social solidarity and thereby, alienating the citizen from the larger society. Emile Durkheim’s theories are explored and applied to assert that the hyper-individualism that is prevalent in current society has overwhelmed the individual’s sense of identity and belonging. The main question here is: is the trade off worth it? How can one resolve this apparent paradox that the aspects that appear to provide the most happiness for us, i.e., monetary gain, personal success, are the same aspects that seem to beget depressed feelings of loneliness and isolation? In many ways, this inquiry is a direct result of modernity, and is arguably the question of our time.

Although the breadth of Emile Durkheim’s theories in sociology is immense, his assortment of works can be explained in terms of one of his central concepts, social solidarity. Social solidarity refers to the social cohesion and interconnectedness of a given society. This concept essentially constitutes the entire basis of Durkheim’s theories about societies and the ways in which they function. Not only does the concept of social solidarity provide a means for understanding the workings of a particular society, but it also serves as a guideline for distinguishing the mechanisms between different societies. Durkheim identifies two basic forms of social solidarity, mechanical and organic. This distinction is made based upon the given society’s division of labor, which Durkheim greatly emphasizes as a highly determinative factor for the society’s organization and functioning. Applying his theories to current world events, many connections can be drawn while examining the struggle that is evident in many regions of the world due to the transitioning from mechanical solidarity to organic solidarity.
The article, *Young and Arab in Land of Mosques and Bars*, clearly illustrates the experiences of people who move from a mechanical society to an organic one. In particular, it focuses on the development of Dubai into a highly advanced, technologically-forward and modern society. The article relates the experiences of several different people living in Dubai, but largely centers on one main character, Rami Galal. As a young, working man in the “glittering, manic Dubai”, Galal faces many of the same issues and challenges that effect a large number of people who have migrated to Dubai. Galal himself is a fairly recent migrant, having moved from his home in Egypt about a year ago for a job offer in construction. The article begins by detailing the “wonderful” qualities of Dubai, particularly in comparison to Egypt. It describes Dubai’s cultural diversity and openness, especially in terms of religion. The atmosphere is such that both orthodoxy and lack of religiosity are equally welcome, and neither is more or less valued. Thus, “religion is not something young men turn to because it fills a void or because they are bowing to a collective demand”, as is in most of the Arab world (Slackman 2008). The young especially appreciate such a society, which then judges a “person based on productivity more than what [s]he looks like.”

More broadly, Galal states, “Here, no one keeps you in check.” It appears that the lack of religious mandates is accompanied by more freedom in general for a person to make his own choices. These instinctively seem to go hand-in-hand with each other; the religious atmosphere of a society is highly correlated with its overall rigidity. Although Dubai is still an “unmistakably Muslim state […] religion has become more a personal choice and Islam less of a common bond,” which lend to Dubai’s larger “socially freewheeling” nature. These descriptions of the city look to be quite similar to Durkheim’s descriptions of a society based on organic solidarity. In fact, Dubai emerges as a perfect example of all the various aspects of an organic society. To be precise, Durkheim explains organic solidarity to occur with the specialization and division of labor. As individuals take on different roles in society, they are grouped “according to the particular nature of the social activity to which they devote themselves” (Giddens 1972: 143). Thus, solidarity in this type of society results from individuals’ interdependence on each other, which can be likened to the mutual interdependence of organs within an organism’s body.

Because the specialization of the individual gains greater importance, the concerns of the collective whole do not have as much of an impact in organic societies as they would in more traditional, mechanical societies. In fact, the conscious collective, which is Durkheim’s concept of “a determinate system of ideas, attitudes and beliefs which create social likenesses among individuals in society,” is minimized in organic solidarity (Morrison 2006: 328). This conscious collective is the “body of collective beliefs and social practices” that serves as the basis for collective action in mechanical societies, in which there is minimal division of labor. In organic societies, however, the individual
takes the place of the collective, and accordingly, individual beliefs guide one’s behavior and activity. Again, Dubai serves as a prime example to illustrate this aspect. Galal explains that since the traditional religious values, such as family honor, does not dictate his life in Dubai as it did in Egypt, “everything is up to him… what he eats, whether he goes to the mosque or a bar, who his friends are” (Slackman 2008). All these things, once prescribed to him based on the norms “approved” by the society as a whole, are now fully matters of personal choice.

“Dubai dazzles, but it also confuses.” With the significant change in being able to exercise individual freedoms, individuals must learn to deal with the limitlessness that a society like Dubai entails. “It is a land of rules… but it also dares everyone to defy limitations.” The same reasons that attract people to Dubai are the reasons why the people are also confused. Such is the contradictory nature of an increasingly organic society. Dubai is a land of opportunity; it is a fresh, vital, highly advanced city where opportunities are based on merit, salaries are plentiful and increase accordingly, and success is within everyone’s reach. However, with the atmosphere needed to make all these freedoms possible comes the lack of regulation. There are virtually no limits imposed on individual wants, and although there are restrictions put on general behaviors, the enforcement that would follow in more traditional, tighter-knit communities is missing. Hence, Dubai’s conditions are identical to those characterizing Durkheim’s notion of an anomie. Arguable as the epitome of a free market and a capitalist society, Dubai inherently encourages people to express their wants and “pursue them to the utmost” (Garner 2004: 68). A society that has no interest in regulating material wants and gains is bound to cause “disorientation and confusion that [inevitably] arise out of the limitless wants and the inability to satisfy them.” Despite all the positive aspects of Dubai, Galal eventually admits that he is losing control of himself. With the absence of regulation in his daily life, he was “overloaded” (Slackman 2008). As much as he explained that he was enjoying himself and fully living his life like he had never done before, he expresses a dire need to “break from the drinking and the women, and reconnect with his values.”

It becomes evident then that “if Dubai offers opportunity, it also poses risks.” There seems to be an alienation from true values in the structure of an anomie that will lead to people losing control of their desires. It follows then that if an anomie is thought of as an organic society to the very extreme, then individualism, combined with severe underregulation, will run rampant and be self-destructive to the individual. Although regulation may bring the unwanted control that lies outside the individual, it also brings the moderation that is required for Durkheim’s view of a balanced, smoothly functioning society. Not only did individuals like Galal struggle with the temptations of Dubai, but many faced the isolation that accompanied it. Paradoxically, “Dubai has everything money can buy, but it does not have a unifying culture or identity.” The individual is elevated to
such a great extent in an organic society that personal ambition becomes of paramount importance. Because of this, and also because of Dubai’s attempts to foster the greatest diversity and tolerance, notions of unity and common identity completely fade away. Galal’s sentiments are overflowing with evidences of his struggle with depression; he did not feel any sort of self-belonging, culturally, personally or otherwise, in Dubai. Durkheim would further assert that Galal is a prime candidate for anomic suicide, which results when an overwhelmed individual begins to pursue his unchecked wants and desires that are beyond his capacity to obtain (Morrison 2006: 327). Galal becomes more and more emphatic when talking about the loneliness and the lack of trust he feels in Dubai, and yet, he makes a firm decision to stay. Even after returning to Egypt for a short while, and re-experiencing the togetherness of a common culture, he says that he did not feel like he fit in at home anymore; his home was now Dubai.

Why does Galal choose to go back, even though Egypt provided him all the things that he was longing for in Dubai? Why did he return despite all the loneliness and alienation he felt? Are having a common identity and feelings of belonging secondary only to living in an efficient, modern city that is full of opportunities? Are physical and material fulfillsments, as with job opportunities and the like, really more important than mental and spiritual needs? The only explanation that seems plausible is that the individual and his needs have become so great that sacrificing the collective is a justified means to achieving the end. This mentality particularly resonates with those who have lived in more mechanical societies, such as many Islamic nations. For these people, whose individual choice and freedoms, i.e., societal norms, acceptable behaviors, the idea of personal success, have thus far been essentially nonexistent, Dubai’s risks are yet to be fully uncovered. The city’s glittering opportunities are still at the forefront of every hungry soul’s vision. Right now, Rami Galal, as well as all others in similar scenarios, is only focused on the aspect that he needs the ability to express free choice, which is completely valid. On the flip side, however, is the eventual realization that he cannot lead a happy life without a sense of the communal. Giddens sums up this idea best in his introduction, “The key to Durkheim’s whole life’s work is... to resolve the apparent paradox that the liberty of the individual is only achieved through his dependence upon society” (Giddens 1972: 45).

**Bibliography**


A Light History of Electromagnetic Waves: Waves and Particles before Wave-Particle Duality

Brien Puff, 2009

It is everywhere. In today’s society, with today’s infrastructure, one has to retreat far, far into the vast reaches of the countryside in order to lose most of it, and even then, one has to hope for the cloudiest night imaginable, one that even then lacks a storm and the inevitable flashes that go with it. It is so hard to hide from light, that when one finds oneself finally alone, devoid of it, awash in a sea of darkness, it is always a bit overwhelming, awing, and bewildering.

It is everywhere. In today’s society, with today’s infrastructure, one has to retreat far, far into the vast reaches of the countryside in order to lose most of it, and even then, one has to hope for the cloudiest night imaginable, one that even then lacks a storm and the inevitable flashes that go with it. It is so hard to hide from light, that when one finds oneself finally alone, devoid of it, awash in a sea of darkness, it is always a bit overwhelming, awing, and bewildering.

Light was never really paid attention to until the time of the Enlightenment. The first major scientist to cover and hypothesize about light was Christiaan Huygens, a Dutchman. His book *Treatise on Light* from the late 1600’s suggested that light was a wave, similar to that of a sound wave, or waves “formed in water when a stone is thrown into it, …which present a successive spreading as circles, though these arise from another cause, and are only in a flat surface.”¹ Like those two examples, he said, light waves move “from the luminous body to our eyes by some movement impressed on the matter which is between the two.” The matter that Huygens is referring to here, of course, is the æther, a scientific theory from the Enlightenment-era period. It is the invisible medium that scientists proposed filled the universe and through which the earth moves and so forth.²

About the same time that this was published, Isaac Newton, the famous Englishman, was working on his own book, which would become *Opticks*, to be published in 1704. In this groundbreaking work, Newton laid out the groundwork for what would become

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the standard by which light was looked at for the next century and a half.

Newton, born 1653 to a family of common farmers, became interested in math, science, and astronomy after reading texts from Galileo and Kepler while he was at Trinity College Cambridge, and soon after produced his first book (Quaestiones Quaedam Philosophicae) addressing his own questions and thoughts on science. Even as what we would consider an undergraduate, Newton was already creating important works in the fields of math and science.³

While the plague was raging in England in the mid-1660’s, Newton began work on what would become the basis of his great book on light. Among his lesser-known experiments were to poke his eye with a small knife to see how it would affect his sight and to look at the sun until he risked becoming blind.⁴ More importantly (and more wisely), he began by using a prism to break up sunlight (which is, basically, just white light) into its component colors. This broke the theory that white light was just a single entity, that is, that it could not be broken down into any further elements. Even Aristotle had believed this, and most likely partly because of that, it had not been expressly questioned until Newton, and even then, it was an accident (he had noticed a chromatic aberration in a telescope that had resulted in him seeing the spectrum of colors; figuring this was a problem with all telescopes with lenses, he invented his own reflecting telescope, known today as the Newtonian telescope).⁵

Because of his work with optics in this time, Newton was rewarded with a professorship at his alma mater, where the first course he taught was in that same subject. In 1672, he published his first paper exclusively on light in the Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, to which he belonged, that explained his thoughts on the components of light and other theories he had. This paper was controversial in the scientific community, raising concerns from men like Robert Hooke and even Huygens.⁶

Hooke took exception to many propositions that Newton made, and refuted them all in a letter to Newton and the Royal Society during the same year that the paper was published. From said letter, Hooke wrote,


With this, I confess, I cannot see yet any undeniable argument to convince me of the certainty thereof. For all the experiments and observations I have hitherto made, nay, and even those very experiments, which he alleged, do seem to me to prove, that white is nothing but a pulse or motion,

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ O’Connor and Robertson.

⁶ Ibid.
propagated through an homogeneous, uniform and transparent medium: and that colour is nothing but the disturbance of that light, by the communication of that pulse to other transparent mediums, that is, by the refraction thereof: that whiteness and blackness are nothing but the plenty or scarcity of the undisturbed rays of light: and that the two colours (than the which there are not more uncompounded in nature) are nothing but the effects of a compounded pulse, or disturbed propagation of motion caused by refraction.\(^7\)

What he is saying here is that, in opposition to Newton’s theory that white light has different parts, different wavelengths, that all combine to make the total “whiteness,” Hooke believes that the difference between that and the “blackness” of light is just a matter of intensity; the more light there is, the whiter it will appear, and the less there is, the blacker it will appear.

He also argued that color was no more than a perception in the human eye. When light is passed through a prism and refracted, he wrote, “a differing pulse is propagated” on all “parts of the ray,” and when the differing pulses hit the eye, they are interpreted as the red, violet, blue, etc.

that Newton reported on as being different rays of light in themselves. Hooke compared it to sound (a comparison that was often made in the 17\(^{th}\) and 18\(^{th}\) centuries), and specifically, a noise coming from an instrument, “the ray is like the string, strained between the luminous object and the eye, and the stop or fingers is like the refracting surface, on the one side of which the string hath no motion, on the other a vibrating one.” The different vibrations create different tones, which hit the ear and the brain perceives the difference between them as different sounds; this is exactly the principle that Hooke is trying to apply to the eye.\(^8\)

Newton did not take kindly to this at all, especially since elsewhere in the letter, Hooke had accused Newton of stealing his ideas, and so began a feud that would last between them until Hooke’s death in 1704 (it is no coincidence that Opticks was not published until this year; Newton held off on publishing it so Hooke would have no way to complain about it).\(^9\)

But, between 1672 and 1704, Newton had plenty of time with which to prove Hooke (who, as head of the Royal Society, became his main detractor and opposition) wrong and to prove his own thoughts and theses right.\(^10\)

His seminal text Opticks was a summary of all the experiments and trials and hypotheses that he had had since

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\(^8\) Ibid.


1672 on the field of optics. Of course, he had worked on other things as well in that time, most notably his *Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica*, but much of his time was devoted to optics. It has been said that though the *Principia* was more famous, *Opticks* was easier to read since it was printed in English, and thus it can be understood if the latter had a greater influence in general than former in the general understanding of science in the British Isles.\(^\text{11}\)

The text itself was split up into books and what he called “Queries,” which were statements that basically summarized his experiments and the conclusions that he reached in his book. But what were they, or, what were the most important conclusions he reached?

Arguably the most important question he asked in his queries came in the form of Query 29: “Are not the Rays of Light very small Bodies emitted from shining substances?”\(^\text{12}\) This one sentence has a much bigger impact than it suggests. First, and most shakingly, this suggests that light is an actual substance. It is implying that light has a mass, no matter how small it is, yet he says that they are weightless. And secondly, this is going directly against the wave theory that Huygens had proposed.

This became known as Newton’s corpuscular theory of light, taken from the fact that he, at one point, refers to the tiny bodies of light as “corpuscles.” And not only were they there, he argued, but there were corpuscles of different sizes that corresponded to the colors that those particular corpuscles produced. Wrote Newton himself,

> Nothing more is requisite for producing all the variety of Colours, and degrees of [refraction] than that the Rays of Light be Bodies of different Sizes, the least of which may take violet the weakest and darkest of the Colors, and be more easily diverted by refracting Surfaces from the [straight] Course; and the rest as they are bigger and bigger, may make the stronger and more lucid colours, blue, green, yellow, and red, and be more and more difficulty diverted.

This tells us that he considered the red light particles to be “larger” that those of the violet light, so therefore the red would be affected differently (specifically, less so) when a force is enacted upon the ray of light as a whole.\(^\text{13}\)

The rest of the book was devoted to optical issues like refraction and reflection, two aspects of light that supported Newton’s corpuscular theory. The latter concept is simple to understand: the light just bounces off the surface that it comes incident to at the same angle at which it approached and angle normal to the point of incidence. On refraction, however, Newton projected something different than what the scientific community accepts today, mostly because his own theory was wrong in the first place: “Every Ray of Light in its passage through any refracting Surface is put into a certain

\(^{11}\) Baierlein 33-4.
\(^{12}\) Ibid., 34.
\(^{13}\) Ibid., 40.
transient Constitution or State which in the progress of the Ray returns at equal Intervals, and disposes the Ray at every return to be easily transmitted through the next refracting Surface, and between the returns to be easily reflected by it.\textsuperscript{14}

Newton’s work was ultimately important because it provided one side of the wave-particle duality notion that we know of today. Since it would be wrong to paraphrase Albert Einstein in a formal paper and dilute the genius of his work, he wrote in his 1938 version of The Evolution of Physics that, “To keep the principal idea of Newton’s theory, we must assume that homogeneous light is composed of energy-grains and replace the old light corpuscles by light quanta, which we shall call photons, small portions of energy, traveling through empty space with the velocity of light. …Newton’s theory in this new form leads to the quantum theory of light.”\textsuperscript{15}

This quantum theory of light (which really is just the corpuscular theory at its very base—that light is composed of small packets—but modernized) supports the wave-particle duality in that it says exactly that light will behave as a particle. The fact that modern physics (as well as Einstein himself) endorsed it did wonders to reestablish the acceptance of this particular theory.

Jumping back through time, however, Newton’s respected and somewhat exalted status in the scientific community of the 18\textsuperscript{th} century meant that no one really appeared to doubt or challenge the results that he had come up with. Newton was untouchable, especially now that Hooke, his prime opposition, was dead. But slowly, towards the 19\textsuperscript{th} century, opposition began to rise up—to use a better term, not so much opposition to Newton, but more in support of Huygens and his wave theory of light.

In 1803, an English physicist who, of all people, had helped decode the Rosetta Stone four years earlier, came onto the scene. Though he was an admirer of Newton’s, Thomas Young had his own suspicions when it came to light that it was not actually (or not purely) a particle phenomenon, but it also had elements of Huygens’ wave theory. And, Young was able to prove that there is a definite wave property to light through his famous double-slit experiment.\textsuperscript{16}

Young was inspired by his knowledge of sound as a wave, which seems to pop up again and again in the 17\textsuperscript{th} and 18\textsuperscript{th} centuries, as mentioned before. He knew that if two equal but individual sound waves met, when the waves and their respective equations

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., 41.


were 180 degrees out of phase, there would be no noise heard at that point (a phenomenon called phase cancellation). This can be likened to dropping two stones simultaneously into a still body of water; where the peak of wave one meets with the trough of wave two, they will cancel each other out, so it would be like there was no wave there. So, the interference causing the phase cancellation in that scenario would be the same as if light was a wave. If light had wave-like properties, then where the waves were 180 degrees out of phase, there would be no light.\footnote{Or, in Young’s words: “When two Undulations…coincide with either perfectly or very nearly in Direction, their joint effect is a Combination of the Motions belonging to each.” Cited from The Trail of Light, page 94.}

The figure above shows the setup for his experiment.\footnote{Image retrieved from http://farside.ph.utexas.edu/teaching/316/lectures/img1495.png.} The light would enter from the right, split into two separate but equal waves through the narrow slits, travel through the distance \(L\), and dark and light bands will appear on the screen exactly 180 degrees away from each other.

And, that is exactly what Young found. In 1807, he wrote,

> The middle is always light, and the bright stripes on each side are at such distances, that the light coming to them from one of the apertures must have passed though a longer space than that which come from the other by an interval which is equal to the breadth of one, two, three, or more of the [wavelengths], while the intervening dark spaces correspond to a difference of half a [wavelength], of one and a half, of two and a half, or more.\footnote{Baierlein, 95.}

So, what he said here is that there was both constructive and destructive interference on the screen when he passed the light through the slits, meaning that light did, in fact, have a wave-like property. This was a loud voice of support for the work of Huygens more than a century beforehand.

But, when Young presented his findings to the Royal Society, the same Royal Society that had been led by Newton’s main opponent one hundred years earlier, he was derided for it. It was not accepted by the general scientific community until another physicist, this time a Frenchman by the name of Augustin Fresnel, came along twenty years and showed that light moves slower through a medium, whereas it was discovered that if Newton’s corpuscular theory were true, then light would have to, in fact, propagate faster through media that were thicker or denser than air.\footnote{Fitzpatrick.}

That was not the biggest change in the history of the theory of light in the nineteenth century, however. Other scientists came and found various things about light, but nothing that was too ground breaking as compared to Huygens, Newton, and Young/Fresnel. Most work, in fact, between 1820 and the latter part of the century concerned the new interests in electricity and magnetism. Although, some work would
actually contribute to advances in research involving light, and actually directly inspired the major figure in light in the late nineteenth century to make his particular findings.

In 1820, a physicist in Denmark named Hans Christian Øersted was searching for a connection between electricity and magnetism, thinking the two things to be related. It would turn out that he was right, and in an experiment he made during a lecture of his university physics class, proved that an electrical current can create a magnetic field by running an electric current through a copper wire set next to a compass (as seen in the diagram to the left); the needle of the compass was affected by the electrical current, and thus the conclusion was made.\textsuperscript{21}

More than ten years later, back in London, former-bookbinder-turned-physicist Michael Faraday was working on just the opposite of that.\textsuperscript{22} Seeing how Øersted’s electrical current could cause a magnetic field made Faraday wonder if the opposite was possible as well. The experiment he carried out was a relatively simple one involving only a magnet and a charged solenoid, a wire twisted into a tight tube (as seen in the diagram below)\textsuperscript{23}. When Faraday inserted the magnet into the solenoid, an electric current was detected. When it was placed in the solenoid, however, the electrical flow stopped. Taken out again, the magnet caused the flow of electricity again. Thus, it was determined by Faraday that only a changing magnetic field (which emanated from the magnetic bar in loops called “lines of force” from the magnetic north pole of the magnet to the south and which has different values at each point along each individual line of force) causes an electrical current.\textsuperscript{24}

From this work that Faraday contributed to the study of electricity came the inspiration for James Clerk Maxwell, and for a little longer, a sidetrip down the road of research in electricity and magnetism is necessary to advance further towards wave-particle duality and the twentieth century in the history

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\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{21} Baierlein, 114-6. Image retrieved from http://www.practicalphysics.org/imageLibrary/jpeg326/525.jpg.
\item \textsuperscript{22} Basil Mahon, The Man who Changed Everything: The Life of James Clerk Maxwell (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., 2003), 56-65.
\item \textsuperscript{23} Image retrieved from http://www.uvi.edu/Physics/SCI3xxWeb/Electrical/BfieldSolenoid.gif.
\item \textsuperscript{24} Baierlein, 116-8.
\end{itemize}
of light. Maxwell, the Edinburgh-born physicist, was searching for a unification theory, one that would tie together electricity and magnetism. He had seen that the two were related from both the experiments by Øersted and by Faraday, but he wanted to know if the two could be joined together.

In his search for 19th-century unification theory, Maxwell needed a good imagination and an even better ability to see hypothetical models in his head. He decided on using a model that consisted of tiny, spherical cells, thinking that the molecules in a medium were similar to that of these cells. What he wanted to do was to induce an electrical current through these cells, and he hypothesized that the magnetic field created by the electricity would cause these cells to spin, which would, in turn, cause adjacent cells to spin, and so forth, creating propagation through the field of the cells. The way the cells spun, too, he hypothesized, would dictate exactly what sort of magnetic alignment they would have. If a cell spun one way, it would be magnetically aligned with magnetic north; if it spun the opposite way, it would, of course, point towards the opposite pole.

When he was actually doing the experiment, his predictions were correct. He also found that the cells themselves would store energy. Whenever he would turn off the electrical current that ran through the cell medium, the cells would continue to spin until the energy they contained ran out.

He also found something amazing that would lead directly to the discovery he is most known for in today’s world. Maxwell noticed that when an electrical current was induced into the cells, they would distort, meaning that particles moved in the cells towards one of the plates that was being used as a conductor of the electrical current. So, because these particles have moved, then that indicates that there is a charge on the plates now, one now with an excess of particles and the other with a lack of particles; by definition, as we know now, the latter would be positively charged and the former would be negatively charged. The cells would then be ready to spring back to what they had been before when the electromotive force becomes balanced again; said Maxwell, an “effect of electromotive force, namely, electric displacement, which according to our theory is a kind of elastic yielding to the action of force, similar to that which takes place in structures and machines owing to the want of perfect rigidity of the connexions [sic].”

The speed of the movement was remarkably fast. In calculating the velocity of the cells, he found them to be moving at an in accurate rate, but close to 300,000,000 meters per second, or $3 \times 10^8$ m/s (which is how measurements like this will be, when necessary, referred to from here on for the sake of ease).

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25 Mahon 4.
26 Ibid., 95-102.
27 Ibid., 96.
29 Robert D. Purrington, Physics in the Nineteenth Century (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1997), 69; Mahon 122.
Maxwell suspected that this was close to the actual speed of light, which at the time was being actively measured by several different scientists in Europe. One German duo clocked the speed of light at $3.1074 \times 10^8$ m/s. A French group found it to be about $3.1485 \times 10^8$ m/s. So Maxwell knew that he was close, and he knew he had stumbled onto something big.\(^{30}\)

There were three strong reasons that Maxwell first got the idea that electromagnetism and light were related like this. First, he knew that the electromagnetic waves were causing velocities of this speed because he “only made of use of light…to see the instruments,” so there was no light involved in the experiment, so something else must have been moving so fast in the experiment.\(^{31}\) Secondly, the way the particles were moving in the medium was resulting in transverse waves, as opposed to longitudinal waves (also known as compression waves), which was the same type of wave that light was, which had been known previously and inferred from Young’s double-slit experiments.\(^{32}\) And, finally, of course, there was the speed of the movement. Nothing had ever really been timed as moving that fast before, so it could not have been much of a mere coincidence. The speed was too close to the recordings of the speed of light to not be significantly associated somehow.\(^{33}\)

Maxwell had much to write about this. On the velocity issue, he wrote, “This velocity is so nearly that of light that it seems we have strong reason to conclude that light itself (including radiant heat and other radiations, if any) is an electromagnetic disturbance in the form of waves propagated through the electromagnetic field according to electromagnetic laws.”\(^{34}\) So even Maxwell had his questions with just one piece of evidence, but the other facts almost certainly cemented his suspicions. On the wave evidence, Maxwell wrote that the wave theory of light “requires us to admit this kind of elasticity in the luminiferous medium, in order to account for transverse vibrations…we need not then be surprised if the magneto-electric medium possesses the same property…we can scarcely avoid the inference that light consists in the transverse undulation of the same medium which is the cause of electric and magnetic phenomena.” And, ultimately, “The agreement of the results seems to show that light and magnetism are affections of the same substance, and that light is an electromagnetic disturbance propagated through the field direction of movement; longitudinal/compression waves are like sound waves or a Slinky, that is, physical movement along the direction of movement; Mahon 107.\(^{33}\) Baierlein, 122.\(^{34}\) Ibid.
according to electromagnetic laws.” 35 It is in this statement, this relatively simple statement, that Maxwell is saying that not only are electricity and magnetism the same thing, but that they are the elements of light. Light as an electromagnetic wave (see above picture for an example) was born.36

Maxwell published his findings at the end of his paper regarding Faraday’s work, “On the Lines of Force.” In 1865, however, he published them again as a paper unto themselves called “A Dynamical Theory of the Electromagnetic Field.” In this paper, Maxwell reports all of his findings on electricity and magnetism from this experiment, along with further revelations that moving electromagnetic waves have a moving electromagnetic field and included in Part III of the paper what became known as Maxwell’s Equations: equations of electrical displacements, magnetic force, electric current, electromotive force, electric elasticity, electric resistance, free electricity, and of continuity. These were read to the Royal Society before they were published in December 1864.37

The reaction was favorable. In the span of several years after that, he left his position in London and was hesitant to accept the position of head chair of experimental physics at the University of Cambridge. He taught, did his research, and edited the works of Henry Cavendish, a former professor at the university. He did, however, get complaints and disagreements from other scientists on his views on the theory of æther, which he supports. The most notable opposition he saw from this was from William Thomson, who said that he “can not see” where he could prove this “inconceivable” and “misty” æther.38

Maxwell responded to this thinking he was correct, but as we know today, he was not: “I have now got materials for calculating the velocity of transmission of a magnetic disturbance through air founded on experimental evidence without any hypothesis about the structure of the medium or any mechanical explanation of electricity or magnetism.”39 Aside from that, though, there was nothing wrong with Maxwell’s electromagnetic theory of light. And, Maxwell’s theory helped lead directly to the discovery of the photon and the photoelectric effect, and ultimately the concept of wave-particle duality, wherein light exhibits qualities of both waves and particles; the wave portion of the theory is supported by the work of Maxwell, Huygens, and Young, whereas the particle theory (the correct portions of it) is supported by the work of Newton and later on in the twentieth century by Einstein. Einstein actually used the basis of the photon (now that it was discovered) to help win his Nobel Prize for Physics in 1905.40

Ultimately, the idea of light evolved much the way Darwin’s theory

35 Maxwell, 86.
36 Purrington, 68-9; image retrieved from http://www.mtholyoke.edu/~mlyount/MySites/Pictures/e_mag.JPG.
37 Purrington, 69.
of evolution said animals would. The basic concepts were correct since Huygens and Newton, that light is a wave and a particle, respectively. The details they may have gotten wrong, but that is what the rest of the following centuries were there for: to provide more scientists to iron out the kinks, to improve on the theory until it became perfect. The only difference, however, is that unlike Darwin, this theory of light has to have a teleological end.

Bibliography
Introduction

After the fall of the Soviet Union, Russian society plunged into chaos. Familiar institutions were disbanded and leaders were removed from office. While the end of the Soviet Union brought much joy in both Russia and the West, the prevailing feeling in Russia was trepidation and fear. How would a once mighty superpower reclaim its position at the top of the world?

Boris Yeltsin, the pro-Western leader elected in June 1991, was the person the Russian people trusted to lead them into the uncertain future. He
relied on the West, specifically the United States, to give him advice on how to reinvigorate a country that had never been democratic and was in economic shambles. George H.W. Bush, an ally of Gorbachev, was hesitant to advise Yeltsin; for so long, the United States and the Soviet Union were enemies. But now, the evil empire had fallen and the Russian economy and society needed reforming. The advisors that Yeltsin turned to advocated “shock therapy,” whereby Russia would try to transform to a market economy and a full democracy as quickly as possible. When Bush’s successor, Bill Clinton, came into office, he advocated much more of a liberal, Kantian policy as opposed to the realist policies of his predecessor. Clinton was able to secure aid packages from Congress and, using his personal relationship with Yeltsin, helped him improve the Russian economy. The early policies that Clinton advocated had mixed results, and during Yeltsin’s re-election campaign, Yeltsin almost lost to the Communist challenger.

After Yeltsin secured a second term, the Russian economy started to spiral out of control. Inflation was at an all-time high, the Russian people were disenchanted with their leadership, and the economy tanked in 1998. The Russian people partially blamed Yeltsin for this collapse, but they also blamed the United States’ overly aggressive economic policies, based on democratic principles and institutions, for their problems. Even though Clinton’s policies were well-intentioned, the Russian people were dissatisfied, and this led to wide-spread disenchantment with the Western world, specifically the United States. This disenchantment manifested itself by a retreat from democratic progress; instead, the Russian people favored economic growth over democratic governance. This prevailing belief was responsible for Yeltsin’s single-digit approval ratings, his subsequent resignation and apology to the Russian people, and the rise of Vladimir Putin. I would argue that the lackluster U.S. policies of democracy promotion contributed to this disenchantment and was ultimately a large factor in the Russian people’s indifference towards Western-style democracy.

**Defining Reform: The Blitzkrieg and Fabian Approaches**

The primary framework of analysis that this paper will be using is Samuel Huntington’s theory of reform as expressed in his 1968 work, *Political Order in Changing Societies*. Russian governance has been at times conservative, reforming, and revolutionary. After the fall of communism, Russia was receiving much aid from the United States, and one must evaluate the positions that the United States recommended and Russia’s reaction. What this paper seeks to provide is a framework for evaluating the success of these reforms and what impact they had on Russian society.

When political analysts define types of change in governance, they usually place countries under one of three criteria: revolution, conservatism, and reform. Revolution is defined as a rapid, complete, and sometimes violent change. This change is almost always
complete in nature, as it fundamentally changes the social, political, and economic norms that the population had been following previously. Russia has experienced multiple revolutions: one in 1905, two in 1917, and one in 1991. The revolutions of the early 20th century changed Russia from a capitalist monarchy to a communist authoritarian regime almost overnight. The consequences of these sudden changes were catastrophic for the Russian people; there was a civil war between the Reds (the Communists) and the Whites (the Monarchists) which left people displaced and demoralized. This change was so sudden that violence resulted and changed people’s beliefs on authority and governance. Subsequently, these people were disenchanted with a system that they neither asked for nor understood. Revolution is almost always violent and turbulent for the people - it is not the preferred action for change.

Reform is a more moderate form of revolution because the changes are more limited in scope and moderate in speed. While reformers do wish to alter the status quo (as opposed to conservatives, who do not seek change), they realize that the only way to produce sustainable change is through gradual reform of the system. Primarily, they are focused on weakening the power of the privileged while simultaneously elevating the repressed, which expands the political equality of the system. As opposed to revolutionaries, reformers have the political skill to change a system without resorting to upending previously held shared norms. Reformers must successfully balance political equality and socioeconomic change with legitimacy and without violence.

All reform has the potential for violence, but good reforms often minimize the upheaval of disparate social forces. There are two different types of reform: Blitzkrieg reform and Fabian reform. Both of these types of reforms have produced successful results in the developing world, but the task of this paper is to show that these reforms have been beneficial for a collapsed world superpower.

Blitzkrieg reform is the quicker reform of the two. Blitzkrieg reformers create large early goals that are laid out publicly in an effort to achieve as many of these goals as possible in a limited time frame. Achieving these goals requires much bargaining on both sides, but in order for Blitzkrieg reform to work, both bargaining parties must be relatively stable. If the reforming party is losing influence or importance, then the impetus for change is no longer there. If the opponents lose influence or importance, reckless change (similar to revolution) can be imposed by the reformers without any checks on the reforming power. The danger with Blitzkrieg reform is often similar to the dangers of revolution. If the reform is perceived to be too expansive, opposition will form quickly because of the polarization of the new plan. This opposition can oftentimes be insurmountable, and Blitzkrieg reformers sometimes are unable to come to agreement on any of the goals that they originally outlined.

Fabian reform is a more gradual type of reform where goals are concealed and separated in order to make reform
more manageable. While this tactic might be labeled as anti-democratic, this type of reform is ultimately less jarring than either revolution or Blitzkrieg reform. Fabian reform allows for a gradual change in cultural beliefs about governance, which makes future beneficial reforms possible. Without the quickness and surprise of Blitzkrieg reform, opposition groups are less likely to form, since more apathetic groups, who do not see a pressing reason for reaction, will not form alliances. Fabian reform can be used in all systems of governance, but the best outcomes occur with a strong, centralized power, which has historically been more able to consolidate reform.

However, even though reform, whether Blitzkrieg or Fabian, is often perceived as good for the development of social and civic society, questions often arise over whether reform is a substitute for revolution or can actually become a catalyst for it. Examples of both are prevalent in Russian history; the Russian revolutions of 1917 followed periods of Czarist reform, but the emancipation of the serfs in 1861, an extremely significant reform for Russia, led to decades of relative stability.

When is reform a substitute and when is a catalyst? One must analyze the opponents of reform in order to predict its outcome. In the case of 1905-1917, Czar Nicholas II enacted reforms in response to opposition demands, which only emboldened the opposition to demand additional reform. In the eyes of the opposition, the reforms delegitimized the government because they were a reaction as opposed to preemption. This emboldened the revolutionary elements of Russian society enough to make the case for full revolution in 1917. In contrast to the Revolution, Alexander II’s emancipation of the serfs led to prosperity simply because it was a preemptive solution to a great societal problem. The opposition to serfdom (mainly the serfs themselves) had no political power, so their opposition to their own slavery was unable to enter the public discourse. This reform was made quickly and with little notice, guaranteeing that the landowners could not mobilize to oppose it.

Reform can be advanced by government in many different ways, but all reforms have consequences for both the government and greater society. In order for a government to advance its reforms without provoking revolution, the proper type of reform must be chosen, based on the context of the situation.

**The Fall of the Soviet Union and the U.S. Reaction**

When George H.W. Bush took the oath of office in January 1989, his administration was distrustful of Mikhail Gorbachev, the leader of the Soviet Union, and Gorbachev’s intentions for the USSR. However, by year-end 1989, the administration was endeared to Gorbachev because of his unequivocal support for free elections in Eastern Europe and the reunification of Germany. Consequently, the Bush administration felt it could not undermine the leader who was helping

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them fulfill U.S. national security objectives, namely liberalizing a dilapidated and stagnating Soviet regime. In contrast, Boris Yeltsin, the challenger to Gorbachev’s power, was viewed as an untrustworthy, drunken idiot by many senior administration officials. However, for all his flaws, he was in favor of complete neo-liberal market capitalism as well as creating stronger political and economic ties with the United States. Beginning in the fall of 1990, Yeltsin and the pro-liberalism group Democratic Russia challenged Soviet sovereign authority over Russia.

After Yeltsin’s call for Russian sovereignty, the Bush administration was in a predicament. Under the status quo in the international system, states must recognize other states’ right to exist. Under Yeltsin’s plan, Russia would secede from the Soviet Union and become a democratic state. This secession movement was unlike a rebellion or decolonization; it was a political takeover from the inside. However, unlike traditional secessionist movements, Yeltsin intended to become closer to the international community rather than pull away from it.

Even though Yeltsin was in support of a Western capitalist Russia, the Bush administration made the decision to continue to support Gorbachev up until the August 19, 1991 coup against him. The coup, known as the Vodka Putsch, was headed by eight top Soviet officials, who formed a State Committee for the State of Emergency, which claimed that while Gorbachev was ill, they would govern the country. Gorbachev was not ill; rather, he was vacationing at his dacha when his phone lines were cut, rendering him unable to govern. Yeltsin took advantage of this situation by denouncing the coup and vowing to put up a resistance. Rather than listening to the decrees of the State of Emergency Committee, he organized an emergency session of the Russian Supreme Soviet to ratify his decrees instead of the Emergency Committee’s decrees. He set up a situation of dual sovereignty. Yeltsin’s decision to unilaterally create policy was the trademark of his style of reform-individual-driven rather than institutionally-driven.

The Bush administration was hesitant to support either side. If they supported the Emergency Committee, they would legitimize a coup against a sovereign leader of another country. If they supported Yeltsin, they would be supporting a nascent, potentially democratic government that had broken away from the Soviet regime. They ultimately chose the latter, to support Yeltsin, although he was still considered untrustworthy, would at worst continue the Soviet Union, at best bring down the

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2 Dimitri Simes, “Reform Reaffirmed,” Foreign Policy, No. 90, (Spring, 1993), 46.
entire Soviet apparatus. Bush viewed Yeltsin as the tentative new freely elected leader of the Russian Republic, but also supported the restoration of Gorbachev as the constitutionally chosen head of state. After three days, the coup disbanded, and Gorbachev returned to the Kremlin.

Although Gorbachev returned to Moscow as the leader of the Soviet Union, it was Boris Yeltsin who actually controlled the government. The August 1991 coup was the last hurrah for a system that had run its course; by December, other republics besides Russia were holding referenda on whether to become independent. After both the Ukraine and Belarus voted for independence, Yeltsin declared an end to the Soviet Union. However, he still technically controlled very little of Russia, including the borders, the army, or the currency. Fractures in the Russian state started to manifest themselves; with no constitutional separation of powers, regional governments used the Soviet collapse to consolidate their own power. In addition, the crumbling institutions of the Soviet Union were weak and ineffective, and since they would be transforming to a market economy and a democracy, had to be overhauled significantly. The economy was in shambles; the budget deficit stood at 20% of GDP, there were no goods on store shelves, and all production of new goods had halted. Worse still, winter was approaching, and many experts predicted mass starvation throughout the former Soviet Union. This expected starvation was the most pressing issue for the new government, as people would rise up if they were unable to survive. Reform was necessary, but free-market, democratic Russian institutions were still so nascent that they could not provide any vehicle for change.

Although Yeltsin adopted a radically pro-Western foreign policy, the Bush administration was unwilling to intervene in the domestic affairs of Russia. This was mostly because of Bush’s philosophical underpinnings. Rather than explicitly help build democracy in Russia, Bush was content to cheer privately as the Russians moved towards democratization on their own. However, since Russia’s initial and all-consuming priority was to revitalize the economy in order to prevent mass starvation and revolt, there was little that any governmental or nongovernmental actor could do at that time to build interest in the further development of democracy.

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9 McFaul, World Politics, 227.
Shock Therapy Reform and Opposition

When Yeltsin became the sole head of state, Russia was in shambles. Yeltsin believed that in order to reinvigorate Russia, economic reform was needed first. To accomplish this goal, as Yeltsin described in an October 2003 interview with the Moscow News: “What was needed was a kamikaze crew that would step into the line of fire and forge ahead, however strong the general discontent might be. ... I had to pick a team that would go up in flames but remain in history.”

To press ahead with reforms, he appointed Yegor Gaidar as deputy prime minister for economic reform. On October 28th, 1991, in a speech reputedly written by Gaidar, Yeltsin declared that “the period of progress by small steps is over… a large-scale reformist breakthrough is needed.” After this speech, Gaidar assembled a team of radicals who supported sweeping reforms to the economic system. Gaidar was primarily concerned with creating a market economy through a comprehensive economic package which liberalized prices and trade, controlled government spending, and slowed down the printing of money. This “comprehensive reform package” was introduced on January 2nd, 1992. Gaidar, a Blitzkrieg reformer, was determined to quickly achieve as many goals as possible, and many ministers were only given a few months to achieve success. By his own admission, Gaidar believed that fanaticism (i.e. radical reform) was necessary to make irreversible the transition to a market economy. His methods of promoting his policies reflected his fanaticism; Gaidar suggested in December that the head of the central bank should resign, which angered many of the people he depended upon to push for economic reforms. While he was respected in the West, he continued to make blunders in the newly-formed Russian government by moving too quickly and refusing to negotiate.

Consequently, opponents to Yeltsin’s policies formed rapidly, with one side favoring a return to Communism and others criticizing him for his haste and precociousness. To marginalize the opposition, Yeltsin temporarily disbanded the Communist Party;

15 Michael Burawoy, “Review: The Soviet Descent Into Capitalism,” *The American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 102, No. 5, (Mar., 1997), 1433. For the U.S. opinion on making these reforms irreversible, see Strobe Talbott’s memo entitled *US must lead strategic alliance with post-Soviet reform*, US Dept. of State 4: 17, April 26, 1993. There, he argues that there are no alternatives to the policy that if the U.S. increases its stake in Russian reform, such progress would be made that the reforms would be irreversible.
however, this meant that there were now no political parties that could effectively represent any social base for political rule during transition. His brash demeanor and overemphasis on quick liberalization was questioned by many conservatives and revolutionaries alike. One side of the opposition did not matter; the Yeltsin team deliberately avoided negotiating with Communist sympathizing legislators in the Congress. Willingness to compromise in political negotiations, while essential to creating strong democratic norms, has historically been perceived as weakness in Russia, particularly in the times immediately following the fall of the Soviet Union. The blitzkrieg reform strategy, although confrontational, left the remnants of the Communist Party on the defensive. They were unable to create an updated ideology and alternative choice for the Russian people.

This disagreement over economic reform created a constitutional crisis—who was really in charge of Russia? Yeltsin and his advisors, in the haste of creating economic stability, chose not to institute fundamental political reforms, instead relying on Yeltsin’s personal charisma and authority to push through the reforms quickly. Communist sympathizers and other factions formed an alliance against Yeltsin. Polarization quickly occurred due to the scope and speed of the complex changes proposed for Russia. During the period of 1991 and 1993, no consensus was reached between the Yeltsin administration and the Duma on any issue, let alone economic reform. Forgoing negotiations, this only reinforced the legislative side and the executive side’s hatred of each other. Moreover, both sides believed that the military would back them. The power balance was relatively equal; however, Yeltsin actually had the military behind the executive side. The White House (the Duma’s parliament house) was shelled in October 1993, killing a few parliament members, and the Duma was forced to acquiesce to Yeltsin’s proposed method for reform.

To the Russian people, these reforms were happening so quickly that most people did not believe that ordinary Russians would be able to survive. For most Russians, living standards had decreased dramatically from the days of the Soviet Union. This decline in living standards forced many Russians to sell their valuables and possessions to survive. Taking advantage of relaxed standards on market capitalism, Russians overflowed the streets and sidewalks, selling everything in impromptu retail bazaars. They were

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18 Tom Bjorkman, Russia’s Road to Deeper Democracy (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), 41.
19 Desai, 90.
20 McFaul, World Politics, 226. Gaidar’s personal perspective on the situation was that Yeltsin’s authority would be able to counteract any challenges to the economic agenda being proposed. Since Yeltsin’s authority rested on the continued success of presidential decrees, parliamentary power had to be restricted to maintain continuity in governance. See Desai, 95.
21 Goldgeier and McFaul, 122.
23 Simes, 39.
selling everything because of the volatility of the reforming system.\textsuperscript{24} The freeing of prices caused the price of essential goods to rise dramatically, which depleted people’s savings. Although the bread lines that were mainstays of the Soviet regime disappeared, this was because bread prices were climbing higher than wages. Price liberalization and the resulting inflation also affected business balance sheets, forcing businesses to withhold paychecks from workers.\textsuperscript{25} All of these problems fueled public discontent with the government, particularly the Gaidar reformers. Buoyed by Yeltsin’s personal popularity and Western ideological support, Gaidar was able to work on these reforms without fear of political backlash from the Russian citizens. Even though he had the West’s political backing, Gaidar sought to implement these shock therapy reforms without financial aid from the West, consistent with George H.W. Bush’s reluctance to provide aid without necessary political reforms.\textsuperscript{26} Although Gaidar did not ask for aid from the West, he did require advice in order to achieve the largest economic transformation ever attempted.\textsuperscript{27} This advice was necessary for two reasons. First, Gaidar was not as familiar with Western-style capitalism, as he received a doctorate in economics from a Soviet university, which taught communist, command-oriented economics. He, like many other Russian reformers, was trying to reform the country with only a limited knowledge of the goals he was actually trying to achieve.\textsuperscript{28} Consequently, he relied on many abstract theories that had not been proven in any state, let alone a reforming superpower. However, he also needed the advice so that he would achieve both domestic and international legitimacy. Without international legitimacy, Gaidar would not secure outside financial aid or continued international political support for Russia; without domestic support, he would need a new job.\textsuperscript{29}

However, the advice Gaidar had been receiving from esteemed economists such as Jeffrey Sachs focused too much on the microeconomic side of developing a capitalist market, as opposed to developing laws pertaining to private property, contracts, and rules of competitive markets. The failure to enforce these types of basic laws spelled greater disaster for the Russian economy. The Yeltsin economic reform team had neglected the institutional underpinnings of the Soviet command economy that needed to be transformed if the country were to become a market economy. As a result, Gaidar and the reformers ended up enacting bold market-oriented and democratic reforms (which are risky even in a Western, liberal capitalist system) in the decayed infrastructure of the Soviet system.\textsuperscript{30} These reforms only perpetuated the rapid income inequality between the Russian oligarchs and normal citizens. The consequences of Gaidar’s reforms allowed oligarchs such as Boris Berezovsky, Roman Abramovich, and Mikhail Khodorovsky to amass their fortunes at the expense of

\textsuperscript{24} Goldman, 88.
\textsuperscript{25} Desai, 96.
\textsuperscript{26} Goldgeier and McFaul, 66.
\textsuperscript{27} Goldgeier and McFaul, 67.
\textsuperscript{28} Desai, 94.
\textsuperscript{29} Goldgeier and McFaul, 67.
\textsuperscript{30} Desai, 91.
average citizens who were unable to hold on to their land. Although Yeltsin’s government would try to create universal laws that protected citizens later on, the lack of rules initially allowed these oligarchs and the Russian Mafia to consolidate power through corrupt means.

Gaidar and his team did not take into account the political context of reforms. They mistakenly believed that citizens would adapt readily to issued decrees that were intended to change people’s consciences, work ethics, and the way they conduct business. Moreover, Gaidar’s people were indifferent and unconcerned with what the people wanted. Gaidar and his team were appointed, and they could not be voted out of office. However, Gaidar responded that he understood that “these reforms carried a huge social risk, just as I realized that absence of reform meant not risk but inevitable defeat.” This risk manifested itself by mid-1992, when the Yeltsin government lost control over the economy. The only saving grace for Yeltsin was the continued external support from Western nations and the Russian population’s confidence in Yeltsin personally. The government itself did not enjoy the same confidence - perceived failure in reform left the Russian population bewildered as to what went wrong.

After these new problems started to arise, Yeltsin diluted Gaidar’s power by appointing three new prime ministers. These new ministers, instead of backing Gaidar’s reforms, attempted a more mixed plan of reform. They advocated postponing liberalization of oil and gas prices, renewing state subsidies, and conceding to enterprise directors on the government’s privatization program. This program had disastrous effects for the economy. Because the government did not have the money to continue subsidizing the large, formerly state-owned industries that were buoying the Russian economy, inflation rose to astronomical levels. As a result, Yeltsin appointed a new Central Bank Director, Viktor Gerashchenko, who advocated printing more money and giving businesses Russian government credits that they could use to continue operating. This policy was even more disastrous, but Gaidar had no power to continue pushing for “shock therapy” reforms. He was ousted in late 1992 by Yeltsin, who sought to have a more pragmatic solution to the current economic crisis.

Yegor Gaidar’s reforms were classic Blitzkrieg strategy, as he set early and overwhelmingly optimistic goals for Russia. He failed because his approach was inconsistent in the context of Russia’s situation at the time. More specifically, Gaidar asked for too much from a government that was barely a year old. His reforms were predicated on the government being able to help change the market system into a more capitalistic one, with supportive financial institutions and each citizen acting in their own economic self-interest. This did not occur. Russian

31 Desai, 90.
33 Gill and Markwick, 140.
34 Goldgeier and McFaul, 87.
35 Goldgeier and McFaul, 88.
citizens continued to be more comfortable acting as cogs in the command economy machine, rather than being able to act independently in pursuing their economic best interests. The increasingly dire economic situation allowed Gaidar’s domestic opponents to consolidate into an alliance that was able to convince Yeltsin that a more pragmatic approach was necessary. However, many Russian liberals still believed that Gaidar was the last chance for Russian market liberalization. After his ousting, there was no more impetus for rapid, shock reform by the Yeltsin government. The Russian economy would have to modernize and liberalize more slowly and pragmatically.

**Bush Administration Support for Shock Therapy**

During Gaidar’s tenure as finance minister, the Bush administration was reluctant to engage with Yeltsin’s new finance minister. The Bush administration still had ties to the Gorbachev government, and consequently, was shut out from all of the reforms that Gaidar was promoting. The U.S.’s primary concern was that Russia would not cancel its debt to the U.S., as had happened in the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution. The United States threatened to halt all grain shipments to the country if Russia cancelled their debt, which would have starved millions of people. Since Gaidar and Yeltsin were unwilling to risk the political legitimacy given to them by the West, they chose to not cancel the debt. Crediting the decision made by the reformers, the Bush administration was prepared to offer limited economic assistance to Russia. However, Bush’s own political capital was stifled by his perceived weaknesses in managing the U.S. economy, so initially only $1.5 billion in food aid was given to Russia.

In addition to his weak poll numbers, Bush had yet to create a framework for economic assistance to Russia, which severely hindered the potential for more aid to be distributed. This lack of a framework for assistance resulted from Bush’s desire for international political stability. In an election year, Bill Clinton seized upon this failure on Bush’s part; he argued that Bush had shown a lack of political judgment by supporting Gorbachev. Moreover, Clinton argued that the Republicans had betrayed core American values by favoring an unelected leader over an elected one. Strobe Talbott, Clinton’s Deputy Secretary of State, echoed these sentiments, stating that

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37 Keith Bradsher, *U.S. Planning $1.5 Billion in Food Aid to Soviet Peoples Through Moscow*, New York Times, November 21, 1991. This aid was supposedly to be given to the other USSR republics, but Moscow for the most part used the aid to help Russia directly. For another article on where the food aid was supposed to be appropriated to, read John Yang, *U.S. to Give Soviets New Food Aid; $1.5 Billion Package Will Go to Republics*, Washington Post, November 19, 1991.

38 Clinton delivered a speech to the Los Angeles World Affairs Council on August 13, 1992, where he argued that President Bush was “oddly reluctant to commit America’s prestige on the side of the people inspired by American precepts and example. When democratic reformers sought to break up the Soviet empire, Mr. Bush snubbed Mr. Yeltsin.”
Bush’s position implied that change, even if “fueled by the yearning for democracy,” could be dangerous if it threatened stability. Clinton’s team was able to portray Bush and his administration as inexperienced foreign policy analysts, eroding a perceived Bush strength, This, coupled with Bush’s perceived bungling of a weak economy (it’s the economy, stupid) and his broken promise to not raise taxes (read my lips, no new taxes) lost Bush the election.

Throughout the campaign, Bill Clinton continually highlighted Bush’s failure towards Russia, but the Bush administration did not respond by trying to communicate with the Yeltsin regime. The Bush administration left office without approving any more aid packages for Russia. However, the question remains whether Russia would have been more stable had the Bush administration provided more aid. Bush had made the decision not to intervene in Russian affairs, and as a result, Russia was undergoing a rapid transformation with no support from the country that was best prepared to help them.

The Clinton Presidency and Improved Relations with Boris Yeltsin

Bill Clinton came into office on January 1993, after Yegor Gaidar’s term as finance minister came to a close. In contrast to President Bush, President Clinton believed that the United States could be a valuable ally and resource to Russia during its period of transformation. The shift from Bush’s hands-off approach to Clinton’s activist approach was startling; since Clinton believed that a Kantian system would make the world safer, he advocated as much democratic reform as possible. In his mind, the United States had a vested interest in promoting democracy everywhere. Unlike Bush, who continued to support Gorbachev as long as was politically possible; Clinton forged a close relationship with Yeltsin that he would use to advocate particular types of security and political relationships between the two countries.

Clinton’s excitement over the possibility for reform could be gathered from his early speeches on Russia. He argued that Russia’s democratic transformation, in addition to providing many Russians with a voice for change, would also bind them to the United States in a potential security relationship. While securing loose nuclear weapons was still a priority for both nations, Clinton believed that the United States and Russia would be able to form a security partnership based on their strength of democracies. Clinton’s argument had practical benefits for the United States as well. If Russia were an ally as opposed to an enemy, the United States would be able to divert money from military spending to help improve


41 George A. MacLean, *Clinton’s Foreign Policy in Russia: From Deterrence And Isolation to Democratization And Engagement* (London: Ashland, 2006), 17.
the American economy. While this plan would help the U.S. tremendously, Russia was still in the midst of economic reforms, with few political reforms having been passed so far. President Clinton’s military spending reduction goals would have to wait until Russia developed further.

In order to facilitate Russia’s transition to democracy, President Clinton embarked on a policy of “trying to create an environment that was conducive for Russia finally making it.” If Russia did not transition into a democracy, it would become another national security threat. In order to counter this possibility, Clinton started providing more financial aid to Russia, starting with a $704 million aid package in April 1993. Later, Clinton was able to secure a $2.5 billion aid package from the G7 in July 1993. In addition to providing monetary aid, Clinton also proposed programs that would transform Russian political, social, and economic life drastically. In virtually every segment of Russia, the United States would help build institutions to help the regime stabilize. Although Clinton was firmly in support of helping Russia, polls showed that 80% of Americans opposed increasing aid to Russia, while 34% supported cutting aid to the reforming nation. These polls ultimately meant little; while Clinton’s strategic alliance with Russia was not popular with U.S. citizens, it was received favorably by the new reformers that Yeltsin had appointed. Clinton, as opposed to Bush, always tried to help those government officials who were associated with reform. In the particularly turbulent political period of 1993, the only person that Clinton believed would stay in power was Yeltsin himself. Therefore, the United States used continued pledges of aid to keep Yeltsin in power and on their side.

This U.S. policy of supporting only President Yeltsin was unpopular with other Russian government officials, particularly those who were in the Congress of People’s Deputies, who continued to block Yeltsin’s reforms. Russian officials, including the speaker of the Congress, Ruslan Khasbulatov, warned the United States to stop meddling with internal policies, but opposition leaders were loathe to negotiate with Yeltsin, especially considering Yeltsin was propped up by

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42 Warren Christopher made a speech entitled Securing U.S. interests while supporting Russian reform (U.S. Dept of State 4: 13, March 29, 2003) where he outlines the potential security relationship with the new Russian regime, as well as the possibility that the U.S. could lower its own military budget commitments if Russia is more stable.

43 Yegor Gaidar interview, St. Petersburg Ekho, January 13, 1993. This was one of the first interviews that Gaidar gave after his firing by Yeltsin. He states that reforms are moving slower, and might ground to a halt if intervention does not happen soon.

44 Goldgeier and McFaul, 91.

45 Cox, 643.

46 Alan Freeman, G7 expected to announce Russia privatization program $3-billion initiative largely appears to be redirection of aid, Globe and Mail, July 9, 1993.

47 Goldgeier and McFaul, 92.


the United States. In addition to supporting Yeltsin, the Clinton administration also supported Anatoly Chubais, the first deputy prime minister, who was an early supporter of U.S.-based economic advice. By supporting both Yeltsin and Chubais, the Clinton administration was hedging their bets that these individuals would always prevail in political contests. However, because reforms were taking place under a system of government that was divided in power, the U.S. strategy would not prove effective because of the turbulence of the Russian political process.

During the period of time of 1993 to 1996, Yeltsin and Chubais were taking advice from the United States, but instead of slowing down reforms as the United States suggested, they continued to institute reforms quickly. Much opposition to Yeltsin’s plan at this point was incited not by the quickness or completeness of the reforms, but rather the connection with the United States and the perceived meddling in Russian affairs by the Clinton administration.

There was never any doubt that Clinton would support the reformers: having a democratic Russia was in the United States’ national interest. However, it was difficult for the U.S. to support the Russian reformers because of the turnover in the main decision-making Kremlin institutions. Gaidar was removed from power in late 1992, but returned briefly in the fall of 1993 as minister of the economy, only to resign a few months later. Other officials who were pro-American would also be removed after only short terms in office. This left the Clinton administration in a conundrum; either they could support politicians who were more dubious reformers but had staying power, or continue to support the unpopular reformers. Consequently, they tried to be activists in Russian affairs, but with a clear focus on economic issues. Even then, Clinton continued to fail to support economic institutions that would help combat corruption, which alienated many Kremlin officials and Russians. This overt U.S. activism led many Russians to believe that Yeltsin was simply a stooge for the United States, only lowering his popularity among Russian citizens.

U.S. activism and the Clinton administration’s realization that the primacy of economics was hindering political reform resulted in a new U.S. plan for improving all sectors of Russian life. This plan, the Summers-Lipton Plan, continued to promote economic liberalization, but with the new idea that a developing middle class would be able to pave the way for further democratization.

Russia’s own economic reform was arguably from a bottom-up approach rather than a top-down

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52 Goldgeier and McFaul, 112. This belief that the middle class is needed to support democracy was thrown around in Clinton policy meetings. The idea has been around for centuries, with the founding fathers even debating as to how the U.S. government should promote a strong middle class. However, the preconditions for democracy come from Barrington Moore’s Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World (New York: Beacon Press, 1966).
It is interesting to note that scholars felt that Russia’s reform would be top-down, even in areas of economic liberalization. The nature of creating markets necessitates a bottom-up approach. However, the political history of Russia has always included reforms that were initiated by a ruling elite, even though the elite might not have control over the effects of these reforms. Yeltsin’s particular decision-making processes favored economic development, and many Russian analysts believe that his failure to use his personal authority to fight for democratic and institutional reform meant that these reforms were slow-moving and secondary to economic success. Moreover, Yeltsin was unable to reconcile the different objectives of the ruling elite during his tenure in office.

A consensus among the political elite to promote legitimate institutions makes it easier for a successful democracy to form. However, these political elites were divided in Russia at that time. Some believed that the President and Parliament should negotiate to bring about successful reforms from within. Others, including most Parliament officials, believed that the entire system needed to reform in order to bring about change. Gavril Popov, one of the political elites, argued for a radical redefinition of the President’s powers. Only through elections could change come about. In the Russian political system, since the President defines his own powers, with a new president comes a new definition of the power of the president.

While the ruling elite were debating the type of institutional reform that was needed, Russian citizens were still following the norms of the Soviet Union. There were no social groups that advocated for economic liberalization or democracy. In order to progress, U.S. administration officials argued, Russians had to develop social norms that favored capitalist development. Once these social norms were developed, more democratic reforms would then be able to develop, hopefully with less U.S. intervention. This “capitalist consciousness” would then be able to sustain Russian citizens through transition shocks, because at least the economic situation would be stable enough that Russians would not revolt. These economic cushions were especially important given the failure of the United States to help build viable, uncorrupt political institutions. Russian reformers argued that institution-building was not a high priority for the Clinton administration. However, it was not because building institutions were a low priority for Clinton, but rather that the United States underestimated the difficulty in setting up these institutions.

The Clinton administration was also stymied by different interest groups, bureaucratic challenges, and corrupt officials that did not want reformed institutions to take root in

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54 Bjorkman, 37.
55 Bjorkman, 41.
56 Gill and Markwick, 154.
57 Goldgeier and McFaul, 113.
58 Goldgeier, 115.
Russia. This could not have been solved from Washington; the particular system that arose from the ashes of the Soviet Union benefited those within Russia who controlled the most resources. The most powerful of these groups represented the banking and trading conglomerates, the oil and gas sector, the agrarian lobby, the Interior and Defense Ministries, the Federal Security Service, the federal bureaucracy, and some regional elites. These wealthy elites were able to voice their preferences because the main political actor, Yeltsin, was unelected, which meant that there were few checks on his power. Without elections, individuals could not compete with the associations representing the interests of powerful economic actors.

No matter what type of reform Yeltsin proposed, these special interest groups had halted progress for two reasons. First, if Russia continued to have vague laws regarding economic issues, these organizations could continue to cheat the system and make more money. Second, these groups believed that their current ability to extract financial advantage was fitting revenge for the corrupt behavior of Soviet officials in the past.

President Clinton underestimated the power of the opposition groups against Yeltsin’s proposed plans for reform. Early on, the administration was optimistic about prospects for Russian reform. Although the United States disagreed with the speed of the blitzkrieg shock therapy reforms, Yeltsin was the only person who could deliver results that mattered to the U.S. Aid packages were approved for the reforming regime, and Clinton was hopeful that in addition to promoting economic reform, Yeltsin would also institute democratic reforms. Since other reformers had high turnover within the government apparatus, Clinton hinged his entire reform promotion policy on Yeltsin’s staying power. However, the ruling elites in Russia could not come up with a consensus on political reform, so Clinton’s early policies towards Russia would continue to fail until the ruling elite was voted out of office in the upcoming elections, and new reformers took over to undertake continued reform.

Clinton’s Reaction to 1996 Parliamentary Elections and the Communist Resurgence

The first times that Russian citizens would be able to vote on the success of Yeltsin’s reforms were the parliamentary elections of 1995 and the presidential election of 1996. Although Clinton was interested in how each reform was progressing, the most important indicator of success was if Yeltsin were still in power and popular. If Yeltsin was popular, the reforms were working. If he was not, then prospects for further reform were limited. As Thomas Dine, head of U.S. Agency for International Development, asked in a testimony before Congress, “will Russia continue on the road to reform, or will it turn off and move back toward the path it had been on in its recent past?”

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59 Angela Stent and Lilia Shevtsova, “Russia's Election: No Turning Back,” Foreign Policy, No. 103, (Summer, 1996), 94.
60 McFaul, World Politics, 230.
61 Goldgeier and McFaul, 120.
62 Sarah E. Mendelson, “Democracy Assistance and Political Transition in Russia: Between
Clinton administration’s decision to support Yeltsin, who was frequently ill and prone to rash actions, was increasingly viewed as flawed. In terms of United States interests however, the alternatives to Yeltsin were much worse.

In the 1995 parliamentary elections, the Communist Party, headed by Gennady Zyuganov, captured almost a quarter of the vote. His rhetoric was fiery and intensely anti-American; he accused Yeltsin of being a puppet to the United States’ imperialistic power. Additionally, he threatened to roll back all of the “illegal” privatization reforms that Yeltsin had overseen during the past five years. The other candidate, Alexander Lebed, a former general in the Russian Army, gave speeches detailing how he would bring Russia under martial law if elected. Neither Zyuganov nor Lebed promised the types of reform that the United States wanted for a new Russia. Therefore, the only option for

Success and Failure,” International Security, Vol. 25, No. 4, (Spring, 2001), 92. Thomas Dine’s (Colgate class of ’62) testimony was given on June 13, 1996 to the Congress Committee on International Relations. He claimed in his testimony that creation of a “democratic condition” through Russia’s 2nd free national elections was something that the U.S. should support. For another opinion, see Assistant Secretary of State Strobe Talbott’s speech to the U.S.-Russian Business Council on July 11, 1996, where he warned that the U.S. should not “turn back the clock” on Russia’s future.

New York Times, The Communist Comeback, December 19, 1995. For Yeltsin’s individual reaction to the Communist victory, read the Deutsche Presse-Agentur’s article Communist victory in parliamentary vote "no tragedy". Yeltsin says, December 20, 1995. Yeltsin was not concerned with the victory; in this article, he outlines that he refuses to change course on his reforms.

Goldgeier and McFaul, 145.

the U.S. was to continue supporting Yeltsin.

During the mid-1990’s, the Communist Party enjoyed a resurgence in popularity. Although the Communists had failed to save the Soviet Union, many Russian citizens supported them because they knew what to expect under a Communist regime. Moreover, the Communist Party had learned from its early mistakes and evolved into a statist, social-democratic party that reminded voters of the past glories of the USSR. Communist norms had still not been overcome, which was a large impediment to Yeltsin’s plans for reform. Under the Soviet Union, social services were provided to the citizens, and although they were not excellent, the country functioned. Under the new Russian government, basic social services were cut in order to expedite the transition to a privatized economy. Many Russians lost their savings, were unable to get adequate medical care, and police forces were as corrupt as ever. The 1995 elections revealed that a majority of Russians did not support Yeltsin’s economic reforms; the elderly disproportionately voted for the Communists, while the young voted for reform. The social costs of the transition ended up delegitimizing capitalism for those citizens who felt economically disenfranchised. A return to the normalcy of the Soviet Union was an

63 Lilia Shevtsova, Yeltsin’s Russia: Myths and Reality (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 1999), 177.
64 Refet Kaplan, Ambassador to Russia sees emergence; Crime, corruption can be overcome, Yeltsin a key, says returning Pickering, Washington Times, November 15, 1996.
65 Stent and Shevtsova, 97.
attractive option for many Russians who were disenchanted with the current failing model for reform.

The United States had limited options to continue helping Yeltsin, especially considering the policies that he enacted immediately before the 1996 election. Specifically, the United States did not criticize Anatoly Chubais’ “loans-for-shares” program, which allowed for a massive insider sale of state properties to oligarchs that were friends of the Yeltsin administration. This plan was designed to gain oligarchic support for Yeltsin’s re-election campaign, as the oligarchs could only take control of the properties after the 1996 election. Although the Clinton administration disagreed with this policy, citing it as “bad politics,” they continued to give Yeltsin as much support as possible. Some development of democratic norms had taken place under Yeltsin, but further progress was threatened by his political missteps. The response by Western leaders was to minimize, forgive, or overlook Russian inability to fully establish democratic norms. The unintended consequences of the West’s tacit approval of incomplete reform however was the weakening of the same norms the West sought to promote in Russia.

In contrast to the West’s rosy view of Russian reform initiatives, the Russian voters concentrated on the negative side of the story. They viewed loans-for-shares as a corrupt program to consolidate the control of the rich, while at the same time depriving them of the collective assets average citizens had earned during the Soviet Union. In speeches on Russia, Clinton emphasized the importance of the democratic process and how Yeltsin was a historic leader who Russia needed in this time of change. Privately, Clinton was offering political advice to Yeltsin, who at the time of the election had a 6% approval rating. He campaigned aggressively, promising more extensive economic and political reforms to woo voters. In addition to more reforms, he also promised a significantly increased government spending, a promise he was not able to keep.

On March 18th, 1996, a warning from a source in the Kremlin detailed a Yeltsin plan to postpone the elections for two years. The Clinton administration reacted immediately, but they had few policy options that could deter Yeltsin from postponing the election. Consequently, President Clinton sent Yeltsin a personal message asking him to respect the Russian constitution, but by his own admission, Yeltsin was ambivalent about democracy because he was fearful that he would lose. Yeltsin truly believed that he was “chosen” to lead his nation until his reforms were completed. In one thousand years of Russian history, no leader has left office except by death or forced retirement. However, by the end of the day, Yeltsin appeared to have decided to not postpone the election, and

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68 Goldgeier and McFaul, 147.
69 Mendelson, 91.
blamed the plan on high-level advisors in the Kremlin. This concerned the Clinton administration, not because of the reversal in policy, but because Yeltsin had advisors in his “reform” government who would not uphold the constitution. When the election occurred, Yeltsin won the first round, and was in a run-off with Zyuganov. He won with 53.82% of the vote in the run-off election, and the Clinton administration was relieved.\(^5\)

How did Boris Yeltsin win the election? He won for a combination of reasons. First, his victory was the result of an estimated $700 million to $1 billion dollar campaign. During the election, Russia’s debt grew by $16 billion, part of which can be attributed to Yeltsin’s campaign expenditures, which he appropriated from the treasury. He was heavily bankrolled by the same oligarchs who stood to benefit from his “loans-for-shares” plan. Although the amount that the oligarchs claimed to have put up for his election is exaggerated, their funding provided the ability for Yeltsin to connect with voters. Yeltsin’s team used the newest communications technology and his face was constantly on television.\(^6\) This was critical to his success, as a large majority of the Russian population receives their news from television.\(^7\) By spending large amounts of money to gain exposure and name recognition, Yeltsin was able to put the other candidates at a disadvantage.

Yeltsin’s win was also attributable to smart political decisions. After the first round of elections, where Lebed received the third highest number of votes, Yeltsin drafted him for his campaign. He promised Lebed a position in his cabinet if elected, and as a result, Lebed campaigned heavily for Yeltsin.

The final and most important reason for Yeltsin’s success was his promise for stability. The message that Zyuganov was spreading was not just in opposition to Yeltsin, but called for a return to an entirely different system of government and economics. This return would potentially trigger the same results as had happened in 1917-backlash against the revolutionary members of the governing elite. Yeltsin urged the Russian population to vote for the future and not judge the very young Russian state too harshly.\(^8\) In addition, Yeltsin promised to keep the country on the same track with reforms, and argued that going back would not only be disastrous politically, but would undermine all of the progress made in the previous five years.

**Economic Depression of 1998**

After Yeltsin’s election victory, the Clinton administration was optimistic about the future of Russian society. Now that campaign promises and political maneuverings were out of the way for at least another four years, Yeltsin could return to improving the economy. He appointed Chubais deputy prime minister in charge of the economy and Boris Nemtsov, a reformer from Nizhny Novgorod, as another deputy

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\(^5\) Shevtsova, 190.

\(^6\) Shevtsova, 191.

\(^7\) Brigit Beumers, *Pop Culture Russia!* (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2005).

prime minister. The Clinton administration was pleased with these appointments, labeling them “a dream team.” These new ministers were able to form a more cohesive front towards the economic future of Russia.  

There were also positive signs coming from the economy after the election. Inflation had dropped from 22% in 1996 to 11% in 1997. The Russian gross domestic product also recorded positive growth— the first time since the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, due to the “loans-for-shares” program that Yeltsin instituted during the elections, the oligarchs were becoming more adventurous in purchasing companies. There were bidding wars for most of the formerly-owned state enterprises, and the government had little power to stop the oligarchs. Yeltsin had sacrificed increased economic security for reelection. Indeed, Vladimir Gusinsky, an oligarch who wished to purchase Svyazinvest, a government telecommunications firm, was outbid in a fair process by a consortium of Western investors. Chubais was delighted that the markets were working fairly, but Gusinsky took revenge by exposing a Chubais deal to funnel the remaining money from the 1996 election to Chubais and his associates. As a result, Chubais was fighting for his career, and Russian reform was stuck in bureaucratic infighting.

In most societies, the battle for economic advantage often spills over into the political arena. In Russia in the mid-90s, the oligarchs, after consolidating their economic power, were trying to establish rules that would give them increased control over the Kremlin. Gusinsky and Berezovsky, two of the most powerful oligarchs, wanted a government that would respond to oligarchs’ needs first. Chubais and Nemtsov wanted to limit the influence of business in government. This particular disagreement was new for Russia, reflecting the new social classes that had risen as a result of privatization and liberalization. Moreover, this political battle was essential, otherwise the oligarchs would continue to consolidate power at the expense of a weakened government.

During these clashes with the oligarchs, Chubais came up with the idea to promote short-term bonds, called gosudarstvennye kratkosrochnye obligatii, or GKOs, to pump needed cash into the economy at a time when inflation was low and the ruble was stable. GKOs, which matured in three to six months, were originally established in 1995 by the Russian Finance Ministry, but had been unpopular because of the volatility of the Russian economy. Foreigners especially purchased these bonds; some economists estimated that foreigners owned nearly two-thirds of all stocks traded in Russia.

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82 Goldgeier and McFaul, 215.
83 Shevtsova, 219.
84 Goldgeier and McFaul, 217.
in 1997. These bonds, like other Russian securities, were very popular with foreign investors; some economists estimated that foreigners owned nearly two-thirds of all stocks traded in Russia in 1997. However, these GKOIs had the unfortunate effect of propping up an overvalued ruble, which made it difficult for manufacturers to compete globally. Consequently, Russian banks were unwilling to give out loans to these non-competitive corporations, especially when the alternative of buying GKOIs netted great returns in three to six months. When Chubais endorsed these GKOIs, he did not believe that they would be as popular as they were; and did not contemplate the unintended consequence of stifling the corporate debt markets.

When the Asian financial crisis occurred in October 1997, foreigners rushed to pull their capital out of any overvalued and risky currency, including that of Russia. The Kremlin had to dip into more than $1 billion in reserves to stabilize the ruble. However, the negative impact on the Russian economy was compounded by the decreased demand for Russian oil from Asia. Consequently, oil prices dropped more than 40%, and the Russian government went from a multi-billion dollar surplus to a huge deficit in only a few months. This crisis unraveled the potential economic reforms proposed by Chubais.

The United States did not believe that the Russian economy would be severely impacted by the Asian financial crisis; Russia’s economy was not as integrated with the world because of their internal privatization obligations. This failure to recognize the global impact of the crisis left the Clinton administration to figure out how they could save Russia’s economy and continue the positive reforms that had emerged since 1991. Using funds from the IMF, Russia was able to secure a $22.6 billion emergency financing package. With this influx of cash, Russia was able to avoid a major political and economic catastrophe.

However, this positive moment was a fleeting one. Foreign investors viewed Russia’s need for cash as a signal of the weakness of the economy, and demanded the money from their bonds.

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85 Anders Aslund, Building Capitalism: The Transformation of the Former Soviet Bloc (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 409. This statistic refers to the specific period between early 1997 and May 1998. On May 18, the government halted all payments of GKOIs, which made foreign investors more nervous about investment prospects in Russia. For a more economically-driven argument, read Hanson, 1151.

86 Goldgeier and McFaul, 218. It eventually was revealed that the GKOIs were not guaranteed by the Kremlin, but the perception from both Russian investors and foreign investors was that these bonds were less risky than investing directly in Russian business. Due to the overvalued ruble, Russian domestic industry had ground to a halt, making it difficult for investors to invest in anything but natural resources and GKOIs.

87 Hanson, 1151.
88 Goldgeier and McFaul, 219.
90 Goldgeier and McFaul, 221.
back. The banks in Russia could not keep up with all the demands for repayment, considering that they also had large reserves of these bonds as well. As a result, many banks shut down. The Kremlin then devalued the ruble, imposed a debt moratorium and restructured all government bonds.\textsuperscript{92} The United States did not support this decision, but Clinton had to endorse them, as a show of support for Yeltsin. During the economic downturn, Russia’s vast oil resources were tapped by policy makers to keep both banks and private enterprises still running, however, when world oil demand and prices dropped, Russia was unable to support the entire economy from natural resources.\textsuperscript{93} All of the reforms that had worked so successfully prior to the crisis had been nullified.

The crash had huge repercussions politically for Boris Yeltsin. The reformers that had been working in Yeltsin’s government for years were removed, including Gaidar, Chubais, and Nemtsov, and they were banned forever from running for public office.\textsuperscript{94} Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov was appointed by the Duma as prime minister on September 11, 1998, and he formed a coalition government of centrists, liberals, communists, and liberal democrats.\textsuperscript{95}

The economic crash also exposed many weaknesses within Gaidar’s and Chubais’ strategy of Blitzkrieg economic reform. Many Western regimes attributed the failures of Russian policy makers after 1994 to lack of macroeconomic financial discipline. While the reformers were able to initially stabilize inflation and the ruble, they were unable to impose financial discipline on producers. Moreover, there were other institutional weaknesses in the financial sector that had yet to be reformed. Tax rules until then had provided incentives for producers to barter rather than use money, a holdover from the Soviet system. Additionally, the prevailing Western belief was that the Kremlin did not carry through the reform process to its fullest extent. Scholars believe that many reforms were held up by Gaidar and Chubais’ opposition, resulting in a continued lack of institutional stability, thus limiting Russian economic growth and stability.\textsuperscript{96}

The effects on the Russian population were longer lasting. After the financial crisis, the concepts of democracy, reform, and liberalization were discredited in the minds of the population. Russians went back to preferring more government intervention in their lives and creating a “Russian Way” towards economic and political stability. Additionally, the financial collapse triggered theories of Western conspiracies against Russia.\textsuperscript{97} Reform was widely been perceived as failure; most Russian citizens were now no better off than they were immediately following the collapse of the Soviet Union.

\textsuperscript{93} Hanson, 1156.
\textsuperscript{94} Goldgeier and McFaul, 233.
\textsuperscript{95} Hanson, 1153.
\textsuperscript{96} Hanson, 1156-1157.
\textsuperscript{97} Goldgeier and McFaul, 244.
Yeltsin’s Appointment of a Successor and Resignation

After Yeltsin had recovered politically from the economic crisis, he was able to remove Primakov from the prime minister post, and appointed Sergei Stepashin, a more loyal reformist. Primakov was removed because of his accusations that the American “darlings, the young reformers” were responsible for the economic crash. Stepashin was viewed as more supportive of reforms; however, just weeks later, Yeltsin removed Stepashin and appointed a previously unknown KGB man, Vladimir Putin, as the prime minister and his future successor. Until then, Putin had served in East Germany and as a technocrat in St. Petersburg. He was still relatively unknown, and Russians were skeptical of this seemingly non-democratic transition of power.

Ten days prior to New Years Day 2000, Yeltsin interrupted Putin at a routine meeting to notify his successor of his impending resignation. Yeltsin claimed that this early resignation would give Putin a chance to get ahead in the campaign cycle. On New Year’s Eve, he recorded a dramatic address where he asked the Russian people to forgive him for his resignation. After being President of Russia for close to a decade, Boris Yeltsin was removing himself from power.

Conclusions

Immediately after the Soviet Union disbanded, Boris Yeltsin committed to making sweeping reforms in Russia. Initially, the Bush administration was wary of Yeltsin’s commitment, and consequently, they did not assist him. Yeltsin was most concerned with helping the economy transition from a command economy to a market economy and these reforms, known as shock therapy, were some of the most controversial. However, Yeltsin did not push for any political reforms to accompany his economic reforms, besides those that would allow him to push through his shock therapy plan more quickly.

Yeltsin and his main advisors viewed Blitzkrieg reform as the only way to successfully transform the economy. Yeltsin and Gaidar presented their reforms all at once and pledged to complete them quickly. This brashness surprised and angered Yeltsin and Gaidar’s opponents, who were still recovering from the shock of the fall of the USSR. These reforms had a polarizing effect, and both sides jockeyed for power. Yeltsin won the struggle, however, he spent much political capital doing so, which weakened his reelection prospects. Moreover, it was apparent that the Kremlin preferred to let Yeltsin’s personal charisma push through reforms, rather than making any significant reforms in the political arena.

Blitzkrieg reform can only succeed if it is consistent within the context of the political situation. Yeltsin deemphasized political reform, instead trying to solely implement economic reform to achieve results. Because these

98 Goldgeier and McFaul, 244.
Blitzkrieg reforms were not consistent with the poorly established political norms and institutions; these reforms did not last. Yeltsin and Gaidar mistakenly believed that the Russian population would embrace these reforms and be able to adapt to the new, volatile economy with few problems. However, most Russians were not being paid for their work, prices for basic goods were too high, and as a result, most Russians were disenchanted with the reforms. They equated the failure of these new reforms to the failure to create democracy.

Although Yeltsin and Gaidar had the support from Western nations, particularly the United States, they were unable to use this support to help the reforms. The Bush administration refused to intervene. The Clinton administration, while supportive, supported Yeltsin himself, believing him to be the embodiment of Russian reform. This strategy was flawed. By supporting only Yeltsin, the U.S. was unable to promote Russian democratic reform. Institutions were weak, but short of continuing to give loans, the U.S. was not in a position to promote particular types of reform. What the U.S. did advocate was slowing down the Blitzkrieg shock therapy reforms to a more Fabian level. What they should have advocated was not slowing down reforms, but rather a simultaneous promotion of democratic ideals and institutions.

Boris Yeltsin’s Blitzkrieg reforms were mostly failures. They failed because a corresponding level of political reform did not accompany the quick economic reforms. This greatly undermined the potential for these shock therapy reforms to succeed. The United States contributed to this failure by refusing to encourage necessary political reforms. The final result of these poorly executed reforms was the disenchantment with liberal democracy in the minds of the Russian people.

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