Nothing Succeeds like Access?
NGO Strategies toward Multilateral Institutions

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Abstract: Despite a large literature on international nongovernmental organisations (NGOs), we still know relatively little about their nature as strategic actors. This paper addresses this gap, arguing that a key determinant of NGOs’ strategies toward multilateral institutions in particular is their level of formalisation. NGOs’ choices over both organisational structure and strategy toward multilateral institutions reflect their level of commitment to being a social movement organisation. Some NGOs bureaucratise their organisations and seek insider access to (and influence in) multilateral institutions, while others reject formalisation as betraying the social movement network ethos and inviting co-option. Drawing on an original database, this paper demonstrates that NGOs adopting formal bureaucratic structures are more likely to engage in insider strategies—i.e., lobby and seek accreditation at multilateral institutions—than those maintaining informal coalitional structures, regardless of these NGOs’ budgets, age, or ideology. This finding gives us new insight into the divisions within global civil society and the limited prospects for cooperation between two sets of actors central to emerging forms of global governance.

Keywords: NGOs, NGO strategies, social movements, international institutions, global governance
How international nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) engage multilateral institutions will significantly affect the evolution of global governance in the twenty-first century. The population of international NGOs has exploded in the past thirty-odd years, from under 5000 in the early 1970s to over 30,000 today. Many NGOs command considerable material resources, and can exert strong pressure on both governments and international institutions to alter policies and practices regarding the environment, human rights, and other issues on the international agenda. Multilateral institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, World Trade Organisation (WTO), and the UN system represent the natural targets for NGOs with global operations and ambitions. Yet we still know relatively little both about the relationship between NGOs and multilateral institutions and more generally about NGOs as strategic actors.

Multilateral institutions seem to present a conundrum for NGOs. While we might expect a certain affinity—global institutions as natural interlocutors for an emerging global civil society—the history of NGO protests against the WTO, IMF, and other institutions suggests otherwise. To some extent the tension involves NGOs’ uniform dislike of the ‘neoliberal globalisation’ they perceive these institutions to uphold. But at a deeper level it involves a fundamental divide among NGOs themselves as to whether multilateral institutions represent an opportunity to be embraced or an enemy to be vilified. Why do NGOs that share concerns that these institutions enhance corporate power, weaken social standards, and increase international inequality pursue markedly divergent strategies toward them?

This divergence is not easily explained in the international relations and social movement literatures, which emphasise structural conditions and incentives as determining NGO strategies toward governing authorities. A standard expectation is that gaining privileged access to

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1 Yearbook of International Organisations 2006.
policymakers is the best strategy for groups to influence the policy agenda (Jenkins 1983; Jordan & Maloney 1997; Zald & McCarthy 1987), suggesting NGOs should individually and collectively pursue ‘insider strategies’ of lobbying and accreditation or a more mixed strategy that also includes protest. Yet many groups engage only in protest, which is not only less successful but may also weaken their position in the competition for scarce resources—and may undercut the activities of their coalition partners.

To solve this puzzle, this paper argues that NGO strategies toward multilateral institutions reflect their relative commitment to the organisational principles of social movements. Some NGOs look and act like interest groups: they bureaucratise their organisational structures to increase the probability of achieving policy goals, whether vis-à-vis multilateral institutions or in other arenas. Others are committed to the informal, decentralised network structure of transnational social movements as an alternative, democratic model of governance. These social movement NGOs reject any strategy involving bureaucratic formalisation and being co-opted into the existing system—even though formalisation increases the probability of gaining access to and influence in multilateral institutions. These divergent attitudes and strategies indicate not so much a rational division of labour as a fundamental, principled division in global civil society that may undercut the collective policy impact of broad NGO coalitions.

The paper begins by addressing hypotheses about NGO strategies in the social movement literature, showing how a focus on structural incentives, available resources, or ideology fails to account for some groups’ strategies. The next section elaborates on the paper’s main claim—that NGOs’ level of formalisation shapes their strategies toward multilateral institutions—followed by an empirical analysis based on an original database of thirty-five advocacy groups over
the years 1996-2009, drawn from the *Yearbook of International Organisations*.\(^2\) (See appendix for full list.) Subsequently, a brief qualitative analysis of NGO strategies toward the IMF, World Bank, WTO, and OECD shows how incompatible strategies undercut broad NGO coalitions’ policy impact. The paper concludes with implications of its analysis for further research on NGOs and global governance.

**NGOs AND STRATEGIES**

Starting in the late 1980s, advocacy NGO networks associated with what would be called antiglobalisation movement began to target the IMF, World Bank, and WTO. They perceived these institutions as unaccountable overseers of a liberalisation agenda imposed by powerful states and corporations that they believed ignored global social justice, environmental protection, and other goals. This movement came to include a highly diverse population of NGOs, focusing on a variety of substantive topics—including labour, environment, development, and human rights, among others—and exhibiting range of ideological inclinations—from religious charities to anarchists. Some groups are based in the South, though Northern NGOs, with their greater access to resources and policymakers, have tended to be more prominent. Some are highly decentralised and grassroots-oriented, while others are more bureaucratic and professional.

These NGOs’ choice of strategies toward multilateral institutions—major international economic institutions as well as United Nations agencies—can be understood initially as a dichotomy: whether to exert influence inside or outside the halls of power. An insider strategy involves working within the system, and in practice takes one of two forms. NGOs can seek

\(^2\) Before 1995-1996, the *YIO* data become sparser—and fewer of the sampled NGOs existed. The units observed are the international umbrella organisations that coordinate the activities of affiliated national and local chapters. This focus addresses neither national or local affiliates of international NGOs (Greenpeace International yes, Greenpeace USA no) nor groups with no international partners and/or coordinating mechanism (e.g., moveon.org). On the global-local (or ‘glocal’) nature of international NGO networks, see Princen & Finger 1994.
accreditation to multilateral institutions, which gives them formal consultative status. The UN’s Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), the godfather of NGO-international organisation (IO) relations, as of 2009 offered consultative status to no fewer than 3187 groups. NGOs can also lobby policymakers in IO secretariats or national delegations thereto, as groups such as Oxfam and the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) have often done with World Bank and IMF officials. An outsider strategy, for its part, centers on turning public opinion against the status quo system. An outsider strategy is embodied in protest (in conjunction with networking and media strategies), as in the well-known demonstrations against the WTO in Seattle in 1999. Most NGOs employ some combination of insider and outsider strategies toward multilateral institutions, though some adopt ‘purer’ insider- or outsider-only strategies.

International relations research has addressed the relationship between NGOs and multilateral institutions from a variety of angles. Some scholars have examined NGO relations with specific international organisations (Fox & Brown 1998; Weiss & Gordenker 1996). Others have considered this relationship within the broader context of NGO-state relations (Keck & Sikkink 1998; Khagram, Riker, and Sikkink 2002) or global policy networks (Reinecke 1998; Koenig-Archibugi and Zurn 2006). Still others have sought to identify the conditions under which NGOs can influence global governance (O’Brien et al. 2000; Drezner 2002). Yet most of this work does not speak directly to the question at hand: what factors determine NGO strategies—insider or outsider—toward multilateral institutions.

The social movement literature traversing IR, comparative, and American politics, by contrast, offers initial hypotheses for NGO strategies. Two main strands of this literature have focused on the nature of the target institution and the resources available for social movement organisations (SMOs) to mobilise. The former strand focuses on political opportunity structure
(POS) (Tilly 1978; Kitschelt 1986; Tarrow 1998, 2005) and the relative probability and payoff of NGO capture of target institutions. Risse-Kappen (1995) argued that the relative centralisation of target institutions brings a tradeoff between access and impact. Centralised institutions offer the best prospect that capture would bring effective policy change in NGOs’ preferred direction, but are the most closed and thus offer the lowest probability of achieving capture. Alternatively, decentralised institutions are more accessible, but less capable of delivering effective policy change. So, the best targets for potential NGO capture are both accessible and efficacious, and the worst are neither. In the former scenario, NGOs are expected to pursue a predominantly insider strategy (accreditation/lobbying), and in the latter an outsider strategy (protest).

Broadly speaking, multilateral institutions are sufficiently accessible and efficacious to induce NGOs to pursue insider-oriented strategies. The most accessible tend to be the UN’s specialised agencies, which accredit hundreds, even thousands of NGOs. The World Bank has permitted (and solicited) ongoing NGO access to review mechanisms for its lending operations since the 1980s. The IMF and WTO have each accredited hundreds of NGOs on an ad hoc basis to participate in conferences alongside ministerial meetings, and have offered more informal access as well. Security institutions such as the UN Security Council are less accessible, though the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) does accredit many NGOs.

Multilateral institutions vary more with respect to their efficacy—i.e., the extent to which they feature binding and enforceable rules. Although the determinants of efficacy are beyond the scope of this paper, a few examples give the reader a sense of the range. Many of the most binding multilateral institutions—the IMF’s structural adjustment programs, UN Security Council resolutions, WTO panel rulings—are both effective and relatively closed. However, both

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3 On this definition, “hard” international law is most efficacious. See Abbott and Snidal 2000.
the IMF and WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body have some access points for NGOs, and other relatively effective multilateral institutions—such as the FAO and the IAEA—offer permanent consultative status. Weaker multilateral institutions such as the OECD and UNCTAD can be important norm-building and agenda-setting targets for NGOs. Ultimately, few multilateral institutions are either so inaccessible or so weak as to make protest a necessary choice.

Moreover, because international organisations like the IMF or WTO are not directly vulnerable to shifts in public opinion, a protest-only strategy—one without a corresponding insider strategy—is unlikely to directly induce policy change. IOs’ top officials are appointed by member states and accountable only them. There are high costs to removing such officials, given the delicate negotiations and intricate compromises that go into appointing them. More generally, few outside a small circle of policymakers and interested private parties are aware of the activities of most IOs, making it difficult for slogans like ‘More World, less Bank’ to resonate deeply in world public opinion. Therefore, given multilateral institutions’ accessibility and relative insensitivity to protest, incidences of non-accreditation, protest-only NGO strategies are difficult to explain as a function of political opportunity structure.

A second strand in the social movement literature focuses on the availability of material resources to social movement organisations as a determinant of strategies (McCarthy & Zald 1977). Those working within the organisational ecology literature have generally argued that, ‘under conditions of resource scarcity, SMOs are more inclined to alter confrontational tactics into more mainstream or acceptable approaches to change’.4 Resource scarcity and competition is the prevailing reality for internationally-active NGOs (Cooley & Ron 2002), and thus we would expect a general inclination toward the most cost-efficient mainstream strategy toward

4 Minkoff 1999: 1673. See also Carroll 1984; Powell and Friedkin 1987; Zald and Ash 1966.
international institutions: accreditation, which not only involves little direct expenditure of
resources but can also send a positive signal to foundations and other potential funders that an
NGO is ‘serious’ and potentially worthy of support. Yet the modal strategy among the sampled
NGOs was to avoid accreditation altogether.5

Others have suggested a positive relationship between NGO budget size and insider
strategies—i.e., the rich lobby and the poor protest. The conventional wisdom regarding interest
groups is that money buys access to policymakers, while protest, according to Lipsky (1965), is
the ‘resource of the powerless’. However, in their study of environmental groups, Dalton,
Recchia, & Rorschneider (2003) find that NGOs with larger budgets engage in more of both
types of strategies—they lobby and protest more than less well-off groups (see also Goldstone
2003). Greenpeace is a prominent example: though known in the popular imagination for the
exploits of its activists and Rainbow Warrior ship, it is first and foremost a lobbying
organisation, both at the national and international levels, deeply involved in international
negotiations such as those on climate change in Copenhagen in 2009. The statistical analysis
confirms the Dalton et al. finding that NGOs with larger budgets are more likely to pursue
insider strategies—though resources explain only some of the variation.

If structural factors are insufficient to account for NGO strategies, a potentially relevant
unit-level attribute is NGO ideology. Dalton (1994) has shown that environmental NGOs engage
in ‘ideologically structured’ action, selecting strategies at least in part based on deeply held
principles. Here we might distinguish between what Scholte (1999) calls reformists, which
pursue incremental change, and radicals, which pursue structural change. Although Scholte
suggests we cannot assume a correspondence between means and ends, we might expect

5 See Figure 1 in the Supporting Information for descriptive statistics on accreditation.
reformist NGOs to be more likely to pursue insider strategies than radicals. And indeed there is a fair degree of qualitative evidence that more radical NGOs do avoid cooperative engagement with international organisations (see ____), though the quantitative evidence for this proposition is weaker. As such, other factors are needed to explain the broader range of NGO strategies—especially those focused on protest.

**FORMALISATION AND NGO STRATEGY CHOICE**

This paper’s argument is that NGOs’ level of formalisation shapes their strategies toward multilateral institutions: NGOs with more formalised organisational structures are more likely to pursue insider strategies, and those with less formalised organisations are less likely to do so. The underlying rationale appears to be an inverse relationship between NGOs’ level of formalisation and commitment to the social movement ethos: an NGO’s choice to organise itself with a higher level of formalisation reflects a low level of commitment to social movement organisational principles of decentralisation and informality, and vice versa. Highly informal NGO networks tend to have specifically *organisational* objections to insider engagement of multilateral institutions.

This argument begins from a Weberian definition of formalisation as bureaucratisation: the creation of decisionmaking hierarchies and rules distributing authority among an NGO network’s international umbrella and national and local-level affiliates. Highly formalised

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6 Scholte also notes a third category, “conformists” (e.g., business associations), who like reformists are inclined to work through formal channels of influence. See also Winston 2001.

7 International NGOs often have a three-tiered structure—an international umbrella, national affiliates, and subnational/local affiliates—and vary in which level they vest with greatest authority. Because NGOs are rarely born international, but rather develop over time mechanisms of coordination among distinct national and/or local affiliates, the default is to retain authority at lower levels and make decisions regarding the international coordination in a deliberative or consensual manner. National and local affiliates of international NGOs are almost invariably formalized organisations in and of themselves, because most countries legally require all organisations to
NGOs like Amnesty International or the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC, previously the ICFTU) vest their international umbrellas with relatively strong executive offices that oversee the activities of national and local affiliates. Less formalised counterparts like the People’s Global Action (PGA) and Association for the Taxation of Financial Transactions to Aid Citizens (ATTAC) avoid centralised, rule-bound coordination among, explicitly rejecting the establishment of organisational structures that might resemble a hierarchical global bureaucracy and representation of affiliates. Friends of the Earth International (FOEI) and the Third World Network (TWN) fall somewhere in between. (See Table 1.)

[TABLE 1 HERE]

The literature has addressed formalisation, suggesting SMOs that begin as decentralised networks, such as the pro-choice movement in the United States or anti-landmines movement internationally, have incentives to create formal, bureaucratic organisations rather than retain their informal, mass-movement character. Minkoff (1999), among others, has argued that retaining an informal, social movement structure is irrational because informal SMOs have a higher death rate.8 International NGOs have strong incentives to gain the favor of both governments and grantmaking foundations that are a major source of resources; although they have a variety of criteria on which they judge NGOs’ worthiness, they tend to prefer organisations with traditional bureaucratic structures—especially professional managers and effective and transparent procedures for managing resources (Minkoff 1999; Staggenborg 1988; Jenkins 1985). Yet if resources are necessary for survival, and bureaucratisation is a possible

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8 See also Kriesi (1996). However, Hannan and Freeman (1984) argue, “organisations rarely make fundamental [structural] changes successfully,” suggesting SMOs might die if they formalize. Others have argued the formalisation choice is a matter of inherent preference: Staggenborg (1988) argues movement entrepreneurs inherently prefer informal organisations; McCarthy and Zald (1977) claim they prefer bureaucratic organisations.
precondition to attain resources, then the persistent informality of PGA and ATTAC as well as other networks like them is puzzling.

The standard, but ultimately problematic, premise in this literature is that SMOs make decisions about organisational structure and strategy toward target institutions with reference to the goal of maximizing policy impact.9 This ‘rational adaptation’ assumption is not obviously controversial: according to Risse-Kappen (1995: 26), “‘clever’ transnational actors adapt to the [target] structure to achieve their goals”.10 Multilateral institutions, following the general standards established by ECOSOC, give preference to formalised NGOs. ECOSOC’s traditional guidelines—developed primarily for labour groups, the main civil society ‘partners’ until the proliferation of environmental, human rights, and other NGOs after the 1970s—were roughly similar to most national laws regarding incorporated nonprofit organisations: an established headquarters, an administration, authorised representatives, a policymaking body, and a presence in at least two countries (Willets 1982). ECOSOC has adapted these guidelines in recent years to respond to the growing size and diversity of the international NGO sector. These additional standards more directly encourage formalisation: to receive accreditation, NGOs should now exist for more than two years, ‘have a democratic decisionmaking mechanism,’ and draw most if not all of their budgets from affiliates and members, not governments.11 Yet contrary to the rational adaptation premise, a significant element of the NGO population ignores both IO guidelines and structural incentives to formalise and pursue insider strategies.

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9 This premise likely explains why this literature addresses over-time rather than cross-sectional variation in SMO categories: it assumes SMOs with similar policy goals respond in the same way to changes in incentive structures.

10 In their study of institutional isomorphism, Powell & DiMaggio (1983) describe the mimetic, normative, and coercive mechanisms by which organisations adapt their structures to their environment to enhance their capacity to achieve their goals (primarily survival and resource acquisition). Krasner (1995) argues that nonstate actors must conform to the (hierarchical) organisational structures of their more powerful target institutions.

11 These are ECOSOC’s organisational requirements for NGOs to gain accreditation; groups must also clear procedural hurdles to gain consultative status. For both sets of rules, see United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Nongovernmental Organisations Section, <http://www.un.org/esa/coordination/ngo/> (last accessed April 5, 2010).
This article’s conjecture is that these NGOs’ seemingly self-defeating choice of the outsider strategy derives from a stronger commitment to informality and decentralisation, and a rejection of the bureaucratisation of their networks that an insider strategy would require. Alternatively, NGOs that are highly formalised are more inclined to lobby or seek accreditation at multilateral institutions, specifically because they are less concerned about the social movement ethos than about policy impact. In cases of NGO engagement of multilateral institutions, pathways to insider status (i.e., accreditation and lobbying) hinge on NGOs’ capacity to name representatives and multilateral institutions’ greater accessibility to bureaucratised NGOs—both more available for formalised NGOs than their informal counterparts.

This argument departs from two standard premises about SMO strategy. First, while all NGOs are purposive, goal-seeking actors, they are not necessarily ‘influence maximisers’. The assumption that advocacy organisations structure themselves to maximise their likelihood of exerting influence, and adapt to their environment as necessary or expedient, is often inaccurate. Second, NGOs do not only have substantive policy goals such as debt relief or environmental protection—they also have *procedural* goals, namely the promotion of inclusive, democratic decisionmaking. Many NGOs value the decentralised, localist, egalitarian nature of their networks as an exemplar for the sort of direct democracy they want to see in global governance. For many, formalisation of their international umbrella structures would be inimical to this sort of democracy.

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12 This claim distinguishes this paper’s argument from Naoi and Krauss (2009), who retain the influence maximizing premise in arguing that NGOs’ organisational structures shape their lobbying strategies toward governments.

13 Some have noted that NGOs themselves often lack transparency in decisionmaking and allocation of resources. Several larger, more formalised NGOs—such as Greenpeace International, Amnesty International, and Transparency International—created and circulated in June 2006 an accountability charter to push the broader international NGO community toward more internal transparency in their operations. On accountability within NGO networks, see Fox and Brown 1998.
For example, People’s Global Action professes overt hostility to global bureaucracies like the WTO it claims to be undermining localist democracy. Among the PGA’s hallmarks are three principles connecting its philosophy regarding engagement of international organisations, protest, and organisational structure (i.e., strategy and formalisation), including

- A confrontational attitude, since we do not think that lobbying can have a major impact in such biased and undemocratic organisations, in which transnational capital is the only real policymaker;
- A call to direct action and civil disobedience, support for social movements’ struggles, advocating forms of resistance which maximise respect for life and oppressed peoples’ rights, as well as the construction of local alternatives to global capitalism;
- An organisational philosophy based on decentralisation and autonomy.¹⁴

These principles inform a Noah’s ark strategy: build an alternative-model-in-waiting uninfected by the wickedness of the existing system, and try to bring the rains that will wash this system away. Thus the PGA and others created the World Social Forum, whose charter describes it as ‘a plural, diversified, non-confessional, non-governmental and non-party context that, in a decentralised fashion, interrelates organisations and movements engaged in concrete action at levels from the local to the international to build another world’.¹⁵ Maintaining the integrity of this ark—the social movement network—is paramount, regardless of its actual policy impact.

Not all international NGOs are as committed to decentralisation and informality. WWF, Oxfam, and Amnesty International have extensively bureaucratised their international umbrella

¹⁴ PGA expands on its organisational principles by declaring, “The organisational philosophy of the PGA is based on decentralisation and autonomy. Hence, central structures are minimal… The PGA does not have and will not have a juridical personality… In keeping with PGA’s philosophy, all communication processes will be diverse, decentralized, and coordinated… The PGA will not have any resources. The funds needed to pay the conferences and the information tools will have to be raised in a decentralized way.” See Peoples’ Global Action Hallmarks, <<http://www.nadir.org/nadir/initiativ/agp/en/index.html>> (last accessed April 5, 2010).

organisations. They did so not to reject social movement principles, but rather viewed formalisation as expedient for advancing their policy goals. All these groups—formalised ones like WWF and informal (or anti-formal) ones like PGA—share a motivation to change the nature of global governance in their desired direction, and sometimes they share quite similar policy goals. The main difference, at least as it applies to strategies toward multilateral institutions, is that WWF was willing to sacrifice its social movement origins, while PGA remains unwilling to make this sacrifice—despite strong incentives to do so.

This argument begs two questions. The first involves the order of causation: how do we know NGO decisions regarding formalisation are not a response to, rather than a determinant of, available strategy options? Surely the causal arrow does move in both directions: many NGOs do adapt to their strategic environment (Krasner 1995). However, multilateral institutions’ formalisation standards are nonbinding constraints on NGO strategy. If ECOSOC standards were binding, an NGO’s accreditation-oriented strategy would be associated with formalisation by definition. But the standards are merely guidelines, specifically for accreditation. Many international NGOs—such as Friends of the Earth International and the Third World Network—have formal accreditation at ECOSOC despite having comparatively low levels of formalisation. The IMF and World Bank offer ad hoc accreditation at meetings with few specific formalisation requirements. Although multilateral institutions give NGOs incentives to formalise, they do not make formalisation a necessary condition to pursue either accreditation or lobbying.

Second, perhaps social movement-oriented NGOs do not have a primordial inclination to organise as such, but simply respond to other incentives or pursue other goals that make protest an optimal strategy. It is important to recognise that NGOs simultaneously pursue multiple goals, and that a poor strategy for achieving policy impact may achieve other goals, such as coalition
maintenance. Broad networks of NGOs are often held together by a shared critique of an established authority, even as they have a variety of ideas of what to replace that authority with. Protest can also help NGOs retain their ‘street cred’—to demonstrate through outsider strategy mobilisation that they have not been co-opted (Fox and Brown 1998; O’Neill 2004).

But the point here is specifically to explain strategy choices vis-à-vis multilateral institutions. All NGOs face the same formalisation-oriented incentive structures toward multilateral institutions, and all have incentives to formalise as a means to improve chances for organisational survival. It would be odd to start from the premise that NGOs prefer to maintain network structures and outsider reputations rather than maximizing their probabilities of policy impact, resource acquisition, and survival. Moreover, some NGOs’ choice to pursue only an outsider strategy is not obviously part of a coordinated, good-cop bad cop strategy with more formalised NGOs. Not only do more formalised NGOs themselves do this on their own—i.e., protest as well as pursuing accreditation and lobbying—but at times those NGOs refusing insider strategies end up undercutting those that do. The more violent activities of radical groups like the Black Bloc undermine the credibility of mainstream NGOs, just as calls for the abolition of the World Bank undercut the strategies of those working with the Bank to improve its environmental record or democratic accountability. NGOs working toward similar substantive goals have very real problems coordinating strategies.16

DATA AND RESULTS

This paper’s central hypothesis is that highly formalised NGOs are more likely to pursue an insider strategy—to seek accreditation at multilateral institutions and/or lobby their

16 On the relative compatibility of different NGOs’ insider and outsider strategies, see Weinberg 2003.
policymakers—and NGOs with a lower level of formalisation to avoid insider strategies. To test this hypothesis, the sample data were pooled, generating 443 observations with the NGO-year as the unit of analysis. The sampled NGOs were selected based on two primary criteria set by the *Yearbook* itself: they had to have a recognised international umbrella structure and sufficient data on the attributes of interest. Additionally, I sought to ensure many of the largest, most influential NGOs were included and sufficient variation on the primary explanatory variables.

**Dependent variable**

For NGO strategies, I recorded whether they engaged in lobbying and/or protest as well as the number of multilateral institutions they were accredited to. I initially coded these dependent variables four different ways: binary variables (0=no, 1=yes) for accreditations, lobbying, and protest, and total accreditations as a continuous variable. Although I estimated models using each of these dependent variables (see Supporting Information), I focused on the binary variables for accreditation and lobbying. On the accreditation side, the continuous variable was problematic in determining the meaning of intervals—specifically, whether each additional accreditation connoted a commensurately higher degree of ‘insiderness’. In de-emphasizing the protest variable, I was guided by the Dalton et al. (2003) finding that wealthier NGOs engaged in more of both types of activities—lobbying and protest. For my purposes, the lobby variable was better for separating out dominant and secondary strategies.

The dependent variable used in the regression analysis, the *strategy index*, combines the dummy variables for accreditation and lobbying. The purpose was to create a single measure

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17 While an NGO with five accreditations might be more of an insider than an NGO with one, it is harder to assume that an NGO with nine (or twenty-five) accreditations is commensurately more of an insider than the one with five.
18 Groups pursuing predominantly accreditation and lobbying might participate in protests as a secondary activity—perhaps to maintain solidarity and coordination with other groups. Those whose main strategy was protest, by contrast, were not expected to lobby as a secondary activity.
capturing the overall intensity of NGOs’ (dis)inclination to pursue an insider strategy—the idea being that those pursuing both lobbying and accreditation, or neither, show a stronger respective tendency toward insider or outsider status than groups pursuing a mixed strategy (accreditation or lobbying).\(^{19}\) A mixed strategy was the most frequently observed, with 235 out of a total of 443 cases (53 percent). Of the remaining observations, 143 (32 percent) involved a strong insider strategy (both accreditation and lobbying) and 65 (15 percent) saw no insider strategy. More generally, an accreditation strategy was more than twice as common as lobbying (79 percent to 38 percent), reflecting perhaps the former’s status as the ‘cheap’ insider strategy.

*Explanatory variables*

To test the hypothesis that NGOs’ level of formalisation shapes their choices over strategy, I gathered data on formalisation as well as two three variables drawn from the literature—NGO budgets, age, and ideology—expected to play a major role in strategy choice.\(^{20}\) NGO annual budgets and age are variables pertaining to the resource mobilisation approach: that richer and/or more established groups would be more naturally inclined to be insiders.\(^{21}\) Both were measured as ordinal variables on a five-point scale, coded 0 to 1.\(^{22}\) The central tendency among the

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\(^{19}\) Factor analysis confirms these measures both represent the underlying dimension of “insiderness,” showing a correlation of .745. Moreover, the strategy index’s three values (0, 1, or 2) permitted use of OLS regression, which in turn facilitated inclusion of multiple control variables for the year (necessary because the data were pooled).

\(^{20}\) Issue-area focus was not included in the analysis because I was unable to establish a reliable coding scheme. Groups like Amnesty International that focus on a narrow issue are relatively rare. Near-random coding judgments were necessary in many cases because the majority of NGOs professed an interdisciplinary focus (e.g., sustainable development) covering several issue areas. This coding difficulty may not be insurmountable, but the trend seems to be for NGOs to orient their research and advocacy toward multiple issues. See Ostry 2001 and Elliott et al. 2004 for nominal categorisation of NGOs by issue and/or role in a movement.

\(^{21}\) The budget variable is a measure of resources as an attribute of the NGO rather than of the environment. As such, my analysis did not directly address the question of whether general resource scarcity affects NGO strategies.

\(^{22}\) I coded the budget and age variables as a range based on a rationale similar to that noted above regarding accreditation: intervals are tricky to interpret. An increase in age from 1 to 2 years, or in budget from $1 to 2 million, may be more significant than increases from, say, 100 to 101 (in years or millions of dollars).
sampled NGOs was toward moderate annual budgets (under $10 million) and ‘youth’ (under 20 years) (see Figures 3 and 4 in Supporting Information).

Attributions of NGOs’ ideology derived from a content analysis of their reported ‘aims’ and ‘activities’ in the Yearbook and their mission statements on their websites, distinguishing reformist statements seeking incremental changes in international institutions and radical statements calling for deep, structural changes. NGO ideology was coded continuously from 0 to 1, with higher scores indicating greater radicalism. The tendency among the sampled NGOs was toward relatively low levels of radicalism in their ideology, with comparatively few advocating a full-scale rejection of existing international political-economic structures (see Figure 5 in Supporting Information).

To measure formalisation, I used indicators available in the Yearbook to capture levels of bureaucratisation. These indicators included the presence/absence of five attributes of the NGO umbrella organisation: a headquarters, a chief executive, a board of directors, an executive committee, and a regular, periodic congress or assembly among affiliates and/or members. From these five indicators I created two indexes: an executive index and a rule index.

The executive index, coded 0 to 1, comprises two elements: the presence/absence of an international headquarters or secretariat, and the strength of the chief executive. This index

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23 The content analysis observed words identifying: (1) The perceived nature of the problem (reformist: problem, concern, difficulty, etc.; radical: structural, exploitation, oppression, etc.); (2) the nature of desired change (reformist: improve, help, aid, etc.; radical: reject, resist, overturn, etc.); and (3) the disposition toward capitalism (negative attributions of neoliberal globalisation, transnational corporations, etc.). The final coding of an NGO’s ideology in a given year reflected the mean of the individual Yearbook and website codings, weighted by the relative length of each in terms of word count.

24 Factor analysis demonstrated that the individual components of the executive and rule indexes were highly correlated, though reliability analysis showed somewhat lower alphas — .57 for the executive index, and .39 for the rule index. Meanwhile, there was only a weak correlation between the two indexes (.049), reaffirming that they measure distinct aspects of formalisation.

25 A strong chief executive was one whose title suggested a high level of executive authority, such as an executive director, secretary-general, or president. A weak chief executive suggested only minimal executive authority, such as a coordinator.
captures the relative centralisation of authority within the international umbrella organisation, both at the headquarters and the office at the top of the organisation. The rule index, also coded from 0 to 1, consists of the absence/presence of a council and/or assembly and a board of directors and/or executive committee. This index captures the presence of rules distributing authority among these groups and reinforcing the upflow of authority to the NGO’s international umbrella. The rule index permits us to evaluate NGO formalisation in a Weberian sense as bureaucratic as opposed to merely hierarchical, because the essence of bureaucratic formalisation is that executive authority is defined and reinforced by rules.

The executive and rule indexes, though somewhat crude, capture a simple but important idea: the more of these types of offices an NGO has, the more detailed and formal the rules it needs to allocate authority among them—and between the international umbrella and national local members and affiliates. By default, the fewer such offices and rules exist at the international level, the more organisational authority remains decentralised among national and/or local affiliates.

Results

I estimated four multivariate models using OLS regression to test the effect of formalisation when other causal variables were included, with the strategy index dependent variable. The first (Model 1) estimated the effects of the executive index when NGO budget, NGO age, and control variables for the year were included. The second (Model 2) estimated the effects of the rule index when each of these control variables was included. The third (Model 3) estimated the

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26 The rule index was initially with three values (0, 1, 2) and then transformed to 0 to 1 coding. A 0 corresponds to neither assembly/council nor board/executive committee; 1 to either of the two; and 2 to both.
27 The year control variables were necessary to estimate models using pooled data, to ensure that activities in particular years (such as the WTO protests in Seattle in 1999) did not skew the results.
effects both the executive and rule index and all the control variables. The final model (Model 4) repeats its predecessor but removes the insignificant year variables.

As Table 2 demonstrates, the evidence suggests NGOs’ level of formalisation does shape their strategies toward multilateral institutions. In each of the four models, the two measures of formalisation were strong and significant predictors of NGO strategies: more bureaucratic NGOs were appreciably more likely to lobby and seek accreditation at multilateral institutions than their more informal counterparts. Of the two measures of formalisation, the rule index appeared to have a greater impact on strategy, leading to the possible interpretation that NGOs which establish formal organisational rules and procedures internally are most likely to respect other organisations’ rules and procedures—including multilateral institutions’ rules for NGO access. But the strength of the executive index also suggests a consistency in NGOs’ inclinations toward centralised authority, with those rejecting centralisation internally also more likely to reject association with ‘globalist hierarchies’. Bivariate regressions confirmed the robustness of these findings (see Table 1 in Supporting Information).

NGO budgets were the single strongest predictor of NGO strategies. As expected, NGOs with more resources were more likely to pursue insider strategies than those with fewer such resources. But as noted, better-endowed NGOs tend to pursue more of each type of strategy—accreditation, lobbying, and protest—suggesting that richer NGOs are simply more active activists than poorer ones, rather than pursuers of a more purely insider strategy. A simple bivariate model estimating the relationship between NGO budgets and their extent of activity provided further evidence larger budgets are closely associated with more activity of all types.  

\[ \text{To test the Dalton et al. hypothesis, I estimated a bivariate model in which the outcome variable was coded to measure the extent of activity: 0=neither lobby nor protest; 1=either lobby or protest; and 2=both lobby and protest.} \]
More generally, the presence of the budget variable in each of the four models did not quash the effect of NGO formalisation, strongly suggesting that formalisation is not simply itself a side effect of greater resources but is rather a distinct and independent determinant of strategy choice.

The age and ideology variables, by contrast, had little effect on NGO strategies. Contrary to expectations, age was (weakly) negatively associated with strategy—i.e., older NGOs were slightly less likely to pursue insider strategies. This finding suggests casts doubt on the connection between NGO survival and conventional strategies. But perhaps more surprising was consistently insignificant effect of ideology on strategy: although more radical NGOs were less likely to pursue insider strategies, the relationship was weak—which seems to contradict the findings of Dalton and Scholte (and basic intuition). A bivariate model did indicate a strong and significant negative effect of radicalism on insider strategies, suggesting the need for further work to clarify the role that ideological inclinations play on international NGO activities.

Finally, I did not test directly the effect of the nature of the target—i.e., specific IOs—due to limitations in the data. The Yearbook did not have readily available measures of accessibility and efficaciousness and, more importantly, they would only have applied to accreditation. (The Yearbook did not report which IOs the NGOs lobbied or protested.) However, a limited test of accreditation targets produced notable results. Among the 352 cases in which an NGO had at least one accreditation, 180 (51 percent) attained such accreditation only at UN agencies—i.e., not the IMF, World Bank, WTO, or OECD. A model with UN-accreditation-only as the dependent variable indicated a strong and significant (all at the .01 level) effect for all of the five primary independent variables: the executive and rule indexes as well as age showed a

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29 Kriesberg (1979), for one, argued that NGOs become more centralized as they age. By this logic, we would have expected inclusion of age in the model to reduce the strength and significance of the executive index in particular, but no such effect was clear in the results.

30 In the bivariate model with the strategy index dependent variable, the unstandardized coefficient for ideology was -.308, significant at the p<.001 level.
strong negative relationship (i.e., more formalised and older NGOs were less likely to confine themselves to accreditation at UN agencies), while budget and ideology showed a strong positive relationship (i.e., richer and more radical NGOs were more likely to seek accreditation only within the UN system). Though a full interpretation of these results lies beyond the scope of this paper, one may note that more formalised NGOs appear to seek accreditation at a broader range of multilateral institutions than those with large budgets, further strengthening the particular relationship between formalisation and a broad-based insider strategy.

**CASES: NGOs AND THE WTO, WORLD BANK, AND OECD**

Much of what is interesting about the relationship between formalisation and NGO strategies is how choices over strategy toward multilateral institutions create strains and even overt conflict among NGOs allied with one another on similar causes. This section illustrates this point through a brief discussion of how these relationships played out in particular cases. The first two support the formalisation argument, one involving the NGO coalition that protested the WTO in Seattle, and the other involving a rather different coalition that lobbied the World Bank for poor-country debt relief. The subsequent discussion considers the boundaries of this relationship.

The large coalition that engaged the WTO coalesced around a shared critique of free-trade rules run rampant. Associated NGOs claimed WTO rules could challenge valued national standards—as they had with US laws protecting endangered turtles and dolphins—and more generally reflected the agenda of large, rich-country corporations. In response, NGOs in the coalition targeted both the ministerial meetings like that in Seattle in 1999 and Cancun in 2003, as well as the WTO’s dispute-settlement mechanism more generally.
Most notable within this case is the split among NGOs with different ideas about how to engage the WTO. Labour groups such as the ICFTU (now ITUC) were perfectly happy to work within the system. It had longstanding insider status in Geneva, both through its contacts with member delegations and with the WTO secretariat directly, and its high level of formalisation allowed it to send representatives to Geneva that could legitimately claim to represent global labour interests. Long before the advent of the WTO, the ICFTU organised itself to act as an international interest group, which ultimately improved the reception it received from WTO officials and national delegations.\footnote{O’Brien et al. (2000: 84, 101) claim the WTO saw the ICFTU and other labour organisations as more legitimate representatives of stakeholding interests than other groups that did not represent a clear and specific constituency.} It remained aloof from other NGOs, enjoying its own relatively privileged status in Geneva, but was drawn into uneasy collaboration with the movement networks within the broader NGO coalition in 1998-99 by developing-country (especially Brazilian) chapters of the confederation; thereafter it voiced support for WTO reforms not limited to narrow labour concerns. At Seattle, the ICFTU did engage in the street demonstrations, but limited to its own separate, low-key rallies.

Other NGOs, including critics of global capitalism like PGA and ATTAC, protest-specialists like the Ruckus Society and Direct Action Network, and, at the radical fringe, anarchists like the Black Bloc, rejected the ICFTU approach.\footnote{The Black Bloc is so hostile to centralisation and bureaucratisation in principle that its only internal means of coordination is adoption of a common method for aggressive protest and a common dress code (anything black).} As avowedly antibureaucratic organisations, they refused to designate specific representatives to lobby on their behalf—just as they had done the previous year in their mobilisation against the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI), and its sponsor, the OECD. They criticised insider groups like the ICFTU and WWF as having been co-opted, selling their souls for entrée into an institution that was
irrevocably captured by corporate interests.\textsuperscript{33} These outsider groups focused their activities entirely on protesting the WTO, and within a couple of years had initiated the World Social Forum, their alternative model to the WTO (and the World Economic Forum in Davos).

This split did not really emerge when these groups came together in protests—except perhaps in most groups’ disavowal of violence and destruction of property—but it did affect their strategies toward the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism. Labour groups, together with some environmental groups, have viewed the DSB/AB as an opportunity: they have lobbied the WTO and its member governments to grant them \textit{amicus curiae} status, and to expand the DSB/AB’s remit to enforcing core labour and environmental standards. The movement NGOs have been bitterly critical of this move, rejecting any association with the WTO whatsoever. Some NGO activists have accused the ICFTU and (Northern) environmental NGOs of promoting regulatory imperialism, as it is developing countries that would have to adjust to higher global standards. This resistance by many of their coalition partners has hampered the labour and environmental NGOs attempts to enhance their status at the WTO.

In a second case, during the 1990s and early 2000s a network advocating cancellation of African debt engaged the World Bank and its rich country-dominated board of directors. Led by Catholic charities like Christian Aid and development groups like Oxfam, these NGOs agreed to set up an umbrella structure, Jubilee International, with a headquarters in London that, with a full-time staff of only 15-20 people and a budget of only $1-2 million per year, coordinated the mobilisation of affiliates from almost one hundred countries. The Jubilee Coalition sent representatives to lobby World Bank officials and the relatively accessible US, British, and Canadian governments, which were major players on the Bank’s Board. Although they also engaged in peaceful protests—forming a ‘human chain’ around Birmingham, England during a

\textsuperscript{33} Author interview with WWF staff member.
1998 G7 summit—Jubilee Coalition members typically shied away from confrontational strategies, and had significant influence in ultimately bringing about the cancellation of poor-country debt at the 2005 G8 summit in Gleneagles, Scotland.

But some less-formalised, allied NGOs like the Fifty Years Is Enough network and the World Development Movement were not happy about this strategy. They disliked the World Bank because of the structural adjustment policies it required as a condition for its loans, which they saw as a quasi-imperialist imposition of a neoliberal agenda on poor societies in Africa. Although the Bank was comparatively flexible regarding engaging NGOs in dialogue and even as autonomous monitors, these networks rejected the notion of working with the Bank in principle. They also criticised celebrity-activists like Bono and Bob Geldof for lobbying George Bush and other rich-country policymakers, because they thought this insider strategy reinforced and legitimated US and Western control of the Bank’s board. These other NGOs continue to advocate either disbanding the Bank or reallocating power on its board toward large developing countries like China and India that are less open to (Western) NGO access—both of which would make it harder for the insider NGOs to have the influence that they do.

These cases fit the pattern suggested by the quantitative analysis: highly formalised groups like the ICFTU pursue insider strategies; low-formalisation groups like PGA pursue outsider strategies; and semi-formalised groups like Jubilee International do some of both. But there are also cases that delimit the scope of this relationship. Highly formalised groups like the ICFTU, Greenpeace, and WWF have been vocal critics of multilateral economic institutions and frequent participants in antiglobalisation demonstrations, even if protest is not their dominant strategy. Alternatively, while there appear to be no low-formalisation groups pursuing only insider strategies, some networks do occasionally lobby. For example, in 1996 Fifty Years Is

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34 Author interview with Jubilee USA staff member.
Enough, which sought the elimination of the IMF and World Bank, temporarily complemented its outsider strategy by lobbying World Bank president James Wolfensohn to relax Bank structural adjustment conditions. This suggests protest-oriented NGOs might occasionally pursue an insider strategy toward an amenable IO—and reinforces the point that IOs encourage but do not require formalisation in their NGO interlocutors.

Yet even in international organisations comparatively open to NGO access, officials have learned the hard way to weed out groups that, if offered access, would simply bring the protest from the streets to the meeting rooms. An OECD official involved in the negotiations of the MAI, a controversial treaty that collapsed in 1998, described an encounter in which the OECD president invited protesting groups to come in and discuss the matter. Rather than act the part of insiders granted access to lobby for their policy goals, many activists jumped up on the tables and sang protest songs. Soon thereafter, the OECD established rules requiring NGOs to formalise their organisational structures as a condition for access.

**CONCLUSION**

International NGOs do not uniformly choose strategies for engaging multilateral institutions based on a motivation to maximise policy impact. They vary in their choices over insider and outsider strategies not simply in response to the nature of institutional targets, the availability of resources, or their ideology, but also as a function of their own organisational structures. As this paper has argued, formalised groups like ICFTU and Oxfam pursue insider strategies because they are willing and able to do so. Informal, social movement networks like PGA and ATTAC pursue outsider strategies largely to avoid becoming bureaucratised and co-opted.

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35 Author interview with OECD official.
This paper’s quantitative analysis builds on prior work on NGO strategies to further elucidate the conditions under which they seek accreditation, lobby, and/or protest. In particular, the analysis builds on the work of Dalton et al. (2003), showing that NGOs with a variety of issue-focuses that have larger budgets tend to engage in more of all types of activities, both insider- and outsider-oriented. If a reliable coding scheme can be established to categorise NGOs by issue area, further research might explore whether and how strategies differ among groups focusing on particular policy issues. Furthermore, even though the paper’s analysis does not find strong statistical evidence for the role of ideology or nature of target institutions in determining NGO strategies, there does seem to be sufficient reason to probe these relationships further.

More generally, the findings have implications for the study both of international NGOs themselves and of global governance. Regarding the study of NGOs, two implications seem clear. At the micro level, we need to appreciate that NGOs are not always ‘strategic’ in their choice of dominant strategies when it comes to engaging global governance. Constraints and incentive structures in the global governance environment are not necessarily strong enough to exact strict discipline on their behavior, opening up more space for different modes of preference and strategy formation—space that requires more theoretical and empirical exploration. At the macro level, the paper’s findings suggest a greater emphasis on the implications of organisational diversity and isomorphism for global governance. Much has been made about the organisational advantages of transnational networks for responding to transnational problems that defy national borders and jurisdictions (see, for example, Slaughter 2004; Reinecke 1998), but we also need to appreciate the limits of these networks’ vaunted flexibility and informality within traditional international institutional structures.
Indeed, the emergence of the term ‘global governance’ is itself reflective of these trends. The term is not simply an academic fad, but rather representative of a certain reality: the interrelated dynamics of globalisation, technological change, and proliferating nonstate actors are fundamentally challenging the twentieth-century model of interstate institutions. As this paper has suggested, multilateral institutions are on the front lines of responding to this transformation. Although they are pushing NGOs to conform to traditional modes of coordination, many if not most NGOs are seeking to move multilateral institutions toward new modes of coordination. There is no reason to assume that NGOs will win this contest, though key institutions such as the World Bank and the European Union have shown interest in the network model featuring the sort of decentralised coordination preferred by many NGOs. NGOs are not moving en masse toward formalisation—a condition that traditional multilateral institutions will themselves need to continue to accommodate.
### APPENDIX: SAMPLED NGOs (in text)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NGO</th>
<th>Year founded(^\text{16})</th>
<th>Budget (US$ millions)</th>
<th>Executive index</th>
<th>Rule index</th>
<th>Ideology</th>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>.083</td>
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<td>.67</td>
<td>.083</td>
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<td>Focus on the Global South</td>
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<td>.67</td>
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<td>Int’l Center for Trade and Sustainable Development</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>Int’l Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU)—now ITUC</td>
<td>1949</td>
<td>11.3 (1999)</td>
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<td>Jubilee Int’l</td>
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<td>.083</td>
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<td>People’s Global Action</td>
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<td>Transparency Int’l</td>
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**Note:** All figures are 2009 unless otherwise indicated.

\(^{16}\) Year refers to umbrella organisation; dates in parentheses refer to year the initial affiliate was founded.
REFERENCES


Yearbook of International Organisations (various years). Brussels: Union of International Associations.


TABLES (in text)

Table 1: Formalisation of selected NGO networks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Network</th>
<th>Headquarters</th>
<th>Chief Executive</th>
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<td>No</td>
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Table 2: NGO strategies and formalisation (multivariate)

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<td>.238***</td>
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<td>.294***</td>
<td>.288***</td>
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<td>.352***</td>
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<td>- .018</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>Year 2003</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>- .011</td>
<td>- .005</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Year 2005</td>
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<td>- .013</td>
<td>- .012</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Year 2006</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>Year 2007</td>
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<td>.016</td>
<td>.024</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Year 2008</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>Year 2009</td>
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<td>.183</td>
<td>.160</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N | 328 | 328 | 328 | 328 |
R-squared | .303 | .304 | .336 | .331 |
SEE | .270 | .270 | .264 | .260 |

Note: Figures shown are unstandardised coefficients (b); figures in parentheses are standard errors. *** p<.001